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Soviet Social Realities

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Top Incomes in the USSR: Towards a Definition of the Soviet Elite [1]

Mervyn Matthews

THE object of this article is to investigate the income and material well-being of some of the most interesting yet least studied people in Soviet Society, namely, the elite. We shall use this term to embrace, by and large, individuals who have highly responsible occupations, a great deal of political or administrative power, and a far better standard of living than most of the population. We also include the small number of people who achieve elite status by virtue of artistic or other talent.

The problems of elitism and its dynamic in any society are highly complex. They include the cohesiveness of the elite, its relations with the rest of society, mobility into and out of it, its geographic and local dimensions, change over time, etc. In the Soviet case, study of these problems is rendered more than usually difficult by dearth of information. The recent outflow of Soviet emigrants (including many white-collar workers) has, however, made matters marginally easier and prompted us to study the income aspect of elitism in a little more detail than has hitherto been considered possible. We shall attempt only a static analysis of this problem relating (unless otherwise stated) to the early seventies, but we hope to offer leads into the past which can be explored elsewhere.

It should be noted at the outset that our understanding of " elite " is wider than the common political definition. From the income point of view, as from others, there is a strong argument for treating the Com-

[1] The material presented here is part of a more general investigation of Soviet elites which we have been conducting for some time. We would like to emphasise that many of the data and findings are as yet provisional in character. The article is published by kind permission of the NATO Economic Directorate and has been revised by the author.

We have used the printed sources noted in the text together with facts gathered from 34 Soviet citizens and former Soviet citizens. Nearly all of them were still living in the USSR in 1970–72, the period to which our propositions (unless otherwise stated) refer.

Respondents were selected with some care for their apparent knowledge of the topic, our prime concern being the reliability of their information. Some 14 had direct personal connections with the elite, and most were of " professional " status.

As far as elite incomes were concerned, we asked only for facts on respondents' own earnings, or those of persons they knew very well in the USSR; this relationship had to be intimate enough to permit home visits, informal discussion of salaries, household arrangements, etc. We have taken details of not more than two " friends " from any given respondent, in addition to facts about himself, to reduce the risk of inaccuracy. Details of such " secondary benefits " as the " thirteenth month," the Kremlin ration, special supply channels, etc., have all been attested by at least one person who has personally received or seen them. No payment has been made for any of the information received. By these means, we have attempted to obtain only authentic facts from people well disposed to our study.

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munist Party elite separately from other Soviet elite groups. The so-called " power " versus " plurality " distinction has long been recognized in elite theory, but a " power elite " approach is particularly apposite in the Soviet context, where responsible, full-time Party functionaries seem to form a distinct entity in so many respects. The paucity of information and considerations of space oblige us to include the Party elite in our general treatment, though we shall refer to them specifically as the need arises.

Let us begin by considering the main factors which bear on the attainment of high income and the accumulation of wealth in the USSR. Since Soviet society is avowedly socialist, it seems logical to start with the impediments.

The first is undoubtedly the *state ideology*, which lays great emphasis on egalitarianism.[2] Long-standing social distinctions, including marked differences in consumption levels, are supposed to disappear as society moves towards communism (once proclaimed attainable by 1980, but now relegated to some unspecified time in the future). Though the authorities have been prepared at times to pursue inegalitarian policies, the ideological proposition has remained unshakeable, and has left a deep imprint on Soviet Civil Law.

The *limitations on individual earnings* are well known, and require only listing. The state is almost the only employer of labour, and most legally earned income is under some sort of government control.[3] No citizen can privately hire the labour of others for purposes of production. Buying and selling for profit are labelled as " speculation " and are punishable by law. Personal talents and skills (primarily in the arts, medicine and teaching) must normally be exercised through state-run organizations, and are rewarded at state-approved rates; the private practice which exists is subject to heavy progressive taxes reaching 70 per cent of earnings. Private accommodation should only be rented out for profit with the approval of the local soviet, and under a low rent ceiling; tax here can swallow up to 80 per cent of the takings.[4] No wonder that evasion of the regulations is frequent. Market gardening on private plots is the most common way in which individuals legally produce a commodity themselves and trade in it. The restrictions on holdings are, however, considerable, and given Soviet agricultural economics, are far from yielding large sums.[5]

[2] We use the term " state " in a general sense to cover the whole complex of Soviet administration and polity.

[3] Ignoring the problems of income from private plots, unplanned wage creep, etc. which are not of close relevance to the elite groups.

[4] V. A. Tur, (Ed.) *Spravochnik po nalogam i sboram s naseleniya* (Moscow, 1968), pp. 44–45, approximate figures.

[5] The *maximum* allowable area, according to the Collective Farm Statute of 1969, was 1·37 acres of arable land, including the household premises, and half-an-acre of irrigated land in arid regions; private livestock holding was limited basically to a couple of horned cattle, a few pigs and poultry, etc.

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Thirdly, *controls on wealth* are rather strict. Private ownership of land, natural resources, and production machinery are, of course, specifically banned. The citizen can keep as much money as he pleases at home, but moderate inflation, the risks of theft, etc., make this unattractive in the long term. The virtual devaluation of cash holdings under the December 1947 reform has never been forgotten by the public, nor repudiated by the authorities. Gold and precious stones are very hard to come by in any quantity.

There is no legal limit on personal savings in the state bank, and accounts can be opened with a minimum of formality. Yet a large balance has its drawbacks. The rate of interest is only 2–3 per cent per annum, whatever the type of account. The saver has the right to bank only "earned income," which puts a putative limit on it. A very large sum might attract the attention of the banking authorities who, if they suspect it was obtained illegally, might inform other organs. The RSFSR Civil Code contains a specific provision for confiscation in such circumstances (Article 395).[6] It is not advisable to have very large accounts in different towns, for, with the incapacitation or death of the holder, these sums would come to the notice of the authorities. The estates of deceased persons have to be officially assessed by a notary, rather as in the West. The use of false names and addresses is also somewhat risky, since savings bank officials may ask for a depositor's internal passport.

The Soviet citizen has the right to own his dwelling. The Civil Code stipulates that the Soviet family may, in normal circumstances, own a house (or flat) containing not more than 60 square metres of living space (Articles 106–110). Unpublished regulations are said to limit the height of any individual dwelling-house to one storey. Ownership of a *dacha* in the country is also permitted, though the Civil Code implies that it should only be for temporary residence. In fact, local rules may prevent the winter use of *dachas* by prohibiting stoves, etc., and many are hardly more than sheds. Private construction was inhibited by a decree of December 1960, and special provisions for confiscation of such structures built from unearned income were introduced in July 1962. The approved means of construction and ownership is now through a Dacha Construction Co-operative.[7]

If a person inherits an extra dwelling, he has to sell it; local soviets have powers of coercion, and eventually confiscation, in this respect. The practice of making gifts of such property to the state is envisaged in the law and raises no official objections.

Consumer durables may be another form of wealth. The government's long-standing policy of neglecting consumer industries means

[6] References here and below are to the *Grazhdanskii Kodeks RSFSR*, approved 11 June 1964, with modifications up to 1 Feb. 1972 (Moscow, 1972).

[7] V. I. Zamyatin, *Sbornik zhilishchnogo zakonodatelstva* (Moscow, 1963), pp. 70, 520. *Spravochnik dlya rabotnikov selskikh i poselkovykh sovetov* (Moscow, 1970), p. 37.

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that, although such objects might have great market value, they cannot easily be bought in large quantities, even by an elite. Private motor cars are, by Western standards, still few in number, and naturally have to be licensed. Possession of two or more is hardly conceivable. The prospects for private ownership of sea-going yachts or cruisers are poor, given the authorities' sensitivity about the coasts, the unavailability of sea charts, and the possible use of boats for flight abroad. Ownership of private aeroplanes (!) is specifically restricted by the Civil Code (Article 137). One does occasionally hear of rich collections of smallish objects—porcelain, ikons, stamps—in private hands. Unhappily, there have been some well-known confiscations (with the application of "speculation" charges), and a survey of Moscow second-hand shops, or perusal of adverts in the Moscow evening paper, suggests an exceptionally bare market.

The cumulative effect of these limitations is to ensure that the Soviet elite, in "capitalist" terms, if not in the context of Soviet society, is a *poor* elite. True, there are many ways of getting around the law, and the possibilities of doing so appear to improve with social position. *Some* people do have two or more dwellings, a large boat, or an invaluable collection of eighteenth-century porcelain. But spectacular American-style consumption and accumulation patterns are virtually unknown.

On the other hand, even in this unpromising legal framework, powerful factors promote the development—and well-being—of an elite group. Some are obvious, others less so. Practical Leninism was in many ways fundamentally exclusive and elitist. The centralist nature of the Soviet state, involving the concentration of immense power of political control in the hands of a small group of Party officials was the practical implication of this concept. The leadership of the Soviet Communist Party has always been, by and large, elitist in its attitudes; its very existence ensures state protection for itself and those whom it chooses to favour. Soviet Party officials are the first to benefit from this, but other important occupation groups do so as well.

The Soviet state has a range of occupations which require different skills, afford varying degrees of responsibility, and offer a ladder for advancement. Labour is still paid according to "quantity and quality," and the authorities are keenly aware of the importance of good material incentives. The need for differentials is taken firmly for granted, and only the "spread" of them has to be determined. If there is a tendency in any modern society for the most able or active people to achieve higher earnings, live better, etc., it is difficult to see why the Soviet Union should be immune from it.

On an administrative plane, the official policy towards elitism in earnings has often been positively benign. From the early thirties, for example, Stalin allowed wage differentials among workers, the general differential between workers and peasants, and the gap between

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specialists and everyone else to widen to a very inequitable degree. Khrushchev did something to reverse this policy in the mid-fifties, and evidently trimmed some of the very highest incomes, but extremes remained.

The Brezhnev period may have been characterized by a slightly more " Stalinist " approach. Some differentials have definitely been widened, and the present five-year plan envisaged a rise of the minimal wage by 17 per cent, while the average wage was to go up by 22·4 per cent. The earnings of certain " middle grade " employees were to be increased, and this may have included higher-paid managers and officials, who could hardly be mentioned directly. The so-called " economic reform," started in 1965, seems in some cases to have favoured enterprise managements relatively more than workers.[8] The long-standing special or " confidential " benefits provided for the maintenance of an elitist life-style (which we shall discuss in some detail below) have continued to be very important, and may have been extended.[9]

The tax laws favour persons in the higher income (and, indeed, wealth) brackets. Many essential consumer goods carry heavy duties—which bear heaviest on the poor. Direct (income) tax reaches a maximum of no more than 13 per cent on regular earnings, and promises have been made to abolish it altogether. Wealth is not taxed as such, and the maximum rate of death duties is only 10 per cent.[10]

Another touchstone is the secrecy which shrouds the doings of the most favoured Soviet citizens. It is noteworthy that (a) words like " elite ", " rich " are banned as a description of any Soviet social group (b) no information whatever on higher salaries is printed for open distribution (c) no official figures have so far been given for the national distribution of income, probably because this would reveal an unsocialistic degree of inequality (d) scarcely anything is printed on elite life-styles, or the benefits which an elite might enjoy (e) there is nothing nearly as comprehensive as a " Who's Who " in the Soviet Union (f) there is no popular celebrity or image-building in the Western sense, the Soviet press being, anyway, unsuited to this (g) there are no popular elite-type publications. Given the amount of discussion of pay, differentials and life-styles at lower levels, the obvious explanation lies in a complete censor's prohibition of the topic.[11] The Soviet elite is, therefore, protected from unfavourable comparison and unsympathetic comment in print.

[8] Recent trends are discussed, *inter alia*, by L. E. Kunelski, *Sotsialno-ekonomicheskie problemy zarabotnoi platy* (Moscow, 1972), p. 71.

[9] These benefits are not, incidentally, to be confused with state transfer payments, " free " education, health services, pensions, etc. An unpublished social survey is rumoured to have shown (contrary to official declarations) that rich people actually gain more than poor ones from such payments.

[10] V. A. Tur, op. cit., p. 149.

[11] Unofficial confirmation of this has, in fact, been provided by former Soviet editor L. Finkelstein, in M. Dewhirst and R. Farrell, *The Soviet Censorship* (New York, 1973), p. 56, and in as yet unpublished *samizdat* sources.

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THE problem of providing a general definition for "elites" is far from solution in sociological terms, but this has not prevented elite groups from being studied seriously and with some effect in many societies. For purposes of defining the Soviet elite, we shall use four indices. They are not altogether contiguous, but we believe they are adequate for a tentative analysis. The first two are data on income and occupation collected or calculated in the course of our study. We shall have something to say on the system of nomenclature (*nomenklatura*) or centrally controlled appointment to important posts, both inside and outside the Party; finally, we shall consider access to the confidential material benefits referred to briefly above.[12] We can then take the Soviet "elite" to be, more specifically, people who have a certain high money income, a responsible (probably nomenclature) post at an indicated level, and use of the material benefits system.

Income

As far as elite income is concerned, we could start by naming, as a working minimum, or average, any figure we please, depending on the size of the group we wish to end up with.

We could, for instance, take some multiple of the average wage of workers and employees (officially stated to be 130 rubles a month in 1972) or a multiple of the minimum wage (60 rubles a month in the same year), choosing a factor acceptable for American or some other industrialized society. We might, alternatively, arrive at a necessary minimum or average by costing a notional elite budget in Soviet prices, making due allowance for dependants. These exercises would not in themselves enable us to determine a group magnitude, because no data are published on the numbers of people who earn these figures, but this would be at least a useful start sociologically. The most satisfactory approach would be to locate relevant social boundaries first, and then find the income levels to which they corresponded, but this is quite impracticable.

In the circumstances, we started by asking ourselves what figures Soviet sociologists would themselves suggest for this study, were they able to undertake it. A 500 ruble minimum, with certain additional stipulations, was mentioned to us in private conversation. We believe,

[12] A number of other well-worn sociological yardsticks cannot be applied, through lack of information. Such personal *wealth* as there is cannot be measured at all (the contrast with the data published by the U.S. Government on Americans is striking). "*Social prestige*" is also largely unusable. It is true that since the mid-sixties interesting studies of occupational ranking have appeared, but most important elite-type positions have been excluded from them. In any case, the questionnaires have been restricted to untypical social groups like school-children, or to small numbers of workers. The Soviet elite seems to have its own favoured types of schooling, but there is not enough information available to draw any far-reaching conclusions on this. *Educational achievement* as such is not of much use for purposes of analysis, because degrees are common, if not universal, at this level. Composite measures like *political influences* and *time-use* are still largely out of reach.

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strangely enough, that the Soviet censors can also help, as they are very sensitive about this matter. They have given a clue by setting an *upper* limit for published wage studies. Since, so to speak, *na bezrybie i rak ryba*, this may be provisionally accepted as a rule-of-thumb *lower* limit for the unmentionable elite salaries. The highest figures to come to our notice in openly published discussions of wages and incomes were intervals of 300–400 rubles (V. Ya. Raitsin) and "400 rubles and over" (I. Ya. Matyukha).[13]

Actually, other pieces of evidence which we shall adduce make a figure of 450 rubles for the head of an elite household in the early seventies seem reasonable. Many of the persons holding responsible nomenclature posts would have earned this much and have been in line for at least some of the secondary material benefits. A salary of 450 rubles was about seven times the minimum wage, and three-and-a-half times the average wage; it was apparently received by a suitably small proportion of the work force. Salary structures of a few categories of persons who might, on this count, aspire to elite status, are given in tables 1–8. Some of the figures were estimated by us, others obtained, as available, from our respondents.

TABLE 1 [a]

Earnings of Party Officials

	Basic	*Extras* [c]	*Total*
First (General) Secretary of Party	900 [b]		
Secretary of Central Committee	700–800 [b]		
1st Secretary of a Union Republic (without *oblast* divisions)	600	210	810
1st Secretary of Tula Oblast	600	210	810
Secretary of Partkom, USSR Council of Ministers	500	122	622
Assistant to Member of Politburo	425	115	440
"Instructor" (Junior official) of Central Committee	290–310	105	405

[a] Source references and methodological material available on request. All income/salary figures in rubles, monthly. Rates of exchange, 1971: Official Soviet—2·16 rubles to the pound; Soviet free market (illegal, rumoured)—12–15 rubles to the pound; London free market (illegal in Soviet law)—8–10 rubles to the pound.

[b] Rumour only.

[c] *Extras*: We have merely put in a figure for the "thirteenth month" and an allowance for certificate rubles, these being transposed into ordinary rubles by multiplying by a factor of five. Officials above *oblast* first secretary are considered to receive the 32-ruble rate (see p. 15).

[13] The works we have managed to consult for this purpose were V. E. Komarov and U. G. Chernyavski, *Dokhody i potreblenie naseleniya SSR* (Moscow, 1973); I. I. Korzhenevski, *Osnovnye zakonomernosti razvitiya sprosa v SSSR* (Moscow, 1971); E. A. Lutokhina, *Oplata truda inzhenerno-teknicheskikh rabotnikov* (Moscow, 1966); I. Ya. Matyukha, *Statistika zhiznennogo urovnya naseleniya* (Moscow, 1973); V. V. Onikienko and V. A. Popovkin, *Kompleksnoe issledovanie migratsionnykh protsessov* (Moscow, 1973); N. E. Rabkina and N. M. Rimashevskaya, *Osnovy differentsiatsii zarabotnoi platy i dokhodov naseleniya* (Moscow, 1972); B. Ya. Raitsin, *Matematicheskie metody i modeli planirovaniya urovnya zhizni* (Moscow, 1970). A perusal of the Bulletin of the State Committee for Labour and Wages for recent years

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TABLE 2

Earnings of Academic and Research Personnel

	Basic [a]
Director of VUZ, Research Institute	500–700 [b]
Pro-rector	400
Professor, Chief Researcher	325–525
Assistant Professor, *Dotsent*, Leading Researcher	300–350
Senior Researcher	200–250
Researcher	135–150
Junior Researcher	105–125

[a] To which might be added the following extras:

Membership of Academy of Sciences	350–500 rubles
Headship of Faculty (*dekanat*)	30% on basic
Headship of Department (*kafedra*)	100 rubles
Royalties on publications (see Table 3)	

[b] Depending on category of establishment, of which there were three.

TABLE 3

Earnings of Editorial Personnel

	Basic	*Total* [a]
Editor of Union republican newspaper	240	500
Deputy editor	200–210	n.a.
Responsible secretary	180–200	350

[a] Extra earnings mostly in form of royalties. (This editor received the " thirteenth month ").

Reported Royalty rates (per 6,000 words approx., according to Soviet usage).

Ordinary literary and journalistic work for All-Union publishing houses is paid for at the rate of 150–300 rubles, depending on the standing of the writer and the nature of the work.

Outstanding literary work by authors of All-Union fame, same publishing houses, can fetch up to 600 rubles, by agreement.

Subsequent publication of same material in a different medium may be paid for at similar rates.

Subsequent editions in same medium, however, provide the author with automatically reducing royalties.

Provincial publishing houses pay rates of 70–150 rubles.

Technical and scientific literature is paid for at rates of 100–200 rubles.

Learned articles are frequently unpaid. (For official outline figure, see *Postanovlenie* of the Council of Ministers, USSR, of 25 April 1968, in *Spravochnik partiinogo rabotnika*, no. 9, Moscow, 1969, p. 249).

yielded a figure of only 330 rubles (the maximum for collective farm chairmen). The 1960 comprehensive list of basic wage and salary rates for industry, published in a confidential numbered edition for official use only, revealed a top *basic* salary of 450 rubles for that year, *Tarifnye stavki i dolzhnostnye oklady, pereshchitannye* v *svyazi s izmeneniem tsen* (Moscow, 1960). Edition of State Committee for Labour, 3,000 copies. For data from it and calculations based on it, see tables 4–7 below.

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TABLE 4

Basic Salaries (oklady) *and Earnings of Managers of Largest Industrial Enterprises (Category 1) by Branch*
(See comment)

(1) *Branch of Industry*	(2) *Published Basic Salaries* 1960	(3) *Estimated total wage* 1961 (*Kunelski*) [a]	(4) *Estimated total wage* 1970 (*Kunelski*)	(5) *Provisional Upper Limit of wage* (1959 *regulations*)	(6) *Estimated Basic salaries Post* 1971 (*Plan*)
Coal	400	507	656	681	480
Non-Ferrous	325–375	445	573	596	420
Ferrous	300–350	412	533	554	390
Machine building	300–330	400	516	536	378
Chemical	290–330	394	508	528	372
Oil and Gas	290–300	375	483	502	354
Building materials					
Light Industry					
Textile Industry	180–250	272	352	320	258
Food Industry					

[a] L. E. Kunelski, *Sotsialno-ekonomicheskie problemy zarabotnoi platy* (Moscow, 1972). See Comment on this table.

Comment on Table 4

The salary system for management and specialists is complex, and is said to consist of 150 "schemes" in industry alone. The elements determining a given salary are (1) branch of industry (2) category of enterprise (up to seven, by size and importance to the state) (3) geographical location of enterprise (4) economic performance in the framework of state plans (5) training and length of service (6) skill in manipulating the regulations. The stream of wage legislation is large and continuous—witness the contents of the monthly *Byulleten Gosudarstvennogo Komiteta po trudu i zarabotnoi plate.*

Kunelski provides a few data on the weighting of basic salary in the total earnings of certain personnel, and we have used these here. Unfortunately he does not give a breakdown by branch of industry. Details of other references to the same problem and of our own arithmetic are avaiilable on request.

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TABLE 5

Distribution of Industrial Enterprises by Size and Category Managers' Earnings by Category, circa 1970

(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
			Ranges of Managers' Earnings		
Category of Enterprise	*No. of Workers*	*% Distribution of Enterprises*	*All Industry* [a]	*Light Industry (lowest range)*	*Coal Industry (highest range)*
7	Up to 100	34·6	163–213	—	391
6	101–500	41·9	180–221	197–229	425
5	501–1,000	11·0	196–262	197–229	458
4	1,001–3,000	8·1	229–385	229–262	491
3	3,001–6,500	1·2	278–417	262–295	540
2	6,501–10,000	1·2	295–491	295–328	589
1	10,000 & over	0·3	344–573	328–343	656

Sources:

Columns (1), (2) and (3) *Narodnoe khozyaistvo SSSR v 1972*, pp. 159, 192 (for 1972). Category 6 is the sum of two contiguous categories in this source, categories 2 and 3 are a single category halved.

(4), (5), (6) Estimated from *Tarifnye Stavki* . . . relevant pages, as for column (4) of preceding table. According to this source, salaries are generally lowest in light and timber industries and highest in coal-mining.

(4) [a] Except coal-mining, light and timber industries.

TABLE 6

Distribution of Managers of 2,018 Enterprises of Machine-building and Metallurgy by Earnings

(1) *Category of Enterprise*	(2) *No. of Managers*	(3) %	(4) *Estimated Earnings* 1970
7	2	0·1	163–229
6	149	7·4	246–278
5	549	27·2	262–328
4	662	32·8	328–377
3	371	18·4	360–426
2	186	9·2	409–491
1	99	4·9	491–540

Sources:
Columns (2), (3) *Sotsialisticheskiĭ trud*, No. 11 (1973), p. 36.
Column (4) *Tarifnye stavki* . . . relevant pages, same method adopted as in preceding tables.

TABLE 7

Basic Salaries of Collective Farm Chairmen (January 1972)

Category of Farm	*Basic Salary*	*Category of Farm*	*Basic Salary*
1	270–300	6	180
2	250–270	7	170
3	210–250	8	160
4	200	9	150
5	190	10	140

The legal maximum (excluding supplements for research degrees) was, according to this source, 330 rubles.
Source: *Byulleten Gos. Kom. Truda*, No. 1 (1972), p. 30.

TABLE 8

Earnings of Senior Military Officers and Diplomats [a]

Marshall of USSR	up to 2,000
Major General	600
Colonel	500
Minister-Counsellor, accredited to large capitalist state	500 [b]
Ambassador, small underdeveloped country	400
Counsellor, small underdeveloped country	360

[a] Military salaries from secondary sources only.
[b] Diplomatic salaries as paid in certificate rubles (see p. 15) in addition to material benefits, travel, etc.

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Occupation

A detailed breakdown of the most responsible jobs in the USSR would be extremely useful for purposes of elite analysis. Unhappily, such information is not published. We must make do with the results of the All-Union Population Census, which included tables on the non-manual labour force by occupation, and one or two other sources.[14] A few words on our use of these data are perhaps in order.

Nearly all the categories of personnel we need (containing the various *rukovoditeli*—managers, directors, heads of enterprises and institutions, etc.) as given in the census have to be refined or supplemented for our purpose. The category of "industrial managers," for instance, comprised nearly 123,000 souls, though there were less than 50,000 industrial enterprises.[15] Many deputy managers must, therefore, have been included in it. Furthermore, enterprises vary greatly in size; reference to an annual statistical handbook allows us to distinguish some sort of hierarchy of managers on this basis. Special estimates need to be made for the most responsible or outstanding figures in the intelligentsia, again with the help of other sources. We find that the full-time Party officials have no separate entry and are merged, in the census data, with much less important administrators, and we have to estimate a figure for them from references in Party literature. The census contains no data for the sizeable military personnel, militia or the KGB, let alone the senior officers amongst them.

For purposes of assessing the *size* of each occupational group which might be considered "elite," we have applied the argument of the preceding section, and taken only those "managers," "heads" and "officials," etc., who may be presumed to receive more than our 450 ruble minimum. We have on this basis audaciously distinguished 13 groups of personnel, as listed in table 9. This occupational elite totals about a quarter of a million, or about one employed person in 470. A smaller elite could be surmised by raising income limits and reducing the number of posts, or vice versa. This, however, would probably change the numerical ratios between the 13 parts, since the internal hierarchies of some groups must be "steeper" than others. Finally, a word of warning: sociological objections to the use of the "group" concept for analysis are probably as valid for Soviet elite groups as for any others. Such "groups" may, in many important respects, form a continuum and merge gradually with the rest of Soviet society.

Nomenclature

The nomenclature system is, in a sense, a continuation of the old Tsarist table of ranks; it remotely resembles Party patronage in "open"

[14] *Itogi vsesoyuznoi perepisi naseleniya* (1970), *tom* VI, Tables 2 and 34.

[15] Official figure for enterprises on an independent accounting basis, *Narodnoe Khozyaistvo SSSR v* 1972, p. 159.

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TABLE 9

Elite Occupation Groups in Soviet Society—a hypothetical distribution for the early seventies [a]

(Persons in responsible or nomenclature posts earning 450 rubles a month plus, and having access to substantial secondary benefits, including most full-time party officials)

	Thousands	*%*
Party Officials (responsible, full-time)	95	38
State, Komsomol & Trade Union Officials	60	24
The "Intelligentsia"	43	17
Academicians, heads of VUZy, institutes, faculties, laboratories, etc.	(10)	
Head doctors	(10)	
Senior legal officials	(2)	
Editors & senior journalists	(17)	
Leaders in arts and artistic bureaucracy	(4)	
Enterprise Managers	22	9
Industry	(8)	
Construction	(2)	
Transport & Communication	(2)	
Trade & Catering	(5)	
Agriculture (Collective & State Farm heads)	(5)	
The military, police, diplomatic service	30	12
TOTAL	250	100

[a] The percentage of labour force, taken as 1970 Census figure (115,204,000), comes out at something over 0·21 per cent, or about one employed person in every 470. We discuss these estimates on p. 14 below.

societies, though taken to a degree which is probably unique. It is one of the main levers by which the Party apparatus ensures its dominance in the state. The *nomenklatura*, or at least the upper layers of it, could, theoretically, serve as an excellent basis for a definition of elite in the USSR, since it embraces most responsible, highly-paid, and prestigious occupations, many of which give access to the secondary benefits. It may almost be regarded as an official elite listing. Unfortunately, we do not know enough about it for detailed analysis. Although it is frequently referred to in official sources, facts on its size and configuration are hard to come by.

Nomenclature posts may be filled only (a) by direct Party appointment or (b) with Party approval. The candidates for these posts are, it seems, chosen from registers of promising individuals at the corresponding administrative level. Simple in principle, the nomenclature is vast and complicated in practice. Power to make nominations must be distributed vertically (depending on the importance of the post) and geographically, according to its location. A few key positions are

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probably filled by decision of the Politburo itself. Posts of All-Union and probably Union-Republican standing are controlled by the Party Organs Department of the Central Committee in Moscow; less important ones lie within the competence of republican Central Committees, the *oblast*, town or district Party committees. It seems that some organizations, like the Council of Ministers, the KGB, the Trade Unions and Komsomol, etc., have their own nomenclatures, but all of them are ultimately controlled by the Party. Changes in the nomenclature control of a given post may take place from time to time, and the whole system may be expanded or contracted.

It is difficult to estimate the number of positions involved. The Central Committee in Moscow probably exercises direct control over many hundreds and approves thousands, besides being responsible for the whole network. There is evidence that some of the smaller republican Central Committees handle around 2,000 each. *Oblast* Party offices may have from a few hundred to four or five thousand, depending on the region; towns (apart from the republican capitals, where the lists are apparently immense) a few hundred. The *raion* Party organizations in the countryside also control some appointments. The most important elite category beyond nomenclature control would, for obvious reasons, include leading members of the artistic intelligentsia: but there is an artistic bureaucracy.

Access to Secondary Benefits

These benefits are important not only because they involve a vast increase in the real income of the recipients (besides which, in extreme cases, formal earnings may seem puny), but also because access to them itself implies elite status. They help widen the income hiatus between the elite and everyone else. They seem to be designed primarily for Party officials, though other categories of personnel may use them as well.

First, we shall consider confidential monetary benefits, restricted goods and services. Then we shall consider the specific advantages which the elite have in the sphere of day-to-day practices and customs. In most cases, the extent to which individual elite groups are served is impossible to determine, and we can only give a few generalizations.

1. *The "thirteenth month", and other personal payments*

The "thirteenth month" is an extra month's pay over the year, sometimes euphuistically known as "hospital money" (*lechposobie*, *bolnichnaya zarplata*), though it has nothing to do with health or medical treatment. The term is widely used in industry to cover earned bonuses, but the variety described here is automatic and involves no extra effort. Party functionaries in Central Committee apparatuses in Moscow and the union republican capitals, the heads of the Party

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organizations in central ministerial bodies, and *oblast* Party secretaries have been mentioned as receiving it. We also have reports of receipt by the director of a major research institute and the head of a construction bureau in the defence industry, so it is apparently paid to responsible workers outside the Party hierarchy. According to one respondent, it is sometimes given before the annual holiday, though it may also be paid at the end of the year. The "thirteenth month" has been described as being for the "run of the mill" elite; people at the very top of the occupation hierarchy may dispense with such frivolities.

There are certain other special arrangements which deserve brief mention here. Rumours circulate of "open" or unlimited bank accounts enjoyed by a few individuals of particular prominence. "Personal salaries" are prescribed for many other valued individuals: these salaries may double normal income, but we have no indication to hand of the number granted. Many persons in responsible posts are in a position to arrange additional part-time jobs for themselves and earn up to half of a second salary, despite instances of official disapproval of this practice.[16] Wives are sometimes provided with fictitious posts so that they may qualify, if not for a salary, at least for a pension on reaching retirement age. There is a scheme of personal retirement pensions for outstanding individuals, with a ceiling of 300 rubles a month, as opposed to 120 rubles in normal circumstances. This, though well below our elite minimum, is by no means an inconsiderable sum.

2. *The "Kremlin ration"* (Kremlëvskii paëk)

This may, it seems, come in several different guises. Certain Party officials in Moscow apparently receive an extra payment of 16 or 32 "gold" rubles a month—there are apparently two categories of seniority—to help them along.[17]

These rubles are worth several times their face value, as they can be used to purchase deficit foreign goods, comestibles as well as durables, in the state-run foreign currency shops. The "ration" may also come as the right to buy a quantity of superior-quality goods in restricted shops (to be considered below).

The Kremlin ration has been mentioned by many respondents, which suggests that it is widespread. Leading Party workers, officials of the USSR Council of Ministers, the Commission of People's Control, heads of departments and sectors of the Council of Ministers of the RSFSR, members and corresponding members of the Academy of Science of the USSR, have been listed as getting it. Thus several thousand households may benefit.

[16] A. L. Epshtein, (ed.) *Sbornik zakonodatelnykh aktov o trude* (Moscow, 1974), pp. 157–67.

[17] These rubles are sometimes referred to as foreign, *invalyutnye* or certificate rubles.

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The origin of the " thirteenth month " and the " Kremlin ration " is an intriguing subject. These things may now serve to make up for the so-called " party packet " system, abolished some time after the twentieth Party congress in 1956. Party packets were sealed envelopes containing sums of money delivered monthly to senior officials; the value of these packets was said to have equalled 50–100 per cent of the recipient's regular salary. The object may have been to ensure that the earnings of persons in administrative (particularly Party) posts should not fall below those of high-level industrial managers. One of our respondents was actually delivering them in Leningrad in the late thirties.

3. *Elective status and academic distinction*

A few thousand sinecures (or near-sinecures) are available for the ambitious. The 1,517 deputies to the Supreme Soviet of the USSR were in 1970 entitled to a honorarium of 100 rubles a month, plus free travel, and all-paid biennial trips to Moscow for the sessions of that body. Seats were held on average for eight years; about half of them went to outstanding " workers " and " peasants," but the rest were taken by the first secretaries of *krai* and *oblast* Party committees and persons holding responsible posts in the localities. The 5,879 deputies to Union Republic Supreme Soviets got 50 rubles a month and tended to keep their seats for rather shorter periods. Since 1966, however, the trend has been to increase the involvement of deputies in the work of the legislative bodies.

The country's 2,521 academicians (1970) received 350–500 rubles a month for holding full or corresponding rank at All-Union or branch level, in addition to their normal occupational salaries. Doctors of Science occupying production posts were usually entitled to monthly supplements of 100 rubles, while the rate for candidates in like employment was 50 rubles. (Degree payments for academics were apparently keyed into their basic salary scales). The achievement of academic distinction in the USSR is in normal circumstances by no means easy. Yet the system is subject to corruption and the extra salary raises all academicians and some doctors to " elite " income categories.

4. *Special access to consumer goods*

We have already referred briefly to the unsatisfactory provision of many kinds of consumer goods in the Soviet Union; indeed, supplies of essentials may be interrupted for months on end. Instances are easy to find. Thus it was reliably reported in the early seventies that Rostov-on-Don (population 800,000) was, for some months, quite without meat, while there was no butter or cooking fat on sale in Tula (population 470,000) some time before. The smaller towns in the provinces are usually most prone to shortages. A person with money in his pocket might well have difficulty in spending it usefully, even in the capital

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cities, and economic observers claim that there is much excess spending power.

In these circumstances, it becomes essential to provide key occupation groups with an adequate selection of goods by way of reward for their efforts. Therein lies the explanation for the special channels of supply of (a) better quality goods, (b) unusual and luxury goods, (c) goods of foreign manufacture, all of which may be unobtainable on the open market.

The present system is extensive, and has historical antecedents which also await investigation. The breakdown of supplies caused the Bolsheviks to introduce rationing at artificially low prices very soon after they came to power. Their main aim was to help their own supporters, military and civil. The situation improved in the twenties, but collectivization and the five-year plans caused another wave of serious shortages and high prices. In 1930, the government began to reintroduce a system for supplying low-cost, rationed goods, based on 2,500 or so closed distribution co-operatives at individual enterprises. These may, in fact, have handled up to 18 per cent of all retail trade. Control of the co-operatives soon passed to the enterprise managers, who were at liberty to differentiate between categories of workers and favour the most essential. Rationing was abolished in 1935, and the co-operatives diminished in importance afterwards, but they had re-established the principle of selective distribution.

A system of "commercial" shops selling deficit goods at their full market price was started about 1928, and by 1932 comprised some 70,000 outlets. These were abolished only after the currency reform of December 1947. In 1930, the authorities also established a network of shops (called *Torgsin*) where foreign goods could be purchased by both foreigners and Soviet citizens in return for precious stones, metals, and foreign currency. Trade of this type seems to have died out in the post-war years, as private stocks of valuables were dispersed and foreign visitors became rarer.[18] The most important types of channel in existence in the early seventies are listed below. Although access to them was tied to certain posts, it was normally extended to the incumbent's family. There have also been reports of widows and children of deceased persons continuing to have use of them.

Highly restricted "distributors" existed for the use of a limited number (probably several thousand) of senior personnel.[19] These distributors do not look like shops from the outside, and admission is gained by showing a pass issued at the user's place of work. Many of the customers appear to be chauffeurs sent to collect the well-packed

[18] S. & B. Webb, *Soviet Communism; a new civilisation* (London, 1935), pp. 310, 321, 328. A. Baykov, *The Development of the Soviet Economic System* (Cambridge, 1946), p. 236. *Resheniya partii i pravitelstva po khozyaistvennym voprosam*, Vol. 3 (Moscow, 1968), p. 460. In addition to these channels, it seems that special arrangements always existed for the provision of leading political figures and their families.

[19] The Russian term is *raspredelitel*. Sometimes people say "closed distributor" or *zakrytyi raspredelitel*. See footnote 1 on our source of information.

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orders. Trade in these places can be lively, but there are no massive queues such as those which form in ordinary shops when deficit goods appear. The articles on sale may be of Soviet or Western provenance, but the prices are low, sometimes almost fictitious. This depends on the exclusiveness of the distributor, for they seem to vary in this respect.

One highly restricted distributor whose facade has been described by several Western correspondents is situated on Granovsky Street in central Moscow.[20] It is probably surbordinate to the welfare (*khozyaistvennyi*) department of the Central Committee. Our respondents have so far identified three other distributors in Moscow (two selling groceries and one clothing) and three more in republican capitals. It seems likely, however, that these establishments exist in many large towns. In addition, very senior Party officials in the Politburo and Secretariat (and perhaps at the highest levels in the provinces) probably have much more personalized services at their disposal.

The second major type, which we may term merely *restricted outlets*, are usually attached to public stores or buffets, and camouflaged as home delivery departments or order desks. They are probably more numerous than the highly restricted distributors. They sell to persons living in privileged blocks of flats, and the would-be customer may have to produce his internal passport if he is not known to the assistants. These outlets provide good-quality Soviet articles which are in short supply or unobtainable in ordinary shops. Reports on the prices vary. In some cases, they may be half or less the normal prices, in others they are only slightly lower.

The third kind of channel is the public, indeed well-advertised, network of *foreign currency or certificate shops*, many of which are known as *Berëzka*. Like the old *Torgsin*, they sell a wide range of Western and superior Soviet goods, from food to large consumer durables. The prices are average for Western Europe, which means that some goods—clothes for instance—are sold at a quarter or fifth of Soviet prices at the official rate of exchange. The currency shops seem to have been restarted on a very modest scale in Moscow hotels in the late fifties, and greatly expanded in the mid-sixties. Eleven of these stores, some specialized, were listed in the 1968 Moscow telephone book. They are also to be found in republican capitals and many large towns.

One may well ask, given the relative isolation of the Soviet population from the outside world, whether the foreign currency shops are really important for the elite. The answer is that they are, and to a surprising extent. Many thousands of Soviet citizen are temporarily living outside Soviet boundaries. The USSR maintains 144 Embassies and Consulates abroad; the total of foreign staff with official rank

[20] Reports in the *Washington Post* (22 June 1974) and *Los Angeles Times* (4 Aug. 1974) have been brought to our notice.

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outside the Soviet bloc was recently estimated at 8,000. Press, cultural and banking personnel, not to mention "advisers" and sailors, must certainly number more. Soviet employees abroad may exchange unused earning into certificate rubles at the advantageous official rate for use at home. If we presume, very reasonably, that each individual working or travelling abroad has two or three expectant relatives or friends, and if we take into account the officials who are paid in certificate rubles at home, then we see that this currency must be at least occasionally accessible to tens of thousands of individuals, usually from the more favoured social groups.

The fourth type of outlet which deserves mention here takes the form of *buffets or cafeterias,* located at offices or other establishments and designed primarily for employees. Prices in them are lower than outside, and quality is good. Packed commodities to take away are also sold. The Central Committee in Moscow has at least one buffet which is proverbially good; the USSR Council of Ministers, the *Pravda* and *Izvestia* offices have also been mentioned in this respect. It seems to be the practice for some (perhaps all) *oblast* Party committee offices to have good catering facilities; such have been reported in places as far apart as Tula and Rostov-on-Don. These are open to Party employees and any Party member who has business in the committee building.

Finally, we must not forget important *informal* methods of supply. Everyone who is a position to offer goods, services, or some kind of protection has a strong incentive to barter for things which he cannot obtain legally. Favoured individuals are often allowed to inspect goods in warehouses—and buy them—before they reach the shops. Ability to pay in foreign currency or certificate rubles eases access to black or grey markets. Personal friendships with party officials, sales managers, shop directors, etc., may be cultivated to obtain a steady supply of specific products.

5. *Special holiday facilities*

Hotel rooms and holiday accommodation are also in short supply in the Soviet Union. The mass of holiday-makers buy moderately-priced passes to the crowded rest homes, share rooms in private houses, or just camp. The much-vaunted sanatoria are expensive and most accessible to people who happen to be both ill and rich.

The state provides good accommodation in congenial surroundings for its most favoured employees and their families. Prestige institutions like the Central Committee, Council of Ministers and Ministry of Internal Affairs—to mention three named by our respondents—have particularly comfortable centres in the best areas. These include historic country houses outside Moscow and villas in the Caucasus and on the Black Sea coast. Many of the larger ministries have superior rest homes too. The simplest and most popular establishments are run by the trade union organizations and (occasionally) collective farms.

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According to our information, some Party workers received free vouchers, worth anything up to 300 rubles annually, for holidays at the Central Committee rest homes. Members of their families were entitled to accompany them at a discount; wives apparently went for 25 per cent, children and elderly parents for 50 per cent of the formal cost. Vouchers for some good rest homes can be purchased cheaply for certificate rubles. Certain hotels and day recreation centres with excellent low-cost food and accommodation are run for special categories of personnel (Party officials, writers, etc.).

Some enterprises and organizations offer *dachas* for long-term private use at nominal rents. The Council of Ministers, the newspaper *Pravda*, the Academy of Sciences of the USSR, and certain creative unions have been referred to in this context. The authorities sometimes give *dachas* to outstanding individuals for permanent residence. Rented state *dachas* are thought by some to be preferable to private ones, because they are better built and involve no legal problem over possession or upkeep. Holidays abroad, purchased in the form of vouchers for tourist delegations, are expensive, hard to come by, and are offered primarily to "reliable" citizens. Members of elite groups are thus better placed to obtain them.

6. *Special medical services*

This is another sphere in which extra provision is made for a small part of the population. Medical attention in the USSR is basically free, and drugs are relatively cheap. The quality of Soviet medicine is not, however, very good, and services are often inadequate. It is common knowledge that the Fourth Directorate of the Ministry of Health runs a closed system of hospitals, clinics and dispensaries which are far superior to those operating elsewhere. There are no queues, and conditions for in-patients are much better. Registration with the Fourth Directorate goes with certain jobs, and covers both the employee and his dependants.

Strangely enough, the state also provides purchasable medical services for those who can afford them, though no explanation of this strange departure from communist norms has ever come to our notice. In March 1973 no less than nine "Paid Polyclinics" were listed in the Moscow address book. The only reason for spending good rubles in them must be to procure better or quicker attention. Private advice can be had from individual practitioners quite legally, but the high rates charged mean that this, too, is more accessible to wealthier citizens.

7. *Better housing*

Good accommodation can be as important for elite status as income or access to consumer goods, given the acute housing shortage in the USSR.

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The Soviet elite has a number of methods of ensuring that its standard of housing is well above the average, though, again, facts are hard to come by. First, many top-ranking political organizations (the Central Committee and KGB, for instance) have their own housing funds (usually blocks of flats) which are of good standard, centrally located and sometimes provided with cleaning and special delivery services. The impressive block of flats off Gorki Street where A. Adzhubei (Khrushchev's son-in-law) lived, and the Central Committee block on Starokonyushennyi Pereulok are cases in point. The rents are, as everywhere in the state sector, artificially low, and do not reflect quality. Elite housing, in this sense, enjoys an extra subsidy.

Secondly, persons in managerial positions have considerable control over ordinary enterprise housing funds. When an enterprise or institution builds accommodation for letting to its workers, applications for housing are, according to the rules, considered by the " enterprise administration " and the trade union committee. In some circumstances, managers actually have legal powers to allot housing themselves, but in all cases they can influence their subordinates' decisions. The same is, to some extent, true of officials managing local soviets' housing funds. The implications of this practice require no elaboration. Abuse of the rule by managers who made unfair decisions was frequent enough to provoke a warning decree of the All-Union Council of Trade Unions in February 1960 and its re-publication in 1971.[21]

A third attractive possibility for persons with money is to purchase a flat in a housing co-operative. Though long-term state loans are available at a 2 per cent rate of interest, this type of accommodation is relatively expensive and it is usually necessary to put down a large deposit. Flats can sometimes be obtained more readily if paid for in foreign currency.[22]

8. *Private transport*

The production of cars in the USSR in 1970 was only 344,000, of which a proportion went to state enterprises and establishments. Output had risen to 730,000 by 1972, yet all things considered, cars were still very hard to acquire for private purchase.

They were also expensive. In 1967, a new Volga (which is a medium-sized family vehicle) cost 1,200 foreign-currency rubles, and according to a slightly later report, 10,000 ordinary " Soviet " rubles. The smaller

[21] A. V. Shatovski and others. *Zhilishchno-bytovye voprosy* (Moscow, 1971), p. 193. For other indications of managers' involvement in these affairs see S. N. Landkov and others, *Zhilishchnoe i zhilishchno-stroitelnoe zakonodatelstvo* (Kiev, 1967), pp. 44–56.

[22] Some reported prices: small two-roomed flat on the outskirts of Moscow, 1965, 2,800 rubles; small three-bedroomed flat, a little closer to the centre, 1970, 6,000 rubles, but exceptionally good contacts are required to obtain building materials.

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Zhiguli recently retailed at about two-thirds of this price, i.e. the equivalent of over four years' average pay.[23]

It follows again from the deficit, the high prices and *blat* practices (to which we shall turn in section 9) that (a) the elite had a far better chance of buying a car and that (b) the use (when available) of an official car with chauffeur was a particularly valuable asset. It is not, of course, possible to put a figure on car ownership among the elite, or on personal use of state vehicles. However, several thousand chauffeured vehicles must have been provided for the heads of important enterprises and establishments. In Moscow, certain Party officials have long had the right to summon a car by telephone, though there was some restriction on this practice, and a pooling of vehicles, after 1961.

9. *High-level* blat

Blat is the use of personal contacts, influence, or even bribery to make life easier. Such relations are pervasive in all societies, but are, we believe, particularly important under Soviet conditions, characterized as they are by the absence of a private sector in the economy, endemic material shortages, restrictions on the freedom of exchange, inadequate services, lack of advertised information, etc. Acquaintanceship with persons of influence in the state hierarchy can not only lead to the provision of deficit goods as suggested above, but can also bring the opportunity to queue-jump (through the use of a *bronya* or quota system for goods and services), a chance of getting one's children into a prestige college, promotion at work, etc. Many of these practices are actually criminal in character; it is arguable that the Soviet elite *must* frequently break the law to ensure its own material well-being.

Let us take just one vivid example of this mechanism. One of our respondents, a well-known writer from Tula, was careful to maintain good relations with the third secretary of the local *oblast* Party committee, who ran the propaganda network. One day the writer decided he wanted to buy a car. The normal procedure would have been for him to try and register at the local distribution point—no easy task in itself—and then wait perhaps several years for delivery. In the event, he merely telephoned the Party secretary, who instructed the local sales manager to accept from the writer an immediate order for one of the next vehicles to come in. A car is an enormous blessing in the provinces; it can also be sold after a heavy mileage for far more than its purchase price, despite the official ban on the practice. The same principle, of course, holds for many deficit goods.

10. *Party committee membership and temporary Party work*

Elitism of the Soviet variety, as we have stated, hinges very much on the existence of the CPSU, or, more exactly, the Party apparatus.

[23] *Vneshposyltorg* catalogue (1967), p. 10, and respondents.

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Although *ordinary* Party membership provides certain advantages, including better access to material benefits, better career prospects and sometimes protection from the law, such membership is enjoyed by 15 million souls, who cannot be thought of as elite in any restricted sense of the word.

There is, however, another type of Party membership which may justifiably be regarded as an important "secondary" benefit. Some 40,000 nominally *elective* positions as members or candidate members of district, town and province Party committees are allotted to "managers of industrial, transport, communications and construction enterprises and directors of state farms," that is, persons who are *not* Party officials. In 1972, there were 503 such places in the Moscow *raikoms* alone.[24] Judging by the low turnover figures, these positions tend to be held for long periods, perhaps four to six years. We have not heard of any direct payment being made for such committee work, but Party membership of this type implies extra Party trust, involvement in committee affairs, and the possibility of personal association with the influential full-time secretaries. Advantages of a similar kind, if not order, are enjoyed (together, of course, with a salary) by the many specialists employed temporarily or on a part-time basis in local Party offices.

11. *Cultural advantages* [25]

The present Russian elite, like any other, does not live in a cultural vacuum. Its relative opulence means that it is still able to maintain and enjoy many traditional Russian customs, and even the remnants of pre-revolutionary life-styles which have not survived elsewhere. It is more able to sample paid cultural facilities. Elitist circles may indulge a penchant for theatre visits and art; the interiors of their dwellings may be graced with ikons, traditional ornaments or embroidery. Gifts to other people can only be generous. Entertaining may be lavish, and based on traditional (sometimes expensive) fare—Russian soups and sturgeon, caviar, smoked salmon, vodka, Georgian wines, Armenian cognac, etc. Many of the products needed are available only in the various special shops. Some holiday patterns, like the use of the *dacha*, link up with intelligentsia practices of the last century. The Russian elite has come to resemble elites in other societies in performing these protective functions. Easier contact with the West and Western goods, as mentioned in sections four and five above, *can* mean a better appreciation of Western standards of living and cultural values.

In conclusion, we may reiterate that the elaborate system of

[24] *Partiinaya Zhizn*, No. 14 (1973). Proportions worked out from preceding table and allowance made for membership of revision commissions. V. P. Grigoriev and G. I. Shitarev, *1917–1970, Moskovskaya . . . organizatsiya K.P.S.S.* v. *tsifrakh* (Moscow, 1972), p. 172.

[25] We confine ourselves here to comment on Russians. It is said that other national elites in the USSR presumably endeavour to preserve their own cultural individuality, so far as that is politically feasible.

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" secondary benefits," some specifically state-run, others incidental, are an essential element in Soviet elitism. They help provide the most favoured citizens with a superior style of life. The most desirable step would be for us now to cost them, and estimate their distribution among, or use by, different groups in the Soviet elite. That is not possible, for obvious reasons. It is, however, safe to presume that these benefits significantly increase the income ratings of the elite-type occupations we have in mind, perhaps by a factor of 50 per cent or 100 per cent.

IT is now logical for us to return to the problem of which socio-occupational groups enjoy elite incomes, and the possible size of these groups. We shall comment on the magnitudes of all those which appear in our notional Soviet elite, table 9, though some of them are extremely hypothetical in nature. We have already referred the reader to the data collected, or calculated, on the money incomes of some of them (tables 1–8). These may now be notionally increased to include the secondary benefits: we have not, of course, actually suggested figures, since our information is so far from justifying this.

The size and composition of the *Party and state* bureaucracies are, as we have noted, by no means easy to estimate. It seems possible to arrive at a figure of about 95,000 responsible full-time Party officials by using indications from certain Party publications.[26] This figure would certainly have to be multiplied by a factor of two or three to cover *all* Party employees, including technical and part-time staff, but we would not consider these " other ranks " to be in the elite. Responsible Party officials seem to have easiest access to the secondary benefits, so their money income, though good, may carry bigger supplements and be relatively less important than that of other groups. On the other hand, only officials at the top of the Soviet state legislative and executive structure, the Communist Youth League, and the Trade Union hierarchies could aspire to elite status. So far we have been able to enter only one provisional overall figure for them.

What we have called the " intelligentsia " ranges from outstanding or highly qualified individuals engaged in research and academic work through doctors, lawyers and journalists to artists of various kinds and the state bureaucrats who monitor their activities. Earnings in these spheres are on the whole rather poor; but intra-group income hierarchies are probably very inequitable, and contain small numbers of leading figures with high incomes. It is these whom we have attempted to quantify.

Our first category under this heading is an estimate for academicians, heads of VUZy and heads (deans) of large faculties and research

[26] This is a low estimate by some standards, but we have preferred to err on the side of caution, and have in any case excluded many thousands of low grade " instructors " in the localities. The latest official set of figures for Party membership is slightly more detailed than earlier ones, but still, we believe, misleading. *Partiinaya Zhizn*, No. 14 (1973), p. 25.

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laboratories. The paucity of highly-paid medical doctors and lawyers has often been commented upon. Doctors have the more satistfactory status as a profession, with better opportunities for private earnings, but even hospital directors can have a basic salary as low as 220 rubles. We have, for this reason, entered only a figure for the heads of the largest establishments. Officials of the People's Courts (judges, procurators and defence counsels) are badly paid, and our figure is intended to embrace only judges, procurators and senior officials at the *oblast* level and above. We have based our estimate for editors and senior journalists on the number of publishing houses and periodic publications. There are comparatively few leading artistic figures, but we have included an estimate for the "artistic bureaucracy" under this heading.

The term "enterprise managers," as used in the census, is a very loose classification, and covers a body of about 300,000 persons employed in industry, construction, transport and communications.[27] As far as the *industrial* managers are concerned, the problem is to sift out those heads of enterprises who are in the top income brackets. Table 4 gives some rough estimates of both basic salaries and actual earnings of managers of the largest, or first category factories. Table 5 suggests some distributions of managers by size of the enterprise headed and earnings; the implication here is that only the top 10 per cent or so of these people received enough to qualify for "elite" status. The most highly paid managers, according to this data, were those who ran coal mines. Table 6 shows the distribution by earnings of managers of machine-building and metallurgy enterprises, chosen because earnings in this branch were fairly average for heavy industry. The figures in these tables also suggest that assistant managers in the biggest and most favoured enterprises had very high earnings as well, since the differentials between them and the principals could have been as little as 10 per cent or 20 per cent. It is noteworthy that the "provisional upper limit" given in table 4 does not include all of the extra bonuses accessible to managers in some branches of industry, or "personal salaries" referred to above.[28]

It has not so far proved practicable for us to attempt an analysis of the managerial hierarchies in construction, transport or communications, so we have simply entered, in each case, 10 per cent of the census totals. The earnings of managers in the defence industries, which are certainly very high, also remain unknown.

We have inserted a low putative figure for a few of the 285,000 managers of trade, catering and public service establishments. The basic

[27] *Itogi vsesoyuznoi perepisi naseleniya* (1970), Vol. VI, Table 2, p. 20. See also Table 34, p. 248 ff. The census returns seem to give disparate data on this and certain other categories, but we have in cases of doubt taken the smallest figure.

[28] On bonuses, *premiya*, etc., see the decree passed on 2 July 1959 and republished in *Sbornik zakonodatelnykh aktov o trude* (Moscow, 1970), p. 424. It was presumably still valid then, despite planning changes.

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earnings in this sector were, in fact, very modest and the significant opportunities for managers to indulge in illegal deals are beyond our brief.

The heads of agricultural enterprises (state and collective farms) in all numbered some 50,000. New sets of salary scales for collective farm managers and specialists were recently published in the official wages bulletin. These showed that even on the largest farms, the top basic salary was only 300 rubles, and the maximum, including bonuses but excluding extra payment for research degrees, was only 330 rubles.[29] Most state farm directors would have been only marginally better off. The allowance which must be made for benefits in kind and services would have taken some of these people over our 450 ruble minimum. But the immense drawbacks of rural residence in the USSR preclude, to our mind, the attainment of " elite " standards for all but the most successful. This is why we have entered a figure of only 5,000 for them in table 9.

The most difficult categories of personnel to investigate are the secret police, the militia and the senior military. In 1972, the Soviet Union had an estimated 3,500,000 men in the armed forces, 300,000 more border troops, etc. in the KGB. (The KGB has, in addition, many high-standing personnel working secretly in Soviet organizations which deal with foreigners, both inside the USSR and abroad; the Soviet diplomatic corps and trade delegations are heavily saturated with them). It is probable that officers of the armed forces reach elite income levels at the rank of colonel or major general, which leaves us with a group of a few thousand. It was rumoured in Moscow in the mid-sixties that KGB officers were paid at militia rates, with substantial supplements; another suggestion was that at the higher levels they received something like military officers' salaries. The KGB is, however, said to be particularly good at obtaining secondary benefits for *all* of its staff.

All Soviet officials who serve in non-communist countries (not only career diplomats) have rather low formal salaries, and we suspect that only a proportion of them achieve the equivalent of elite incomes at home. They have, on the other hand, the immense advantage of access to capitalist consumer goods and can sell these surreptitiously to their countrymen at home. We would hope that the magnitude entered for all of these personnel together is not too unrealistic.

IT is impossible, given the sketchiness of the information at our disposal and the limits of this article, to attempt any firm conclusions about Soviet elite income, or, indeed, to compare it with the income of any other chosen elite. If we think in terms of the American rich,

[29] *Byulleten Gos. Kom. pri Sov. Min. SSSR po voprosam truda i zarplaty*, No. 1 (1972), p. 30. References to more generous provisions for bonuses are discussed in K. E. Wädekin, *Die Bezahlung der Arbeit in der sowjetischen Landwirtschaft* (Berlin, 1972), VI.2. These do not, in our view, significantly affect the point we make here.

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however, some interesting distinctions can be postulated. Here we can do no more than mention them: perhaps, with time, an investigation of them in depth will become possible. Taking the Soviet elite as the top half or three quarters of a million individuals (employed persons and their families) in the USSR, and comparing them with their American counterparts, it seems that these Soviet citizens have the following peculiarities. (a) They have much less accumulated wealth, and lower incomes. They have fewer personal possessions, and very little capital-making potentiality. The top 0·2 per cent of American taxpayers are a very rich group indeed; their after-tax income, at the lower level, may have been about 7–8,000 dollars a month, or 12–15 times the US average wage. Even if we double our suggested Soviet elite minimum, to allow for all the extra benefits, we are still far from this figure. (We are also hopelessly distant from the egalitarian ideals proclaimed by the Soviet state). (b) They are less socially differentiated among themselves—they have no " corporate rich," no families of recognized pre-revolutionary standing, no really popular celebrities, rather few representatives of what we call the liberal professions, few religious leaders, etc. (c) They have less economic and political independence; they rely heavily on Party and state for their material well-being, a considerable part of which may take the form of confidential benefits. Yet, in this sense, they enjoy protection and favours unknown in the USA or other " open " societies. (d) They are, on the whole, much more secretive and retiring; socio-economic data on them is extremely hard to come by; the activities of wives, children, etc., are virtually beyond investigation by outsiders; they have few international contacts.

Some of these distinctions are, of course, to be observed between ordinary people in the two societies.

Sociological analysis should be as free as possible from moral judgment, although such analysis can improve the basis of judgment. Inequality and elitism in Soviet society have often been criticised as morally wrong by leading dissidents both in the USSR and abroad. But if, as we suggest, the Soviet elite is by international standards poor and lacking in independence, how far can such criticism be justified?

The answer probably lies in a number of propositions. Soviet society is a poor society from the consumer point of view, and the differentials between, say, the extreme income percentiles may be no less than in the USA. Secondly, the relative opulence of the Soviet elite may seem less tolerable against a background of greater poverty. Thirdly, the manner in which this minority is nurtured by the state, and indeed protects itself, may be found to be disagreeable by many. Finally, the promotion of elitism in the face of a highly egalitarian ideology implies disconcerting hypocrisy on the part of the Soviet leadership. Which is, of course, why Soviet sociologists are not allowed to investigate this intriguing phenomenon themselves.

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Recent Data on Soviet Income Distribution*

Peter Wiles

WITHIN the twelve-month period November 1974–November 1975, a remarkable amount of new knowledge has been and will be published on Soviet income distribution. The policy of concealment has virtually collapsed, and the flood of data in conventional or percentage terms has been converted into actual numbers. Sovietologists have also contributed radical new views on measurement and the connexion between distribution and growth.

(1) For a long time now, we have known the *inter-industrial and inter-occupational* distributions (Yanowitch, 1963; Kaplan, 1969; Chapman, 1970). This knowledge was used mainly as a proxy for knowledge about the distribution of earnings between individuals. It is very risky indeed to argue in this way, since in all societies the main variation is between individuals in a given industry, not between the averages of industries. Certainly Yanowitch was right to infer from these early data that the inter-personal distribution was being equalized. In so doing, however, he relied more on the inter-occupational data (see below) and on miscellaneous scattered information. Today we can settle for the safer and more ordinary use of inter-industrial figures: they tell us something about industrial priorities in various countries, the strength or weakness of trade unions, or about scarcity relationships. So many forces play upon such figures that they are extremely difficult to disentangle. But even so, in their raw state they may become the basis of wage claims in a world full of communication and envy.

Merely as a sample of what is possible, in Table I I give some relativities between coal-miners and other industrial workers. All predate the wage explosion in coal brought about by the Yom Kippur war of 1973.

It is also of interest to compare the whole structure of one country with another. But, again, the only lesson I can draw is that " things are very different for various reasons."

(2) By inter-occupational data I mean differences between the averages of " classes "—a vague and loaded term that must be defined by statistical availability. In Table II the first three groups are for mining and manufacturing only (education and health represent, of course, a whole range of " occupations " and are included only for interest); only for the peasants do we depend on comparatively new knowledge.

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TABLE I

Incomes of Coal-Miners v. *Other Industrial Workers*

(both sexes, without fringe benefits, before tax)

USSR	1928–9	1941	1966	1966	1971
rubles p.m.	[k]	Plan [l]	manual [b]	all grades [b]	all grades [c]
coal	61·57	456	192·6	195·3	206·5
all industry incl. mining	70·87	382	104·4	106·8	131·7
ratio	0·87	1·20	1·85	1·83	1·57
BULGARIA levas p.m.			1970 [c]		
all mining			165·5		
all industry incl. mining			124·0		
ratio			1·33		
HUNGARY forints p.m.			1971 [c]		
coal			3220		
all industry incl. mining			2114		
ratio			1·52		
POLAND zlotys p.m.			1970 [d]		
coal			4095		
all industry incl. mining			2515		
ratio			1·63		
BELGIUM francs per day			1971 [e]		
coal [a]			782·7		
all industry incl. mining			546·1		
ratio			1·43		
FRANCE francs p.a.			1967 [e]		
coal			11765		
all industry excl. mining			9832		
ratio			1·20		
FRG DM per week			1971 [f]		
coal [a]			296		
all industry incl. mining			287		
ratio			1·03		
SPAIN pesetas p.m.					1971 [g]
coal					11174
all industry					8657
ratio					1·29
CANADA $ per hour			1971 [c]		
coal			3·51		
all industry excl. mining			3·28		
ratio			1·07		
UK £ per week			April 1971 [h]		April 1973 [i]
coal [a]			30·53		40·86
all industry excl. coal			25·13		32·22
ratio			1·22		1·27
USA $ p.a.			1967 [j]		
coal			7043		
all industry excl. mining			6672		
ratio			1·06		

[a] Original figure is for males only. I have reduced it by the French ratio of 11765 ÷ 11876.

[b] *Trud* v *SSSR* (Moscow, 1968), p. 140.

[c] ILO, *Yearbook of Labour Statistics 1972*, Tables 2, 18, 19, 20.

[d] *Rocznik Statystyczny 1972*, pp. 190, 220.

[e] *Annuaire Statistique 1969*, p. 557.

[f] *Statistisches Jahrbuch 1972*, pp. 120, 471.

[g] *Annario Estadistico 1972*, p. 289 (25·54 bn ÷ 2·95 bn and 0·895 bn ÷ 0·080 bn).

[h] *British Labour Statistics 1971*, pp. 36, 79.

[i] Manual only, as for 1971.

[j] *Statistical Abstract 1970*, p. 653 " production workers."

[k] Dewar, 1956, pp. 8–9 (manual).

[l] 1941 Plan, pp. 512, 514 (manual).

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TABLE II
USSR *v.* USA
(Table 17 in Chapman, 1970)
Differentials in Average Earnings of Wage Earners in Industry and Construction, USSR, 1965 and USA, 1964
(average earnings in per cent of industrial average)

	USSR, 1965	UNITED STATES, 1964
All industry [a]	100	100
Coal	189	119 [b]
Nonferrous metallurgy [c]	147	115
Ferrous metallurgy [c]	123	129
Petroleum refining	110	135
Chemicals	101	113
Machinery and metal products	100	112
Logging	110	82
Woodworking	89	82
Paper	101	106
Cement	104	117
Textiles	80	71
Garments	71	62 [d]
Shoes	80	64
Food (excluding fish)	75	94
Including meat	81	102
Including sugar	75	103
Construction	105	128

[a] Manufacturing, mining, electric power and fishing for the USSR; manufacturing and mining for the United States.
[b] On an hourly basis, earnings in coal were 128·3 per cent of the all-industry average.
[c] Soviet figures may include mining; US figures exclude mining.
[d] On an hourly basis, earnings in garments were 70·5 per cent of the all-industry average.
Sources: USSR: Tables 6 and 8 (in Chapman, 1970); United States: US Bureau of the Census, *Statistical Abstract of the United States: 1965*, pp. 238–40. The figures are based on average weekly earnings. Employment data from the same source (pp. 221–3) are used in computed weighted average earnings for an industry where necessary.

The data in Table III have often been used to illustrate increasing inter-personal equality. But they are nothing more than relations between the averages of certain groups. During the period of high Stalinism (1934–54), individuals were continually more differentiated within each group (see below), and this more than offset the convergence of the groups. The engineers may be thought of as a small, rich region in a large country. The reduction of the regional average has only a small equalizing effect on the nation, an effect which is overwhelmed by increasing personal inequality, both within the region and within the rest of the country.

A more plausible inference is that these figures reflect three forces. First, the increase in education reduced the premium on literacy, and drove the clericals below 100, while reducing the engineers very substantially. Between 1932 and 1960, the former's relativity fell by 45 per cent, the latter's by 43 per cent. This will be an ordinary market

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TABLE III

Earnings of Soviet Occupational Groups

	Manual Workers [a]	*Engineers and Technicians* [b]	*Clerical Employees* [c]	*Peasants* [d]	*Workers and Employees in Education and Health*
1932	100	263 [e]	150 [e]		—
1935	100	236 [e]	126 [e]		—
1940	100	210 [e]	109 [e]		93 [g]
1950	100	175 [e]	93 [e]		87 [g]
1955	100	165 [e]	88 [e]		—
1960	100	151 [f]	82 [f]	47 [i]	73 [g]
1970	100	—	—	68 [h]	—
1972	100	130 [f]	83 [f]	—	74 [f]

[a] *Rabochie.*

[b] *Inzhenersko-Tekhnicheskii Personal.*

[c] *Sluzhashchie* (note that this word often includes " b " in other contexts).

[d] *Kolkhozniki* (total income from labour).

[e] Yanowitch, 1963.

[f] *Nar. Khoz.* 1972, p. 516.

[g] *Nar. Khoz.* 1967, pp. 657–8.

[h] Sarkisyan, 1972, pp. 167–172 has 21·6 per cent of the population and 16 per cent of the income, or 69·2 per cent of the family income per head of the rest. Add 5 per cent for owner-occupancy, the imputed rent of which is never counted. Convert from " rest of population " to " manual workers in industry " by allowing for the latter's 6 per cent superiority.

[i] $68 \times \frac{1223}{2580} \times \frac{1560}{1078}$, where 1223 and 2580 are a peasant family's income from all sources in 1960 and 1970 (Wädekin, 1975, p. 6) and 1078 and 1560 are a manual industrial worker's wage.

force, operating through supply and demand on the highly imperfect Soviet labour market. Secondly, the development since 1960 reflects mere egalitarianism: all groups converge on 100. Thirdly, there is a simple Marxist bias in favour of manual labour.

Both the second and the third force operate, of course, outside the market, simply overriding supply and demand. Having no difficulty in believing that of capitalism (Wiles, 1974, Lecture IV and Appx. II), I have still less difficulty in the case of a highly imperfect market dominated by a single monopsonist.

Note the astounding relativities for education and health. It is not enough to say that rural teachers and nurses are socially ill-regarded; we must also concede that the planned numbers are provided at these low wages. Partly this is a discriminatory matter and partly, no doubt, a question of non-pecuniary benefits. The Soviet government evidently does not think it cynical to " exploit the idealism of nurses "—it is difficult indeed to see how anyone sensitive to the role of other non-pecuniary benefits could refuse to make no allowance in this particular case.

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(3) The peasants are not only an "industry" but also an "occupation" and a formally separate class. In their case, market forces should not operate since they are (or were, until the law of November 1974) *adscripti glebae* by the lack of internal passports. It was, therefore, in theory necessary only to provide a structure with sufficient differentiation to provide an incentive to perform the required work. While it is far from obvious that much differentiation is really required for this (Wiles, 1974, Lecture IV), the Soviet authorities, led by Stalin, certainly thought so (Wädekin, 1975). But they also tried under Stalin to keep the peasants' average well below the workers' average, even the average of their neighbours, the state farmers.

Eventually *adscriptio glebae* broke down, even before it was repealed (if it has been). Many factors played a part: mixed marriages, town-country communication, the suburbanization of farms, sheer evasion, and the need to remedy emerging, actual shortages of collective farm labour. Not least, however, was the personality of Khrushchev, the "Tsar-Liberator" of the twentieth century. A genuine Leninist, and, therefore, in part a populist, he felt morally compelled to raise peasant incomes and to include the collective farms into socialism. Today the peasant's average income equals that of the state farm worker, a most impressive change for the better.

We have little evidence, however, on the movement of intra-personal inequality at any time (Wädekin, 1975). But now that there is no longer a surplus of farm labour and movement is easier, young able-bodied males must be paid their urban equivalent to keep them on the farm. This is a substantial wage, and it makes intra-peasant egalitarianism extremely expensive. The kibbutz, facing the same problem, simply goes into debt: it must keep its young men and it cannot abandon equality. This will certainly not be the Soviet solution. Thus, even if inequality were not required for incentive purposes, it would be imposed by the threat of differential migration and the necessity to balance the books.

(4) One of our most important new items of information is knowing the *inter-personal distribution of wages and salaries* by earners (Pryor, 1972; Wiles, 1974, Lecture I; Chapman, 1975). The Soviet authorities are fully aware of the importance of this and have long possessed innumerable survey data. Their studies, and their policy of equalization itself, looking backward to Lenin and forward to "full communism," date from 1955, when the State Committee on Wages was founded. This was, of course, Khrushchev's doing, and corresponds to his measures favouring the peasantry.

But the data showed such extreme inequality that few have ever been published: only occasional surveys of regions, industries or enterprises, or national surveys in histograms without any numbers on them. Latterly, the censors have even broken the connection between zero rubles and the nearest point. This makes a very great difference, for if

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the horizontal distance 0a is 100R and ab 5R we get a very equal society, but if 0a is 50R and ab 10R it is very unequal. Pryor used a planimeter to determine the percentage populations beneath the points on the histograms, but he did not, it seems, allow for the



fact that a and g, the extremes, are only mid-points of columns whose width must be first determined—otherwise, the all-important extremes are under-weighted, and so, indeed, is the modal column b. I claim to have identified the ruble values of the boundaries of the columns in some of these histograms, and so to have reproduced them in their pre-censorship form. Chapman has used the obsession of Soviet statisticians with log-normality. If a distribution with a mode of a certain height is log-normal, the quantile ratios have certain values. But the Russians are for ever publishing the rather slight deviations of their censured histograms from log-normality, so Chapman can transfer with little loss the quantile ratios she derives from their log-normal curves to the actual curves.

We all three use the same sources, and come to almost identical conclusions. In brief, I reproduce some of the decile ratios established by these and other methods (for fuller treatment see the source reference).

TABLE IV

Decile Ratios of Earnings of all Workers and Employees *

(both sexes)

USSR [a]	1928	3·82	POLAND [d]	1960	3·1
	1934	4·15		1970	3·2
	1946	7·24 [b]	HUNGARY	1960	2·5
	1956	4·4		1970	2·6
	1964	3·7	RUMANIA	1970	2·3
	1966	3·2/3·26	BULGARIA	1967	2·4
	1968	2·7 [c]	CSSR	1959	2·4
	1970	3·2		1970	2·4
			UK	1966	3·4 [e]

* Except Apprentices.

[a] Wiles, 1974, p. 25.

[b] Exaggerated by bread rationing: Wiles, 1974, pp. xiii, xiv.

[c] This dip is probably transitional, being due to the introduction of the minimum wage. Again, the subsequent reversal may be due to the unusually large bonus payments made at the beginning of the industrial reform (points suggested by Dr Michael Ellman).

[d] This whole column from Wiles, 1975, Table II.

[e] Gross of a much heavier income tax. If the effective average rate is 16 per cent at the top decile and 1 per cent at the bottom (Wiles, 1974, p. 46), the net decile ratio is 2·9.

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(5) How does this look on the ground? Phelps Brown (1975, Table 02) gives us this comparison:

TABLE V

Comparison of Pay Structures in Engineering in Leningrad and in Great Britain

Monthly earnings in Leningrad, reported in 1967; weekly earnings in Great Britain in April 1970; expressed as relatives to the unweighted mean of 8 occupational grades = 100.

LENINGRAD ENGINEERING WORKERS			BRITISH WORKERS IN MECHANICAL ENGINEERING
Management (factory directors, shop superintendents)	146	130	Managers; supervisors and foremen
Non-manual workers in highly qualified technical-scientific jobs (designers)	107	117	Engineers, scientists, technologists
Qualified non-manual workers (technologists, bookkeepers)	93	103	Technicians
Highly qualified workers in jobs with mental and manual functions (tool setters)	109	100	Machine operator (metal), semi-operator
Qualified workers of superior manual work (fitters, welders)	101	103	Fitter (production); fitter (maintenance); welder, skilled
Qualified manual workers (machine tool operators, press operators)	91	99	Machine operator (metal) semi-skilled
Non-manual workers of medium qualifications (inspection and office workers)	71	83	Clerk (intermediate), storekeeper, storeman, semi-skilled
Unqualified manual workers	82	75	Unskilled building or engineering worker

Sources: Leningrad: David Lane, *The End of Inequality? Stratification under State Socialism* (Penguin, 1971), Table 5, pp. 64–65, adapted from D. E. Shkarakan, "Sotsialnaya struktura Sovetskogo rabochego klassa," *Voprosy filosofii*, 1, 1967; Great Britain: *New Earnings Survey 1970* (HMSO, 1971), Table 35, average weekly earnings in April 1970 of full-time men aged 21 and over, paid for a full week.

The differences are quite striking. In the USSR, clerks are poorest, in the UK, unskilled manual workers. In the USSR, the range is 2·06 : 1, in the U.K., 1·71 gross of income tax. On the basis of Table IV, note e, that makes 1·49 net. The Soviet, and indeed almost all communist, income taxes are light on socialist incomes and begin very low down, since there are few personal allowances. Equality has increased greatly since 1967 in the USSR, and quite a lot since 1970 in the UK (Wiles, 1975).

There is clearly scope for an almost infinite number of studies of this kind. They will throw up great divergences—as they already do between capitalist countries. My own feeling is that chance plays a

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very large part in all wage relativities everywhere, and that these divergences should not surprise us (Wiles, 1974, Lecture IV; Wiles, 1975b). It is, on the contrary, resemblance that is suspect.

(6) It is instantly possible to translate our new-found knowledge of the inter-personal earnings distribution per earner into the *inter-personal distribution of total income per family member*. In so doing, we take definite leave of rational resource allocation and go over to social justice.

The communists are very confused here. They hope above all to find some strong, direct and reliable link between (a) planned resource (especially labour) allocation and (b) planned per capita incomes, where (a) is cause and (b) effect. But they do not plan who marries whom, or how many children they have, or whether the mother will fall ill or the father desert his family. And there is not even a strict connexion between the planning of commodity-and-service outputs and the planning of labour inputs, let alone earnings per earner (c), since labour supply curves are unpredictable, and once it has been engaged, labour is very adaptable: so all this is a blind alley (Wiles, 1975b).

However, in pursuit of this chimera, Soviet statisticians have developed several useful formulae connecting (c) with (b). All are purely econometrical, and tell us nothing of cause and effect. All could be upset at once by a change in marital habits or social service legislation. The more sophisticated formulae use data privy to their authors, but one set is quite simply the arithmetical ratios of deciles of wages and salaries per earner to deciles of family income per member. So, knowing what we do in section 4, we can proceed instantly to the latter concept.

Hitherto, we only had one source for these ratios: Rabkina and Rimashevskaya, 1972. The possibility of misinterpretation or error in the source remained. But I am now happy to present confirmation (in an appendix which is not published here). It follows that the figures in Wiles, 1974, p. 48, are substantially correct. I repeat here only the decile ratios.

TABLE VI

Total Family Income per Capita *

SWEDEN		UK	USA	ITALY [a, c]	CANADA	USSR [c] (excluding peasants)
1971	1953–4	1969	1968	1968	1972	1966
3·6	3·3	3·4	6·7	5·9	5·9	3·5

BULGARIA [b, c]	CSSR [c]	HUNGARY [c]	POLAND [b, c]
1963–5	1965	1967	1967
2·7	3·1	3·0	3·1

* After tax, decile ratios [d].

[a] Before income-tax. Certain other omissions, which are probably neutral.

[b] Gross of income-tax, which is small.

[c] Omits owner-occupied rents.

[d] Wiles, 1974, p. 48, except Canada (Communicated by Statistics Canada, 18 June 1974), and Sweden (workings available on request).

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(7) What about regional differences? The basic figures are those produced by native statisticians for the net material product (Marxist concept) of the Union Republics—cf. Wagener, 1972, whose excellent work reaches back to 1958, and is based on the "product method." It checks very well against Koropeckyj's (1975) heroic calculation of gross national product (Western concept) by the same units, based on the "income method." As a result, we know far more about Soviet than, in particular, British regions. Nevertheless, the following data are still missing:

(i) It is more difficult to give a breakdown for the RSFSR, which has half the population;
(ii) We cannot go backwards in time beyond 1958, except possibly for Central Asia (Wiles, 1974, pp. 63–4; Wilber, 1969) [1];
(iii) The irregular price system has important regional effects. The turnover tax is very large, and is incorporated in the prices of light industrial production, which also has twice the average rate of profit. State farms receive lower prices than collective farms, whose procurement prices are, in turn, below those in the free peasant market. But the proportions of these production branches or enterprise types vary exceedingly from region to region;
(iv) There is no proper regional cost of living index, i.e. no "spatial deflator" that tells us the relation at one time of prices in one area to prices in another. But there is a lot more information than in most countries.[2]

We know too little to be able to say much of value about the data in Table VII as a temporal series. We may at least note the fluctuations in the league table at the bottom, typical of underdeveloped countries, the boring stability at the top, and the apparent intractability of the problem in all years. Koropeckyj explains regional inequality by variations in family size and collective farm incomes, not by variations in wage rates (which are quite small), or even in investment location. My own preliminary work confirms Koropeckyj: it is their fertility, not their unproductivity, which makes Central Asia poor. So the very great regional inequality of the USSR does not reflect badly on the Soviet system. For comparisons with other countries cf. Wiles, 1975b.

[1] Wagener's (1973) calculations back to 1950 and even 1940 are not published in enough detail to be judged. They evidently rest on the typical Soviet global indices of the industrial and agricultural output of each region; it is not clear how these have been reduced to net or even gross terms, or by what weights they have been combined. It is made clear that all other production has been omitted: construction, transport and all other services. But, as Koropeckyj shows, the poorer Soviet regions have a very high volume of services, since medicine and education are rather equally distributed. So these omitted components ought to "brake" the rather unconvincing fall of the Baltic republics. Finally, the population in 1950 is arrived at by means unstated, and the 1940 results are unbelievable: pre-Soviet Lithuania is 51 per cent as rich as the Soviet average, Estonia 73 per cent, Latvia 154 per cent, Azerbaidzhan, today one of the poorest, is, at 137 per cent, the richest republic within the 1940 borders.

[2] Only Canada and, above all, USA do better, to my knowledge.

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TABLE VII

Recent Regional Variations

(n.m.p. per capita)

	1958 [a]	1968 [a]	1972 [b]
USSR	100	100	100
RSFSR	109	113	111·3
Ukraine	100	98	96·9
Belorussia	68	82	91·7
Moldavia	80	82	81·8
Lithuania	93	115	112·0
Latvia	129	144	131·8
Estonia	119	141	133·1
Georgia	77	65	76·5
Azerbaidzhan	83	61	62·0
Armenia	74	74	76·9
Uzbekistan	69	56	60·9
Kirghizia	67	62	73·3
Tadzhikistan	56	50	57·5
Turkmenistan	83	57	73·4
Kazakhstan	78	70	82·3
Top two ÷ bottom two (unweighted)	2·02	2·66	2·24

[a] Wagener, 1972, p. 89.
[b] Koropeckyj, 1975, Table 2.
Wagener also gives columns for 1960 and 1965. Our inequality index reads 2·07 (Latvia/Estonia ÷ Kirghizia/Georgia) in 1960, and in 1965 2·38 (Latvia/Estonia ÷ Uzbekistan/Tadzhikistan).

(8) How much does inequality, or the lack of it, contribute to *incentives* and so to growth in the USSR? Views are very muddled on this, both in the East and in the West. If equal Sweden grows as fast as any European capitalist country, and equal Eastern Europe as fast as the USSR, it is not obvious at macro-level why inequality is a necessary incentive. Affirmations of this necessity, both in the East and in the West, come mainly from (a) politicians and enterprise managers, who are mostly in the top millile of the income distribution and need a justification; or from (b) academics, who feel acutely the fact that they are only in the top centile, having sacrificed income for non-pecuniary benefits, but cannot forget that they are as able as the people in the top millile; or from (c) people in the top decile as a whole, who calculate that if the government accedes to this reasoning it will probably give them more money for some muddle-headed reason or other.

Below the top decile or so, incentives are a dirty word, and people look to trade union monopoly power or social services for their income increases. This is not so much a factual denial that inequality makes us work harder, as a moral rejection of hard work as a way of controlling one's environment. From this it follows that inequality is neither moral nor necessary—with the saving clause that all customary relativities have moral or even economic sanction, so that

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my neighbour's 10 per cent raise justifies my own. I hold the views of every decile to be wrong.

In all economies, the inequalities between individuals within a trade are much greater than those between the averages of trades. Taking these latter first, they are, of course, partly the result of the differing skill-intensity and unpleasantness of work within a trade, and that is a structural matter subject to slow change. Promotion prospects are also important, and more changeable because of demographic and recruitment fluctuations. The relative scarcity of the products, or the priority the government gives them, is only one factor among many. Now the young are much more mobile than the old. It is therefore important for enough young labour to be captured by appropriate differentials by trade-and-age; thereafter we only need enough differentials to induce work (below). Labour is also very adaptable within a trade, so even substantial rises and falls in demand for a given labour service within the general competence of the labour force necessitate only small variations in inter-trade averages. It is trade union monopolies and restrictive practices that freeze intra-trade differentials and so necessitate new recruitment, thus widening inter-trade differentials.

The size of these latter differentials in the USSR is, therefore, a little surprising, though it is no less surprising that they are so random vis-à-vis those in other countries—which themselves seem impressively random. The Soviet mining differential in particular has gone up and down like a yo-yo.

As to intra-trade differentials, these serve not only to attract labour of particular skills, or labour in general through promotion prospects, but also to make it work and improve itself once it is there. Take the "self-improvement differentials" first. They need not be big, since, for the most part, *skilled* jobs are more attractive than unskilled ones: the low-pay apprenticeship period must be compensated but little more. *Responsibility* is for most people more irksome, perhaps especially so in a command economy; we can well understand a special rate for it, and this is really what Stalin insisted on in 1931 (inter-worker differentials hardly rose until the Stakhanovite movement in 1936—Bergson, 1945, p. 117). However, he surely went too far, since Khrushchev and Brezhnev have reduced the responsibility differential without ill effect (and Eastern Europe never had it so big).

It used to be thought that the way to make people work day by day was to use piece-rates. Piece-work was much favoured by Lenin, who was smitten by Frederick Taylor. As a result, the USSR has been the world capital of piece-work, but has gradually followed other countries in abandoning it. Piece-work is very attractive in theory, since the incentive goes wholly to the individual and he is paid immediately and predictably. But it is complicated to administer and discriminates unfairly between one worker and another (since it is so

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dependent on the maintenance of particular machines, or on the smooth supply of materials).

At almost the other extreme from Taylorism is promotion by job duration. This, along with security of tenure, has been quite a principle in the USSR, even at the same time as piece-work. The reform has reduced it (Kirsch 1972, pp. 28–9, 105, 108, 155). But it continues, apparently, on a larger scale than under capitalism—except, of course, Japanese capitalism. Promotion on the Japanese or Soviet principles is also an incentive, since it brings contentment, a feeling of being valued and the assurance that you can't " work yourself out of a job." It is even compatible with piece-work. It is probably a better incentive, on balance, for most workers, than its polar opposite, promotion from outside and the fear of instant dismissal—a thing too capitalist to be even conceivable in the USSR. Job security is closely allied to this sort of promotion; it was at one point threatened by reform, in that the manager could supposedly alter the numbers employed and alter the wage-rates, so long as he kept within the wage-fund limits. But this was too strong a medicine, and altogether too unpopular to last.[3]

In a wider way, it is the greatest folly to identify " reform " with incentives. What are the main features of recent reforms? (i) The freeing of inter-enterprise commodity transactions in certain countries —much the most in Hungary. This can—if it happens at all—have no effect on any but managerial incentives (below). (ii) Investment is financed more by banks and ploughback, less by the budget. This is, of course, wholly irrelevant to labour incentives. (iii) The bonus to labour is financed from profit (which the enterprise must therefore earn, so it becomes important) instead of the wage fund (which is, in the last resort, guaranteed by Gosbank's power and duty to make short loans). Theoretically, the Soviet worker is rendered more cost-conscious by this. If Western profit-sharing is any guide, this effect is minimal in large enterprises, where the worker rationally reflects that 1 ruble saved by his actions will earn him $\frac{1}{Nr}$ rubles, where r is the ratio of profit an enterprise may set aside for bonuses and N is the enterprise labour force. We may think of 1 ruble yielding a tenth of a kopek. This, then, is no incentive either.[4]

It may be argued that at least the bonus is very much bigger than it was, rising to a month's pay for manual workers, as opposed to about one per cent before the reform. This would, indeed, have an incentive effect if (a) the effect described in (iii) was not overwhelming still; (b) the bonus was exclusively related to effort—but it isn't, it is related to profit, however gained; and (c) it was immediate and predict-

[3] It was tried at Shchëkino, which was in a region of full employment. Even there, however, the Party interfered all the time (Delamotte, 1973).

[4] Note that in piece-work $N = r = 1$.

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able—but it is all very complicated and, being dependent on profit, must await the end of the financial year.

We are, therefore, thrown back onto such ancient questions as piece-work versus time work, and perhaps differentials by skill and experience—all shown already to have diminished in recent years. Not even the managerial bonus has actually grown. Since it really does act like piece-work upon its recipients and is about 20 per cent of salary and is settled quarterly, it remains, of course, a great incentive, but the main change is in the issue: incentive to do what?

Stalin gave very large incentives to workers and managers to fulfil output plans. Today workers have smaller incentives, and they are more directed towards efficiency. Managerial bonuses have simply redirected effort from output to profit—but only when output has exceeded the plan targets; below that level, profit counts for little. If by incentives we mean some monetary differential or other, the reform has been rather opposed to them. In reality, however, it is a big step from inequalities of money income to incentives. Skill differentials used probably to be unnecessarily big, so that serious applications much exceeded vacancies.[5] If material supplies are very uncertain, piece-work becomes a lottery, producing much inequality, but no incentive. If the particular goods we want, or all marginal goods, are unobtainable, money loses its marginal utility and so cannot be an incentive (Portes, 1974). If a monopsonistic employer like the Soviet state reduces our pay in our present job and all the other ones to which we might turn, we will work harder, since the supply curve of total labour slopes backward (Wiles, 1975a). And beyond these purely economic considerations lie countless moral, demographic and sociological ones. But all this must lie outside the scope of a brief article on inequality.

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[5] For the theory of this cf. Wiles, 1975a. I am now astounded to find the theory empirically verified by Kirsch's " job rationing " (1972, pp. 104–5, 108–9, 122).

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The Soviet Parallel Market*

Dimitri K. Simes

ALTHOUGH officially all sectors of the Soviet economy are either the property of the state or are controlled by it, there exists a huge, illegal parallel market of goods and services which functions outside the system of institutionalized economic relationships and beyond governmental controls. Precise figures are unknown, but it can be stated with a reasonable degree of confidence that this market accumulates annually billions of rubles and involves in its activities, both as producers and customers, the greater part of the Soviet population.[1] Even more important, the parallel market, despite official suppression, seems to be a vital element for the normal functioning of the Soviet economy in particular and of Soviet society in general, and an essential part of the Soviet daily routine.

The parallel market includes, but goes far beyond, the traditional black market, well known outside the communist community. First of all, the parallel market is in no way a temporary phenomenon resulting, say, from rationing and shortages. It is permanent, a product of the very nature of the Soviet economic system, brought into existence by the inefficient methods by which goods and services are distributed—even in relatively good economic periods—and by the lack of quality as well as quantity.[2]

The parallel market offers not only better (usually foreign-made) clothing or rare editions of popular authors, but also gives those Soviet citizens, who are in a position to pay, an opportunity to obtain better medical care, a higher standard of education and training, better vacations, better interior decoration for their apartments, better baby-sitting facilities, better transportation, even identification papers, diplomas and other documents. More than that, not only private individuals, but government firms, agencies and collective farms frequently use the services provided by the parallel market in their efforts to obtain equipment, spare parts, manpower and professional expertise.

A study of the parallel market system in the Soviet Union is an extremely complicated task. As there is no comprehensive statistical data available to students of this intriguing phenomenon, one has to

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[1] According to the Soviet Writers' Union weekly, *Literaturnaya Gazeta*, in the course of a single year occupants of new Moscow apartments paid 10 million rubles to private tradesmen for " additional improvements to their apartments." *Radio Liberty Research Bulletin*, No. 34, 21 August 1974.

[2] The Soviet Central Statistical Agency discloses that only 3·5 per cent of all manufactured goods and 1·4 per cent of consumer goods were awarded a so-called State Quality Mark, and the Quality Mark does not mean anything more than that items bearing it conform to international standards. *Planovoe Khozyaistvo*, No. II, 1974, pp. 6–7.

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base research almost exclusively on the anecdotes which appear frequently in the Soviet press. These anecdotes indicate that the parallel market is a subject of some concern to the Soviet authorities. But how serious is this concern? What place does the parallel market occupy in the overall Soviet economic structure? Fortunately, some pieces of statistical evidence are still provided by Soviet publications. And while quite a few questions remain unanswered, some important conclusions can still be made with a reasonable degree of confidence.

However, I do not intend here to provide answers to these questions, but, rather, to present a picture of the parallel market as it affects different segments of Soviet society and to raise some preliminary questions, while leaving the answers to the authors of more detailed studies.

One important question concerns the impact that the parallel market has on living standards in the Soviet Union. How can one estimate the additional income which this market brings to certain sectors of the Soviet population, and, conversely, the considerable extra expense it imposes on almost every Soviet citizen? It is clear that the parallel market makes some people richer and others poorer, but the actual balance between these two trends is unknown. The situation is complicated still further by the fact that most people are involved in both buying and selling on the parallel market.

The parallel market inevitably affects Soviet income distribution, but does it bring a rough equality to Soviet consumers? Members of the elite do not need the goods and services available on the parallel market, since they have access to special distribution shops and health and recreational facilities established for the privileged few. But the lower and middle classes are heavily dependent upon the parallel market: my impression is that those groups which benefit most from it are to be found among both white-collar and blue-collar workers. The real distinction between beneficiaries and losers is along professional, rather than strictly class lines. Repairmen, craftsmen, retail tradesmen, some teachers involved in private tutoring and prestigious physicians with unofficial private practices are in privileged positions; but the majority of Soviet customers probably continue to lose more than they are able to gain.

The role of the parallel market is especially important where the redistribution of manufactured goods is involved, but it also provides some unregistered goods and services. How should this phenomenon be taken into account in estimating the Soviet GNP? There are no statistics, and the evidence provided by anecdotes in the press is of no help here.

And, finally, but not least important, how can one even attempt to analyse the price structure of the parallel market? Again, no statistical figures are available. Clearly, as in every free market, the law of supply and demand rules. But supply and demand under Soviet con-

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ditions are influenced not only by a desire to obtain deficit items or rare services, but also by a fear of punishment for illegal transactions. Consequently, in some cases, valuable stolen items are sold on the parallel market below even their official price.

THE ordinary Soviet citizen uses the parallel market on an almost daily basis. If he lives in an apartment building, as most Soviet people do, he frequently needs assistance in carrying out household repairs or redecoration. He can call the maintenance department located in every apartment complex and ask for a plumber, but it will probably take quite some time before a plumber appears, and there is a good chance that the plumber will be in a hurry and will have no time to repair things properly or perhaps even to examine what is wrong. But his attitude will change totally if you offer him a tip: suddenly he has plenty of time, and possibly even deficit spare parts can be found somewhere. Usually, you will be told that these parts are unavailable at the maintenance office and, if you still want your bath to be repaired, that you will have to pay more.

Redecoration of apartments brings even greater problems. Again, there exists an official firm called "Zarya" which can send you men and materials. But, in most cases, "Zarya" will put you on a waiting list; then you will be told that they don't have the kind of wallpaper your wife likes, and, finally, the men who are sent to do the job will arrive completely drunk, will strip off your old wallpaper and will then disappear, leaving a nightmare scene in your apartment. After a few such experiences, you will look for somebody upon whom you can rely. Some of your friends will suggest a name, give you a phone number, and you will get what you are looking for. But you should avoid asking tactless questions, such as, "Where did your new wallpaper come from?": it was probably stolen. The Soviet press regularly publishes articles about petty thieves—so-called *nesuny*, or "carriers"—who take home stolen equipment and materials by tricking or bribing factory guards.[3]

If a man has a car, it goes without saying that he is a regular customer of the parallel market. There is a shortage of service stations in the Soviet Union,[4] and those which do exist simply do not have spare parts. A friend of mine spent a month in a vain effort to buy a windscreen for his Moskvitch. Finally, he went to a small street near an automobile plant in Moscow, where he was approached by a man who introduced himself as a worker at the plant and promised to deliver the windscreen the same day for reasonable remuneration—even less than the official price. Needless to say, the worker kept his

[3] See, for example, *Literaturnaya Gazeta*, No. 33, 1974, p. 13, and *Pravda*, 24 March 1975.

[4] According to the ninth five-year plan, car production is to be increased by 250–280 per cent, while the number of service stations is to be increased by only 150 per cent. *Literaturnaya Gazeta*, No. 19, 1973.

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promise. But even if someone is fortunate enough to need nothing more than a simple car repair, he will still not be taken care of unless he pays a station attendant. A car owner in Armavir in southern Russia sent a letter to a drivers' magazine, reporting that he was refused help at a service station. "But then a worker standing nearby chimed in: 'Let him bring it in,' he said, 'I'll fix it up quickly.'" And the "sharp-eared" mechanic carried out the job on the spot, pricing it at six rubles: "Five rubles for me, and one for the till." Another driver, from the Crimean city of Evpatoria, complained that, although he was first in the queue at the service station, attendants did not take any notice of him and started to inspect other vehicles which arrived later, presumably because their drivers had promised good tips. His protests did not help and, according to him, the things he saw and heard there made him wonder whether it was a state enterprise or a private concern.[5]

It is obvious that everyone who owns a car in the Soviet Union has to be a permanent customer of the parallel market.[6] But even those who prefer or who have to use public transport frequently come into contact with the parallel market. For there are not enough cabs in most Soviet cities, and if you want one, you will probably have to wait up to two hours or more. During rush hours or late at night it is extremely difficult to find a cab. Long lines of people wait at special taxi-stands. But, at the same time, there are usually many cars available. Some are just cabs whose drivers say that their working hours have expired or that they are going to have dinner. A couple of rubles, or even less, will usually change their minds. Others are official cars, off-duty. Their underpaid chauffeurs are hungry for additional income and rarely hesitate to give a ride to those who are willing to pay. The normal fare for a trip in central Moscow is one ruble, slightly more than the charge for a regular cab.

It is generally accepted that today Soviet people are better dressed than 10 years ago. At the same time, expectations, especially those of younger people, have grown much faster than the ability of the Soviet retail trade to satisfy them, and this is fertile ground for speculators and black marketeers. One merely has to compare the way people are dressed in Moscow with the clothes that are available in nearby shops to realize how many fashionable suits, skirts, coats and shoes have been bought from speculators. Certainly, some people have access to special stores for top officials or the so-called *Beriozka* stores, which sell goods for foreign currency or special coupons. However, speculators play a prominent role in providing modern clothing.[7]

[5] *Za Rulem*, No. 5, 1974, p. 39, quoted from *Radio Liberty Research Bulletin*, No. 38, 1974.

[6] According to *Izvestiya*, more than one third of car owners in 1972–73 drove on petrol bought on the parallel market. *Izvestiya*, 1 January 1975.

[7] In the city of Vilnius in 1974, 430 people were arrested in the act of selling goods. They were engaged in petty black marketeering. Vilnius Domestic Broadcast, 14 February 1975, quoted from *FBIS*, 27 March 1975.

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Most speculators buy fashionable clothes in regular stores where they have contacts with salesmen or officials. For example, in January 1974, Moscow police arrested a young man who was selling women's jackets in a major Moscow department store. He was charging 30 rubles each for the jackets, which he had bought in another department store in his home city of Baku for only 15 rubles each. There were plenty of jackets in the Moscow store but, since they did not look quite so fashionable, several people paid their money to the young man from Baku, who was, in fact, a scientist, associated at the time with one of Moscow's most prestigious research institutions.

A man from Moscow bought four pairs of foreign-made women's boots from the same department store in Baku. He went back to Moscow a week later and sold them at a profit. Here again, boots were available in the store, but not of the same fancy kind. The man was arrested and put in jail.[8]

In other cases, fashionable clothes come from abroad as gifts from relatives and friends. People who sell them are not usually prosecuted. Still another source is the foreign tourist who visits the Soviet Union. To buy clothes from a tourist in order to sell them at a profit is a criminal offence. However, quite a few American visitors complain that on many occasions they have been approached by strangers asking for jeans and other items of clothing.

Significantly enough, the available evidence indicates that a higher standard of living and the increasing availability of consumer goods have not reduced the volume of parallel market transactions, but, rather, have added some new dimensions to it. 10–15 years ago people desperately lacking the most essential goods were buying clothes on the black market just to cover their bodies; now only fashionable items are in demand. But the raising of expectations has made these fashionable items important status symbols, and possession of them is considered almost obligatory among certain categories of Soviet citizens.[9]

Medical care, private tutoring and legal services are also available on the parallel market. In theory, every Soviet citizen is entitled to free and good medical care. It is not so in practice. Soviet hospitals and clinics are always overcrowded. Physicians do not have enough time for thorough examinations; they spend most of their time filling in innumerable papers instead of treating their patients. There is also a shortage of hospital beds; and admission to a hospital is difficult, unless one is really critically ill, although some doctors and hospitals have a better reputation on this score than others. But the patient does not usually have a choice. Except in cases where the illness is so

[8] It should come as no surprise to anyone that Soviet people are so willing to buy clothes and footwear on the parallel market. According to Soviet official data, only 0·6 per cent of all footwear produced in the Soviet Union and less than 1 per cent of all clothes were awarded a Quality Mark. *Literaturnaya Gazeta*, No. 29, 1974.

[9] *Literaturnaya Gazeta*, No. 11, 1975.

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complicated that it can be treated only in certain selected hospitals and clinics, a patient is expected to go to his local clinic and see a doctor who is entrusted with the care of the residents of his block or apartment complex.[10] If necessary, this physician sends him to a local hospital where he will probably be put on a waiting list. It is not surprising that many Soviet citizens look for ways to be examined and treated by someone they can trust. This is possible, but it costs money.

One way is to go to commercial government clinics which require one to make a modest payment. But such clinics are located almost exclusively in big cities and are consequently out of reach for many people. Similarly, while commercial clinics, as a rule, are less overcrowded and have a better qualified staff than regular medical institutions, they are still handicapped by innumerable shortcomings and the general inefficiency of the Soviet medical system.

Thus, many people try to make their own arrangements with physicians and even surgeons. Although only a handful of doctors are officially permitted to have a private practice, and all surgeons are associated with official medical institutions, quite a few make deals with their patients. Interestingly enough, illegal payment is frequently required even when patients are treated during regular office hours and in government medical facilities. I was told of a prominent surgeon who made a fortune by accepting payments from potential patients. These people, presumably, were not local residents and they needed the sponsorship of the surgeon in order to be admitted to his hospital and to be operated upon by him.[11]

If some privileged citizens can still enjoy adequate medical assistance without paying for it, virtually the only chance they have of getting a good lawyer is to pay some additional unofficial fee for his services. Certainly, one can limit one's expenses to a modest payment delivered to a cashier in a legal office. And, if criminal charges are brought against a defendant, he can even declare himself incapable of paying. The court would then be obliged to nominate a lawyer for him. The only question is, what kind of lawyer? Those who want the assistance of a reputable professional must find someone who knows and who can recommend one. A lawyer will usually ask first for references and only then say how much he wants for his work on top of the official fee. Not only ordinary people, but also famous writers and film directors, academicians, KGB colonels, and even Central Committee members have had to pay unofficial fees to their lawyers.

Private tutoring is another interesting subject. According to a poll

[10] Unfortunately, work in local clinics is so hard and the salaries so modest that physicians tend to leave them as soon as they can find jobs with research institutions and hospitals. As a result, local residents are seldom treated for long by the same doctor.

[11] Those who get the services of qualified specialists for their money are lucky. Quite a few become victims of incompetent phoneys. *Pravda* reports on a retired blacksmith who pretended to be a dentist. Hundreds of people paid substantial sums to this crook who was jeopardizing their health. *Pravda*, 8 January 1975.

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conducted several years ago among freshmen at Moscow University's Department of Mathematics, 85 per cent of the students used the services of private tutors in order to prepare themselves for admission tests.[12] This private tutoring has two different, rather contradictory effects on the selection process at Soviet universities and colleges. Obviously, the services of a tutor are much easier to obtain for those in better financial positions and in major urban areas, and in this sense, private tutoring brings less equality to the Soviet educational system, by favouring applicants with upper and middle class city backgrounds. However, it should also be noted that the Soviet official regulations provide numerous benefits and privileges for applicants from working class and, especially, peasant families. Young people from the intelligentsia are not trusted enough to become loyal and obedient members of the educated community. In this way private tutoring gives scions of the intelligentsia more of an equal chance.

To sum up, one may say that almost all kinds of goods and services are available on the parallel market and millions of Soviet citizens do not hesitate to buy them.

NOT only individual Soviet citizens, but also industrial and agricultural executives seek the services of the black market, thereby infringing numerous laws, instructions and regulations. Moreover, it would seem, on the basis of reports published in Soviet periodicals, that the entire Soviet economic system could not survive without the parallel market. In a letter published in *Literaturnaya Gazeta*, a Soviet construction executive from Rostov says that it is difficult to find a manager who does not violate "financial discipline" or try to disregard obsolete instructions.[13] According to a prominent Soviet columnist, Yuri Feofanov, some government agencies have issued as many as 12, 15 or even 20 thousand instructions and regulations to guide their executives' every step,[14] and, in quite a few cases, bureaucracy virtually forces industrial and agricultural managers to look to the parallel market to obtain the things they need. There, equipment and materials which are otherwise not available are sold to eager customers. At the same time, in order to get cash to pay for these unauthorized purchases, the customers also become involved in illegal transactions, selling, in their turn, part of their own factory's or farm's output on the parallel market.

Thousands of business executives have been imprisoned for alleged violations of Soviet law. Many of these trials would appear rather peculiar to a foreigner: in quite a few such cases, no allegations were made—even by the prosecution—that the defendants were in it for personal gain. The accused were stealing, selling on the parallel market and

[12] *Komsomolskaya Pravda*, 27 August 1969, quoted from *Radio Liberty Research Bulletin*, No. 6, 1975.
[13] *Literaturnaya Gazeta*, No. 42, 1974, p. 10.
[14] *Izvestiya*, 15 January 1975.

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buying stolen goods, not to make a fortune for themselves, but just to get the necessary supplies for their enterprises and collective farms.

Literaturnaya Gazeta tells of two collective farm chairman who were convicted of buying stolen property from thieves. One purchased desperately-needed pipes for a cow-shed; the other, boxes to pack apples in. Significantly, no personal profit was involved in either case. The collective farm chairmen, presumably, were quite unable to get pipes and boxes through normal state supply channels. One of these chairmen later asked in desperation: which is the greater crime—to pay thousands of rubles to thieves, or to lose a harvest? This was the real choice he faced.[15]

Naturally, many business executives start to infringe the law motivated by the interests of their enterprises and farms, but finish up trying to make a fortune for themselves. Illegal financial transactions and the handling of large amounts of unregistered cash corrupt quite a few business executives, especially those in the retail trade where stealing is a way of life. It is safe to suggest that virtually everyone who holds a managerial position in the Soviet retail trade breaks the law almost daily.

There was a meat shop near where I used to live in Moscow. For many years, this shop was known for having an unusually good choice of meat. But, suddenly, steaks, legs of lamb and other rare items disappeared. Salesmen told the story of the former director, a Jew without a high school education, but well-adjusted to the unofficial rules of Soviet trade, who was replaced by a graduate of the Plekhanov Economic Institute. The new director declared that he would not tolerate any violations of the law in his shop. He refused to bribe district warehouse officials and, consequently, his supplies of meat were almost cut off. The salesmen could no longer make a living by taking fees from grateful customers for whom they used to save good pieces of meat. Previously, they had shared their underground income with the former director, providing him with much-needed reserves of unregistered cash. Now the practice was stopped. But, without free cash, the director was unable to pay truck drivers for unloading their trucks, and the drivers refused to do it free. Both truck drivers and salesmen, angered by the new regulations, began to complain to a district Party committee. The former director would easily take care of such charges merely by bribing the district committee officials. But the new one found himself in real trouble. Moreover, without supplies of good meat, his store was failing to fulfil the plan. Everyone was sure that the director would soon be dismissed. But this did not happen. On the contrary, steaks, lambs, partridges reappeared in the shop. There was no need to ask how this became possible. It was clear that the young economist had finally learned the real rules of Soviet trade which he had not been taught at the Plekhanov Institute.

[15] *Literaturnaya Gazeta*, No. 29, 1974.

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The parallel market offers not only industrial and agricultural products, but also manpower and expertise by qualified professionals. Every summer, many collective farms hire groups of city residents to do construction jobs. Some of these people are students, others belong to many different professions, but only a few are employed in the construction industry. However, in the summer, they become construction workers, form so-called brigades, and offer their services to collective state farms. Usually, they are paid far above the official rates. But agricultural managers, short of manpower, feel happy to get these *shabashniks* who are paid, not for the hours they work, but for the job they do and, consequently, are not afraid of overtime.[16]

In the late sixties, research and consulting firms of a new kind were established in many Soviet cities by scientists and engineers eager to earn additional income. Specialists, associated with the firms, kept their official jobs and committed their own time to work on firm assignments. The firms became extremely popular, especially among younger professionals, tired of their modest salaries and the monotonous functions which they had to perform in their regular jobs. Industrial managers, in their turn, were quite willing to make contracts with the firms because of their reputation, unusual under Soviet conditions, of being reliable and capable of doing a good job. Unlike executives of Soviet official institutions, the managers of the new firms could not expect anybody to pay them without being satisfied with their work. Their only chance of survival was to establish a good reputation. In this they succeeded, but they still did not survive. The authorities treated these private enterprises with great suspicion and most of the firms were closed down and some of their managers imprisoned. They were accused of violating state financial discipline, of involvement in private enterprise and, sometimes, of cheating Soviet taxation and economic agencies.

Often, charges were totally false and, in some cases, defendants were found innocent. But the firms, as a result of official suppression, ceased to exist.[17]

However, it is significant that such firms, which were co-operative rather than state property, could exist at all. It is even more noteworthy that they found strong support in influential sectors of the Soviet economic community and from some major publications. *Literaturnaya Gazeta*, particularly active in support of the firms, argued that it was wrong " to judge new developments in economic practice on the basis of old instructions and regulations." [18] It is thus conceivable that the official attitude to the firms could be liberalized.

Notwithstanding the fate of these firms, the parallel market clearly plays a very important role in the Soviet economy. And most low- and

[16] *Pravda*, 27 March 1975.
[17] *Literaturnaya Gazeta*, No. 43, 1974.
[18] Ibid.

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middle-level enterprise managers are, in one way or another, involved in its operations.

THE huge scale on which the parallel market operates can hardly be conducive to the Soviet government's peace of mind. A totalitarian regime, by its very nature, cannot tolerate any initiative coming from outside the institutional system. It sees such initiatives as a threat to its control over the economy and the people, and thus does not like its citizens to become even partly financially independent of the state.

Also, most goods available on the parallel market are stolen from the state, and many people perform their parallel market functions in office hours, frequently making use of the facilities and equipment of state institutions and enterprises. This is another obvious reason for the authorities' disapproval of the black market.

The black market also causes serious economic distortions and interferes with official economic plans. From the point of view of governmental economic agencies, the equipment and supplies which are obtained on the parallel market by some energetic manager may be needed more and could be used more effectively by other firms and enterprises.

Moral considerations are also a factor here. Underground activities with their secret operations create far-reaching psychological consequences for large sectors of the Soviet populace. And private enterprise is, of course, absolutely inconsistent with communist ideology.

Taking into account all these factors, it should not come as a surprise to anyone that the Soviet regime takes a hard line against the parallel market. But in practice, the official attitude towards the parallel market is ambiguous. It is fair to say that, while the authorities are basically opposed to the parallel market, they are forced to live with it and sometimes do not hesitate to use it themselves.[19]

After all, top Soviet officials are known for their pragmatism, and certainly do not believe in miracles. And they know better than anyone else the shortcomings of the Soviet economy. It is difficult to believe that the authorities do not understand that with shortages of materials and equipment, industrial enterprises and farms can only fulfil their plans by resorting to the parallel market. *Literaturnaya Gazeta* tells of officials pressurizing collective farm chairmen to use the parallel market. According to that paper, officials suggest to the chairmen whose farms are short of spare parts for agricultural machinery that they try every means possible to find parts in order to fulfil plans. They even promise chairmen their sponsorship in the event of trouble with the police. The story carried by *Literaturnaya Gazeta* also tells of construction managers who could not obtain nails but who were advised by the supervisors to fulfil plans at any cost.[20]

[19] *Pravda*, 27 March 1975.

[20] *Literaturnaya Gazeta*, No. 29, 1974.

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Even the KGB has used the parallel market in its own peculiar way. In 1961, a certain Rokotov was arrested for illegal transactions in foreign currency, gold and jewellery. He was sentenced to 10 years in prison. Later, Khrushchev himself became interested in Rokotov's case. Rokotov got another trial, was sentenced to death and shot. The author has, in fact, seen documentary evidence proving that Rokotov was a KGB collaborator. His case officer was formally associated with the regular police; in fact, he was passing all information provided by Rokotov to the KGB, who were interested in Rokotov's associations with foreigners.

Prostitution is illegal in the Soviet Union, but the KGB recruit many prostitutes dealing with foreigners, and prostitutes paid in foreign currency surrender part of their earnings to the KGB cashier.[21]

Generally speaking, during recent years some degree of tolerance, if not approval, has developed in the Soviet Union towards certain kinds of parallel market activities. Speculators and thieves are definitely considered criminals, but those who become involved in the parallel market "for a good cause" enjoy unprecendented lenience. In an editorial introduction to an article in *Izvestiya* about two engineers who got into trouble with the authorities for precisely such actions, the editorial writers clearly have sympathy for the people who were forced to break the law in order to do "their important job" properly.[22] Both article and editorial, as well as numerous other statements made by Soviet journalists and officials, including Mr. Brezhnev, call for the "unjustified limitations and small-minded regulations" imposed on the economic management to be scrapped.[23] But such appeals are far from new, and whether anything will be done in this respect remains to be seen. At the moment, the parallel market is the only answer for many dedicated business executives. And it seems that the Soviet leadership is not ignorant of their situation. If there were ever to be a choice between reforms giving economic management actual autonomy and a semi-tolerance of the parallel market, the Soviet leadership could very well favour the latter.

The parallel market is a huge economic structure, simultaneously independent from and a part of the official Soviet economy. This private sector penetrates every segment of Soviet society. People active in the parallel market vary from petty speculators selling fashionable clothes, to people of real influence and wealth, such as the famous Georgian underground capitalist Laziashvili, whose connections included several top officials. The parallel market mirrors shortages and inefficiencies integral to the Soviet economy, and reflects the growing consumer demands of the Soviet people. It is a vital part of the Soviet way of life, and only radical economic and social reforms can wipe it out of existence.

[21] Based on interviews taken by the author as a freelance journalist in Moscow in 1968 as well as interviews with recent arrivals in the US.

[22] *Izvestiya*, 28 December 1974.

[23] *Pravda*, 15 June 1974.

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The General Department of the CC of the CPSU

Leonard Schapiro

THE purpose of this article is to examine what is known about the General Department of the Central Committee (CC) of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), together with the corresponding departments at lower levels, with the object of establishing the extent to which the Department is of political importance, the nature of its duties, and its links with the Soviet State Security Service (now KGB, but formerly known as OGPU, NKVD, MGB). The CC General Department was one of the five CC departments set up in 1919, immediately after the eighth Party congress. It was described as the chancery of the CC. It later became the Secret Department and was subsequently known as the Special Sector [1] until the end of Stalin's rule. The original title of General Department was brought back into use by Stalin's heirs. Very little information about the Department has ever been published in the USSR. Recently, I have been able to obtain some new additional information, which seems to me to be reliable, and is based on conversations with one of Stalin's personal assistants, B. G. Bazhanov, who defected in 1928. This information is incorporated in the appropriate place in this article. It is additional to that contained in Bazhanov's memoirs published in Paris, and in an authorized German translation shortly afterwards.[2]

The first record of the CC Secret Department (*Sekretnyi Otdel*) which I have been able to trace dates back to April 1922, when Stalin's personal secretary, I. P. Tovstukha, was appointed Deputy Head of the Department. Tovstukha had served under Stalin in the Commissariat of Nationalities and had been Head of Stalin's personal secretariat since December 1921. He continued to be personal assistant to Stalin after his appointment to the Secret Department, of which he became Head in 1924. In November 1924, he became Assistant Director of the Lenin Institute, where he edited Lenin's works and wrote the first biography of Stalin. From January 1926 to 1930, Tovstukha again worked in the CC, in Stalin's personal secretariat, and was also active in the Lenin Institute. His obituary implies that he took an active part in the struggle against Stalin's rivals. Tovstukha's final service was to prepare his master's works for publication. The signatories of Tovstukha's obituary included Yagoda, head of the NKVD, and Ezhov, chairman of the Party Control Commission.[3]

[1] In the CPSU a department (*otdel*) in normally subdivided into sectors. However the Special Sector ranked as a department in its own right.

[2] B. Bazhanov, *Stalin: der Rote Diktator*, Berlin, 1931.

[3] Tovstukha's obituary, on which this is based, appeared in *Pravda* of 10 August 1935. His biography in the *Large Soviet Encyclopedia* published in 1956 makes no mention of his association with Stalin and the Secret Department.

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The slightly obscure phrasing of the obituary indicates that Tovstukha ceased to be Head of the Secret Department in November 1924. Examination of the list of signatories of Tovstukha's obituary suggests that his successor was probably L. Z. Mekhlis, who had served under Stalin in the Workers and Peasants Inspection (*Rabkrin*), and this was confirmed by B. G. Bazhanov, who was appointed an assistant to Stalin in August 1923 and served in that capacity for about a year. According to his biography,[4] Mekhlis worked for five years from 1922 (in an undisclosed capacity) in the CC apparatus and Trotsky mentions him as a personal secretary of Stalin around 1923. Bazhanov claimed that Tovstukha again became Head of the Secret Department when he returned to the CC in 1926.

In 1928, A. N. Poskrebyshev became Head of the Special Sector (its former title of Secret Department had evidently been discarded, but was brought back into use in the period 1930–34). Poskrebyshev had been a personal assistant to Stalin since 1924 [5] and continued in office until the winter of 1952–53.

Tovstukha's posting to the Secret Department coincided with Stalin's appointment as General-Secretary. From then on, there is no evidence of any formal distinction between Stalin's personal secretariat and the Secret Department/Special Sector, and they seem, in effect, to have been merged. In my *Communist Party of the Soviet Union*, of which the first edition was published in 1960, I suggested (p. 407, note 4), on the basis of conversations with the late B. I. Nicolaevsky, that the Secret Department and Stalin's personal secretariat were probably one and the same. This conclusion is now supported by the account of the work and organization of the Secret Department given by Bazhanov after his defection in 1928. Bazhanov said that Tovstukha, as chief assistant to Stalin, was also Head of the Secret Department and that Stalin's second and third assistants were First and Second Deputy Heads of the Department.

According to Bazhanov, the Secret Department served as the secretariat for the Politburo, the Ogburo and the Party Secretariat. It also contained a Cypher office and a General Chancery. The function of the latter was to register and check all incoming and outgoing secret documents. Bazhanov commented that the Secret Department and the Organization-Assignment Department were the two most important departments of the CC. He defined the role of the Secret Department as that of a technical mechanism of transmission between the small group of leaders, in whose hands effective power lay, and the countless ramifications of the Soviet Party and government machine.

Documents captured by the Germans in the second world war con-

[4] *Large Soviet Encyclopedia*, 1954. Mekhlis's obituary was published after Stalin's death. It is, therefore, not surprising that his association with Stalin was not alluded to in the obituary and subsequent biography.

[5] *Large Soviet Encyclopedia*, 1940.

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firm that the CC Special Sector was responsible for the security and handling of classified documents in the Party. It issued detailed instructions on this subject and tried to ensure that they were observed by subordinate Party organizations.[6]

In the Stalin era, the Heads of Special Sectors were identified in the CCs of some Union Republics. For example, in 1941, V. I. Popov was appointed Head of the Special Sector and Assistant to the First Secretary of the CC Uzbekistan.[7] Heads of Special Sectors were also identified in Moldavia (1944), Georgia (1946), Turkmenistan (1947), and Estonia and the Karelo-Finnish SSR (1958). All were members or candidate members of their Republican CC, but these rare references give no clue as to the nature of the work of the Special Sectors.

In the *oblast* Party headquarters (*obkom*), the Special Sector was responsible for internal security, including the handling of secret files and communications.[8] At the next subordinate level (*raikom*) in the Party, the Assistant Secretary carried out the duties of the Special Sector, which did not exist as such, at least in the less important *raikoms*. The Assistant Secretary was in charge of the maintenance of files and records of *raikom* and *raikom* bureau meetings and similar secretarial duties.[9] The Special Department (or Sector) of the OGPU was the ultimate authority in the USSR on the handling and protection of classified documents, and was responsible for investigating and prosecuting in cases where the regulations which it laid down were breached. Lengthy instructions on the handling of secret correspondence, issued by the Special Sector of the OGPU in 1927, specified that nobody could work on classified documents unless he had been thoroughly vetted by the OGPU.[10]

The regular duties of the Party Special Sector must have brought it into close contact with the State Security Service on matters connected with the security of Party offices and the handling of secret documents. If, as seems probable, these latter included security reports on Party officials, it is easy to see that the Special Sector would have become involved in the carrying out of Stalin's purges of his opponents. In this context, it should be noted that the registration and re-registration of Party members and the exchange of Party membership cards was an essential part of the machinery through which Stalin's purges of the Party were conducted.[11] Party cards have always been regarded as classified documents and the Special Sector would therefore have been responsible for their custody and issue (as will be seen below, its successor, the General Department, has this responsibility). This, too, would have involved the Special Sector in the purges and thus

[6] M. Fainsod, *Smolensk under Soviet Rule*, Cambridge, Mass., 1958, p. 79.
[7] *Pravda Vostoka*, 10 Sept. 1968, obituary of Popov.
[8] Fainsod, op. cit. p. 67.
[9] Fainsod, op. cit. p. 112.
[10] Fainsod, op. cit. pp. 164–65.
[11] Fainsod, op. cit. p. 210 and numerous other examples.

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brought it into close contact with the State Security organs. Still more important, Stalin's use of the Special Sector as a personal secretariat no doubt meant that his instructions to the State Security Service for measures to be taken against his victims were issued through Poskrebyshev and the Special Sector. We have already seen that Tovstukha, as might be expected of a member of Stalin's secretariat, was active in the struggle against Stalin's opponents. According to Bazhanov, Stalin used his second assistant, Kanner,[12] for operations against his opponents, ranging from stealing private papers to arranging unattributable murder. For this purpose, Kanner was in close touch with the OGPU and was able to call on its facilities. It was probably consideration of facts such as these, together with deliberate Soviet reticence about the Special Sector, which led Western experts to assume that the Special Sector was the CC department which exercised jurisdiction over the State Security Service.[13]

However, it is likely that there was another CC department which was responsible for supervision of the State Security Service, subject always to Stalin's idiosyncratic manipulation of the Party machine which must have distorted the formal pattern of command. In the early stages, the Organization-Assignment Department probably had a section responsible for the State Security Service. In the 1930 reorganization, the Assignment Department is known to have had a section for Soviet Administration, and at the seventeenth Party congress in 1934, Kaganovich described the task of the newly created CC Political-Administrative Department as being " to keep watch on Party aspects of work in general Soviet organs, in the Red Army and its Political Directorate, in procuratorial organs and others." The appearance of the word " Administrative " in the title of this Department indicates that it was a predecessor of the present CC Administrative Organs Department. This Department supervises the Armed Forces, the Procuracy and others, viz. the KGB and MVD, about which Soviet sources are as reticent now as Kaganovich was in 1934. I shall not attempt here to follow the history of the " Administrative " Department through the vicissitudes of successive reorganizations of the Party *apparat*. However, it is worth noting that in his secret speech at the twentieth Party congress, Khrushchev said that A. A. Kuznetsov, a Party Secretary, was responsible for supervision of the State Security agencies from 1946–48; and that a separate Administrative Department was established in the 1948 reorganization.

Poskrebyshev had been employed in 1919 as Head of the Department of Registration and Information of the Political Directorate of the Special Turkestan Army. In 1922, he joined the CC *apparat*,

[12] G. Kanner was one of the four signatories of Tovstukha's 1935 obituary who had either served or were serving in the Secret Department-Special Sector. He is reported to have been executed in the subsequent purges.

[13] Fainsod, *How Russia is Ruled*, Cambridge, Mass., 1953, pp. 170, 176. Cf. e.g. my *Communist Party of the Soviet Union*, p. 407, note 4.

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working first as an "instructor for registration," then as Deputy Administrator of Affairs. In 1924, he became Stalin's personal assistant and from 1928 combined this post with that of Head of the Special Sector. (As we have seen, the practice of combining these two posts was followed in at least one republic.) Poskrebyshev played an important part in the preparations for the eighteenth and nineteenth Party congresses and the eighteenth Party conference. On each occasion, he was a member of the congress or conference secretariat. He also played a leading role in editing Party documents. In 1931, he and a co-editor, M. Savelov, produced a volume of documents on Party policy—*Directives of the VKP (b) on Economic Problems.* With G. M. Malenkov and Ya. E. Brezanovsky, he edited the ninth edition of the *Spravochnik Partiinogo Rabotnika* in 1935, and he was one of the responsible editors of the *VKP (b) Resolutions and Decisions.* With P. N. Pospelov, he edited the thirteenth volume of Stalin's works. Poskrebyshev was also used in posts where he could influence and report on legislative procedures and the formulation of new laws. From 1946 until his dismissal, he was Chairman of the Commission for Legislative Proposals of the Council of the Union of the USSR Supreme Soviet. He was a member of the 1946 Commission for re-drafting the Soviet Constitution.

A recent work of fiction, *Blockade*, which gives the impression of having been compiled from official Soviet archives, supports the view that Poskrebyshev handled all documents of importance to Stalin. In it, the author, A. Chakovsky, describes a visit to Stalin by Admiral N. G. Kuznetsov at the end of August 1941. He comments:

> Everyone had long been accustomed to the fact that Stalin could only be reached through Poskrebyshev's office, that, as a rule, it was Poskrebyshev's voice that spoke over the telephone before Stalin began to speak himself, that all the papers that Stalin had to read went through his hands and that Stalin gave all the most important documents to Poskrebyshev for him to finish off.[14]

At the nineteenth Party congress in October 1952, Poskrebyshev headed the congress secretariat, made a long speech and was re-elected a full member of the CC CPSU. But within three months, he was out of office. The precise date of his removal is not known, but Svetlana Alliluеva, Khrushchev and Soviet press reports agree that it was in the winter of 1952, and not after Stalin's death in March 1953. Svetlana says:

> Shortly before my father died even, some of his intimates were disgraced: the perennial Vlasik was sent to prison in the winter of 1952 and my father's personal secretary, who had been with him for 20 years, was removed.[15]

[14] *Znamya*, No. 6, 1971, p. 25.

[15] *20 Letters to a Friend* by Svetlana Alliluеva, London, 1967.

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In January and early February 1953, there were Soviet press references to Poskrebyshev, not as Head of a Sector, but simply as a worker in the CC CPSU.[16] The statement in *Khrushchev Remembers* (published in 1970) that Stalin himself dismissed Poskrebyshev is more acceptable to the Soviet regime than Svetlana's contrary suggestion and may have been intended to refute it.

Poskrebyshev's successor in the Special Sector was V. N. Malin. Educated in Leningrad at the Kirov Higher Communist Agricultural School and the Institute of Red Professors, he was sent in 1937 directly from this Institute to Party work in Belorussia. On the outbreak of war, Malin became a member of the Military Council of the thirteenth Army on the South-Western Front and was assigned to work with a special group within the Organizational-Instructor's Department of the CC CPSU. Later he was attached to the partisan movement, first as Head of the Political Directorate, then as Chief of the Central Staff of the Partisan Movement. In these posts, he must have had close contact with Soviet State Security (the MGB Fourth Directorate controlled the Partisan organization). By 1943, he had been elected a Secretary of the Belorussian CC. Malin left Belorussia in 1947 to study at the Academy of Social Sciences attached to the CC CPSU. In 1952, having graduated from the Academy, he was posted to the Leningrad Party organization (*gorkom*). Later in 1952 (between April and September), he was transferred to the CC CPSU as an inspector.[17]

Malin does not appear to have had any close links with members of the Party leadership. He was probably a compromise choice. Poskrebyshev had acquired an unsavoury reputation and an influential position as a result of his long service under Stalin. Stalin's heirs were no doubt anxious to ensure that Poskrebyshev's successor should not gain the same influence and should not owe special allegiance to any Politburo member. Similarly, the title of the Special Sector, which was inextricably associated with Stalin's method of rule, was changed back to the original "General Department" (*Obshchii Otdel*), which was unsullied by association with Stalin. It was clearly intended that the Department should resume its original function as the chancery of the CC and should cease to act as the personal secretariat of the Party leader. It seems probable that Malin took over the Special Sector from Poskrebyshev at the time of the latter's dismissal, but according to his official Soviet biography, Malin first became Head of a Department in 1954.[18] This may mean that, after the removal of Poskrebyshev, the Special Sector of the CC CPSU retained its identity until the reorganization which followed the death of Stalin. Malin's deputy in the General Department, V. N. Chernukha, was a Civil War veteran who, according to his obituary,[19] was sent to "responsible work in

[16] *Moskovskaya Pravda*, 27 Jan. 1973, and *Vechernaya Moskva*, 6 Feb. 1973.
[17] *Sovetskaya Belorussia* 4 Mar. 1958.
[18] *Yearbook of the Large Soviet Encyclopedia*, 1962.
[19] *Pravda*, 9 Jan. 1965.

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the *apparat* of the CC CPSU" in 1925 and remained there until the illness which led to his death in 1965. The obituary's silence about the nature of Chernukha's work in the *apparat* suggests that he may, in fact, have served in the Secret Department/Special Sector.

Little information is available on the duties which Malin performed during his term of office (1954–65). He was elected to the Supreme Soviet in 1958 and 1962, but does not appear to have been a member of any Supreme Soviet Commission. He took over some of Poskrebyshev's editorial duties, e.g. that of editing the *Spravochnik Partiinogo Rabotnika* and he was elected to the Secretariat of the Party congress (in Malin's case, the twenty-first and twenty-second). However, there is no evidence that Malin ever acted as an assistant to Khrushchev, who had a separate personal staff of his own. Nor did Malin edit any of Khrushchev's published works.

Seven months after Khrushchev's fall, Brezhnev installed one of his own protégés, K. U. Chernenko, in Malin's place. Malin was appointed Rector of the Academy of Social Sciences attached to the CC CPSU. Chernenko's official biographies are uninformative about his early career, saying only that from 1929 to 1941 he was "engaged in responsible and leading work in the Komsomol, the Government and the Party," but an obituary in *Pravda* of 21 November 1972, signed by Chernenko, suggests that, like so many of Brezhnev's right-hand men, he spent part of his early career in Dnepropetrovsk. The subject of the obituary was S. G. Zadishchenko, a former First Secretary of Dnepropetrovsk *Obkom*. The signatories included Brezhnev, Kirilenko, Shcherbitsky, Grushevoi, Shchelokov and G. S. Pavlov, all of whom have early associations with Dnepropetrovsk. Examination of Zadishchenko's biography shows no other point where he might have worked with Chernenko. By 1950, Brezhnev and Chernenko were both in the *apparat* of the Moldavian CC and their careers have been closely linked since then. In 1956, shortly after Brezhnev became a Secretary of the CC CPSU, Chernenko was transferred from Moldavia to the Agitprop Department of the CC CPSU. In 1961, soon after Brezhnev had been made President of the Praesidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, Chernenko was chosen to head the Secretariat of this body, where he remained until 1965.

The list of signatures to the obituary of A. K. Gorchakov, the Head of Kosygin's private secretariat,[20] illustrates the close association between Chernenko's General Department and Brezhnev's and Kosygin's private secretariats. The signatures begin with Politburo members, then come the Deputy Chairmen of the USSR Council of Ministers plus Chernenko and Tsukanov (Head of Brezhnev's private secretariat). Smirtyukov, the Administrator of Affairs of the USSR Council of Ministers, follows in a group of his own and the list ends with the members of Kosygin's secretariat. Chernenko is the only head of a

[20] *Pravda*, 13 Sept. 1974.

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CC department amongst the signatories (although Tsukanov is believed to rank as head of a department, he is not officially listed as one). However, there is no evidence that Chernenko is considered to be one of Brezhnev's assistants or is regarded as a member of this private secretariat. Chernenko has never, so far as is known, been referred to as such in Soviet sources. In other respects, Chernenko's activities resemble those of Poskrebyshev. In the Supreme Soviet, he has regularly been elected to the Mandate Commission of the Council of the Union. Like Poskrebyshev and Malin, he has been a member of the secretariat of Party congresses. He edited every issue of the *Spravochnik Partiinogo Rabotnika* from 1966 to 1969.[21] Chernenko has also edited the new edition of *Resolutions and Decisions of the CC CPSU* which has been appearing since 1970. Of greater interest is the fact that in 1974 he was for the first time "responsible for publication" of a volume of Brezhnev's speeches. Previous volumes had been edited by members of Brezhnev's personal secretariat or by other officials about whom we know nothing.

Although the Special Sector of the CC had been transformed into the General Department by 1954, at lower Party levels the change took place much later. This long delay may indicate that at these levels the term Special Sector had not been tarnished by the same Stalinist associations as had been the case in Moscow. In Armenia, a General Department and Special Sector coexisted in 1956 and 1957.[22] In 1962, the Special Sector of the Moldavian CC evidently still had the status of a department, as can be seen from the obituary notice of A. G. Uskov, Head of the Moldavian CC Special Sector from 1944–62. It was signed by the entire Moldavian Party Secretariat, the President of the Praesidium of the Supreme Soviet, the Chairman and First Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers, the Chairmen of the TUC and the Moldavian Council of National Economy, the Komsomol First Secretary, the Heads of CC Departments, the Chairmen of the Moldavian KGB and the First Secretary of Kishinev *Gorkom*. No Moldavian CC sector heads signed, with the exception of Uskov's successor.[23]

It was not until 1966–67 that the Heads of Special Sectors in a number of Republics assumed the title of Head of the General Department. For example, in the Ukraine, A. M. Odnoromanenko, Head of the Special Sector of the Ukranian CC from 1948–66, was identified in April 1967 as Head of the General Department.[24] Ya. M. Kirsanov, Head of the Special Sector in Azerbaidzhan from 1961–66, was described as Head of the General Department in November 1967.[25]

[21] Subsequent issues have been edited by K. M. Bogolyubov, who was reported in 1968 to be First Deputy Head of a CC department. It thus seems probable that Bogolyubov is in fact in the General Department.

[22] *Kommunist Armenii*, 27 Jan. 1958.

[23] *Sovetskaya Moldavia*, 29 Aug. 1962.

[24] *Pravda Ukrainy*, 26 Apr. 1967.

[25] *Bakinskii Rabochii*, 24 Nov. 1967.

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In Turkmenistan, M. A. Gavrilov was referred to as Head of the Special Sector until June 1966, but in September 1966 was described as Head of the General Department.[26] V. Ya. Kryukov, Head of the Special Sector in Belorussia, was referred to as "Head of the General Department" from February 1967.[27] The same change of title is known to have occurred at this time in Estonia, Kirgizia, Latvia, Lithuania and Moldavia. In recent years, new heads of some republican General Departments have been recruited from the Department for Organizational-Party Work. As we saw above, V. I. Popov, Head of the Uzbek CC Special Sector in 1941, combined this post with that of Assistant to the First Secretary of the Uzbek CC, but no Head of a Republican CC General Department has been identified in this dual capacity.

The title of the Special Sector at the next subordinate level (*obkom*) seems to have been changed to General Department at about the same time as in the republics. A story by Lipatov published in *Moskva*, No. 2, 1968, twice mentioned the Head of the Special Sector in an *obkom*. The same story was re-published in *Znamya*, No. 2 in 1969, but with "Special Sector" altered to "General Department." In Georgia, the change occurred in 1966.

AN Italian Communist Party (PCI) delegation which visited Moscow in 1957 was given some information by the CPSU about the organization of the CC *apparat*. The published account of the visit[28] contains little or no information about two CC departments, namely, the Administrative Organs Department and the General Department. The latter was merely referred to in the PCI account as the "General Technical Department (archives, etc.)." In this context, "Technical" has the sense of providing a service, in contrast to the executive role of other CC departments. The limited evidence available from other sources shows that the General Department has the following functions:

(a) *Party Cards*

The General Department's responsibility for the issue and safe-keeping of Party cards was illustrated by a report in *Pravda* of 17 November 1972, on a meeting at the CC CPSU attended by Heads of General Departments in Union Republics, *kraikoms*, *obkoms*, and *okruzhkoms* and certain town and *raion* committees. Chernenko and N. A. Petrovichev, First Deputy Head of the Department for Organizational-Party Work of the CC CPSU, gave reports on the tasks confronting General Departments in connexion with the exchange of Party cards decided upon at the twenty-fourth Party congress. Chernenko himself was present at the signing of the first of the new

[26] *Turkmenskaya Iskra*, 24 Sept. 1966.
[27] *Sovetskaya Belorussia*, 17 Feb. 1967.
[28] *Problemi e Realtà dell'URSS*, Editori Riuniti, Rome, 1958.

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cards, issued to Brezhnev in person, and posed with his chief for a photograph. On 13 January 1973, a similar meeting was held in the offices of the Turkmen CC. Here the Head of the Department for Organizational-Party Work reported "On the preparations for the exchange of Party Cards," while the Head of the General Department reported "On the tasks of the General Departments of Party Committees arising from the results of the All-Union meeting and the CC CPSU." [29]

(b) *Party Archives*

According to an article by M. A. Gavrilov, Head of the General Department of the Turkmen CC,[30] a decree issued in October 1966 [31] laid down standard procedures for keeping records at all Party levels from primary organs upwards. Responsibility for keeping Party records lay with the General Departments or, in primary organizations, with the Technical Secretary. Gavrilov drew attention to the importance of stenographic reporting of speeches at meetings, sessions, plenums, conferences and congresses. He set out detailed instructions for drawing up the protocols of Party meetings and submitting them to higher authority, and for registering and keeping track of all correspondence received and recording action taken on it. In earlier articles,[32] Gavrilov had also emphasized the importance of correct and objective records of the discussion of the personal affairs of communists at Party meetings (e.g. when a member was censured or an applicant was being considered for admission). Yearly seminars on the keeping of Party records appear to have been held in the Tadzhikistan CC. *Kommunist Tadzhikistana* of 8 April 1973 reported on a two-day seminar for this purpose attended by the heads of General Departments at *oblast*, town and *raion* level. General Departments in lower formations would seem to have less enthusiasm and lower standards of literacy than their superiors, if we are to judge by the subjects covered by lecturers at a parallel course held a year later for General Departments of town and *raion* committees only.[33] These include, in addition to record keeping, the raising of cultural levels and the development of socialist competition to aid them in the fulfilment of their tasks.

(c) *Complaints*

At the nineteenth Party congress of the Armenian CP in January 1958, the Chairman of the Armenian Revision Commission, L. Osipyan, stated that "In 1956 the General Department received 4,357 miscel-

[29] *Turkmenskaya Iskra*, 13 Jan. 1973.
[30] *Turkmenskaya Iskra*, 14 Jan. 1967.
[31] A new decree on this subject was issued early in 1975. *Partiinaya Zhizn* No. 3, 1975.
[32] *Turkmenskaya Iskra*, 5 May 1965 and 19 Feb. 1966.
[33] *Kommunist Tadzhikistana*, 27 Apr. 1974.

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laneous reports and 1,320 telegrams, and 4,174 reports and 1,545 telegrams in 1957. The Special Sector received 11,985 letters and workers' declarations in 1956 and 12,296 in 1957." [34] Evidence that the General Department is responsible for registering, examining and initiating action on complaints made in writing or in person by members of the public is provided by the articles quoted on page 62. In a later article,[35] Gavrilov gives detailed instructions for recording personal visits by workers. A record of each visit should be entered in a ledger or card-index. This record should contain the name and surname of the visitor, the date of his visit and his address, a note of the content of his statement or question, the name of the official conducting the interview, the conclusion he comes to and the name of the official appointed to investigate the matter.

An article [36] by the Head of the General Department of the Kazakh CC, Kh. Abdrashitov, goes more fully into the reasons for this detailed study of workers' letters and complaints. He points out that:

> People who send in letters and complaints to Party, TU, Soviet and economic organs often raise questions which have a political and general State importance. They provide a wealth of material for assessing the mood of the people and act as a basis for decisions on improvements in industrial and cultural procedures.

All these articles stress the importance of analyzing such letters thoroughly and taking action on them whenever necessary, not forgetting, however, that it is equally necessary to "unmask people who make false charges in their letters." [37]

In *Kommunist Estonii*, No. 1, 1971 the Deputy Head of the General Department of the Estonian CC gives some examples of the kind of action taken by the Party on these letters and statements. A letter to the Estonian CC gave information on unlawful activities in a fish combine. A check revealed that goods were being issued from the central stores without the regulation documents. The Director of the Combine, the Chief Engineer and the Chief Accountant were all punished for their share in the affair. In another instance, the Head of the Trade Directorate of the Kokhtla Yarve Town Council was severely punished after an investigation of workers' letters complaining of nepotism and the misapplication of State funds. The attendance at a meeting of Heads of General Departments and Assistant Secretaries of *gorkoms* and *raikoms*, reported in *Zarya Vostoka* of 20 December 1966, reflects both the archival and the investigative aspects of the work of the General Department. The chief *rapporteur* at this meeting was the Head of the General Department of the Georgian CC, A. Manelashvili, and those taking part in the discussion, apart

[34] *Kommunist Armenii*, 27 Jan. 1958.
[35] *Turkmenskaya Iskra*, 4 Jan. 1968.
[36] *Kazakhstanskaya Pravda*, 31 Oct. 1967.
[37] *Kazakhstanskaya Pravda*, 31 Oct. 1967.

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from the Heads of General Departments, included the Chairman of the Georgian Revision Commission, the Chairman of the Georgian Party Commission and the Head of the Archives Directorate of the Georgian Council of Ministers.

(d) *Internal Security*

The fragmentary evidence available shows that the General Department took over the Special Sector's responsibility for internal security. In the short story quoted above, Lipatov describes how two Siberian factory directors, who were summoned to their local *obkom* and asked to hand in their Party cards, were interviewed by the Head of the Special Sector, a suave, well-groomed official. In a later paragraph, the doorkeeper, who had admitted the directors after a careful scrutiny of their Party cards, had to send for the Head of the Special Sector before letting them out without their cards. This internal security function is also touched on in the report on a Party Conference of Rovno *Obkom* published in *Pravda Ukrainy* of 21 December 1955. The report complains that workers from the *oblast* newspaper were not invited to the Party Conference:

> Apart from the Editor of the *oblast* newspaper, Comrade Medianik, who was a delegate to the conference, not one worker on the *oblast* newspaper was invited to the Conference. It is true that, at the persistent request of Comrade Medianik, the Heads of the two main sections of the editorial staff (the Propaganda Department and the Department of Party Life) were admitted to the hall; but after the interval the Head of the Special Sector of the *obkom*, Comrade Kovtun, suggested that they should leave the conference as they were, he said, "not delegates and not guests."

(e) *Secretariat for the Politburo*

It has been seen above that the Secret Department/Special Sector was the secretariat for the highest Party organs and that it was responsible for registering and checking all incoming and outgoing secret documents. It can safely be assumed that these duties have been performed by the General Department since it was re-established in 1954.

The General Department's responsibility for handling classified material in the CPSU, subject to the regulations laid down by the KGB, must bring it into close contact with the appropriate department of the KGB. This helps to explain why in Moldavia the KGB Chairman was the only official of ministerial rank who signed the obituary of the Head of the Special Sector in 1962. I have been unable to trace a more recent obituary, but it would not be surprising to find the KGB represented in any future obituary of a General Department Head. It is certainly possible that some officials of CPSU General Depart-

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ments may themselves be former members of the KGB. In the Soviet short story quoted above, the Head of an *Obkom* General Department was described in terms which might suggest an association with the KGB. In the Autumn 1974 issue of *Survey*, a former official of the CPSU, using the pseudonym A. Pravdin, stated that the CC "Special Department" was the eyes and ears of the KGB within the Party. Pravdin's use of an obsolete and inaccurate title does not inspire confidence in his testimony. There could, nevertheless, be an element of truth in his assertion if, as is possible, the General Department's responsibility for internal security in the Party includes liaison with the KGB on cases where Party members or officials are under investigation by the KGB. There is no direct evidence on this point, but such reports on Party members might equally well be handled by the Administrative Organs Department. Investigations of the kind described above must bring the Department into contact with the police and the KGB, as well as with the Party Control Committee. There is, however, nothing to suggest that the General Department has any wider executive function in the exercise of Party control over the KGB. This is quite clearly the responsibility of the Administrative Organs Department.

The following conclusions seem well founded:

1. From the time of his appointment as General-Secretary of the Communist Party in 1922, Stalin used the Secret Department/Special Sector as his personal secretariat in order to facilitate his manipulation of the Party machinery.

2. His successors dismantled this arrangement in order to limit the power of the Party First Secretary and to facilitate the establishment of collective leadership.

3. Brezhnev's assessment of the great political importance of the General Department to the Party leader was shown by the way in which he appointed his own nominee to it when he was in a position to do so, a move which Khrushchev had failed to make.

4. The General Department's role as the Politburo's secretariat makes it a key link in the Soviet political command structure. The General Department's duties require close contact with the KGB on security matters, but it is not responsible for supervision of the KGB.

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The Ebb and Flow of Sino-Soviet Literary Relations

Julian L. Laychuk

THE Sino-Soviet ideological break of the late 1950s and early 1960s effectively put an end to a decade of cultural cooperation between the two great communist powers and ushered in a period of cultural development along completely independent paths. The actual divergence of their ways and the varied nature of political and social events affecting the sphere of literary politics in the Soviet Union and China during the 1960s and into the 1970s did not prevent either from continuing to profess, in theoretical terms, an allegiance to a purely "socialist" literature and art reflecting a new society, although that literature and art was defined differently as "socialist realist" by Soviet spokesmen, and as a "combination of revolutionary realism and revolutionary romanticism," "proletarian," or "mass" literature and art by the Chinese. In the cultural realm, too, the Russians and Chinese even now profess basically the same goals—the well-rounded education and intellectual development of the masses under the favourable conditions of a just social order—but interpret the ways and means of attainment of those goals variously and with significantly different emphasis.

The ebb in the powerful tide of co-operation, i.e. the abrupt cessation of cultural contacts and influences, is sufficient cause for a re-examination and reappraisal of the latter—still not too remote in temporal terms—phenomenon; thus, the significance of the changes, clearly manifested in the events of the years since 1960, is cast in bolder relief and can better be appreciated and understood.

An examination of the history of Soviet and Chinese literary developments before the establishment of the official literary and artistic associations of the two countries—the Union of Soviet Writers (USW) in 1932 and the All-China Federation of Literary and Art Circles (ACFLAC) in 1949—reveals, despite obvious differences in such elusive and imponderable factors as historical traditions, national characteristics, degree of social maturity, etc., certain features and experiences common to both, albeit encountered in varying degrees and at different junctures in time. Among these, one can distinguish a pronounced strain of iconoclasm, i.e. a conscious desire to break all ties with the traditions of the past, which characterized certain groups of Soviet writers following the October Revolution of 1917 (e.g. the *Proletcult* association which advocated the creation of a new proletarian culture) and a much more significant part of the Chinese intelligentsia in the wake of the May Fourth Movement in China a scant two years later. Also manifested was a significant interest

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in, and commitment in greater or lesser degree to, Marxist aesthetics which viewed literature and art as part of the superstructure, arising spontaneously and naturally from the economic base and expressing the new economic relationships contained therein.

Both literatures were marked by heated controversy and polemics surrounding the issues of the creative process and the role and function of literature and the arts in society. In the Soviet case, such controversy and parrying of opinion occurred during the first decade of Soviet power and had some beneficial results, since they stimulated and fostered a veritable renaissance in literature which was marked by experimentation in language, form and style, and artistic imagination in the creative treatment of new ideas and subject matter. Such intellectual ferment was also a feature of Chinese cultural life during roughly the same period, but it continued to be felt, albeit to a somewhat reduced extent, during much of the 1930s as well. Naturally, there was some difference in the degree of, and limitations on, the freedom of expression of Soviet and Chinese writers, because of the differences in their respective political situations and environments. For example, the Soviet " proletarian " writers had at least a degree of official and/or unofficial support for their artistic ideas in the presence of an established and sympathetic political authority; that authority, if not overtly, then at least covertly and psychologically, inhibited the expression of " non-proletarian," not to speak of ideologically-hostile, views. On the other hand, polemics marking the Chinese literary scene were quite open and far-ranging, for the advocates of even " reactionary," traditional art, although in the minority, did not have to concern themselves with the political ramifications of their works or pronouncements, since no corresponding " revolutionary " authority with unlimited powers and sanctions loomed in the background. (Increasing political pressures began to be experienced in the early 1930s with the establishment of the [Chinese] League of Left Wing Writers, in which a prominent role was played by the Communist Party of China [CCP] through its " cultural " officials).

The emergence of a wide variety of rival literary associations and their eventual absorption by one monolithic cultural body was a common feature of the literary history of both nations from the beginning of the 1920s.[1] In April 1932, the resolution of the CPSU(b) " On the Reorganization of Literary and Artistic Organizations " cur-

[1] For lucid accounts of the emergence and role of literary associations in the Soviet Union before 1932 and in China before 1949, see the following sources: Vera Alexandrova, *A History of Soviet Literature* (New York: Doubleday and Company, 1963); Marc Slonim, *Soviet Russian Literature: Writers and Problems* (New York, 1964); Max Hayward and Leopold Labedz (eds.), *Literature and Revolution in Soviet Russia 1917–1962* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1963); James Robert Hightower, *Topics in Chinese Literature: Outlines and Bibliographies* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1962); and A. C. Scott, *Literature and the Arts in Twentieth Century China* (Garden City, New York: Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1963).

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tailed the existence of *all* literary groupings, orthodox as well as unorthodox in the political or ideological sense, and provided for the creation of one organization "uniting all writers who support the platform of the Soviet regime and seek to participate in socialist construction." [2] At a stroke, the life of the All-Union Unified Association of Proletarian Writers (VOAPP) and of the more moderate association *Pereval* ("The Pass"), as well as that of the loosely-affiliated, independently-minded "Fellow Travellers," was at an end. Similarly, following the May Fourth Movement, China witnessed a proliferation of literary and artistic groups, of which the major ones—dissimilar in philosophy, aims and membership—were the Literary Research Society, Creation Society, Small Talk Society and Crescent Moon Society. In view of the artistic bias of many of the members, and subsequent political events (the dominant strain of iconoclasm, the writers' desire for artistic experimentation, their concern with, and desire for, political and social change and improvement, and their conception of the functional, utilitarian, even "civic" role of art, all accompanied by the suppression of communist and left-wing activities by the goverment in 1927), an increasing radicalization of their political and social views took place, which led to the establishment in 1930 of the League of Left Wing Writers whose members were drawn from many of the preceding groups. During the 1930s, the Japanese threat and invasion, and the need for national unity and solidarity, resulted in the creation of two competing bodies—both Marxist in outlook—the United Association of Chinese Writers, led by Chou Yang, and the Chinese Literary Workers of Lu Hsun. As a preliminary to the formation of the monolithic ACFLAC, the 1940s witnessed events of paramount importance for the Chinese cultural realm—Chairman Mao's 1942 "Talks" [3] in Yenan on literature and the arts, and, pursuant to that, repeated *cheng feng* (rectification) campaigns directed at intellectuals with the express purpose of "remoulding" their thought and bringing it into line with the sentiments expressed in the "Talks." Mao's basic assumptions in the "Talks" were in accord with classical Marxist aesthetics: art and literature "belong" to definite social classes, and at any given time, the prevailing culture is that of the dominant social class; art and literature are an integral part of the superstructure of the dominant socio-economic system; and no such things as art for art's sake, abstract or supra-class art exist. Therefore, all art must be part of the revolutionary struggle. Specifically, the masses have their own cultural forms, and it is the duty of intellectuals of bourgeois origin to change their attitude, to master those forms, and to develop a

[2] *Pervyi vsesoyuznyi sezd sovetskikh pisatelei, 1934. Stenograficheskii otchet* (Moscow, 1934), p. 7.

[3] For detailed discussions of Mao's "Talks" see Merle Goldman, *Literary Dissent in Communist China* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1967), and Paul G. Pickowicz, "Literature and People in the People's Republic," Centre of Asian Studies, Hong Kong, 29–30 May 1971 (a working paper).

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proletarian or mass written art extolling the masses, and aimed at them directly. The yawning chasm between the intellectuals and the masses was stressed by Mao, and on 23 May, in the second of his two talks, he declared that the popularization of art, the dissemination of culture among the masses—a quantitative criterion—was primary, and art's elevation—the qualitative criterion—secondary. Finally, art's thrust must be political: the message or the content, that is *what is expressed*, is always of more importance than the artistic quality, *the form or the way in which it is expressed*. The political criterion must always be viewed as superior to the artistic.

Several months before the complete communist victory on the Chinese mainland, preparations were made for convening a congress of writers and artists in Peking. That congress resulted in the establishment of the ACFLAC. As in the Soviet case, the creation of a monolithic body virtually put an end to any possibility of expressing competing views on the fundamental questions of art and literature, or of organizing any sustained resistance to the Party-established view.[4]

AN examination of the charters of the USW and ACFLAC, adopted in 1934 and 1949 respectively, reveals striking similarities in the structure and aims of, and the framework proposed for, the respective organizations. Although there are a few specific differences, they are mostly matters of emphasis and degree, rather than of kind. The Soviet document obviously required much more thorough and detailed preparation, which, indeed, encompassed a period of some 28 months, compared to the Chinese rather feverish three-month effort of planning. It is thus more detailed, systematic, business-like, readable, longer, and certainly more subtle. On the other hand, the more imprecise Chinese document is incomparably more revolutionary in its spirit, terminology, and stated purposes. Yet their *raison d'être*, their fundamental unity of purpose, their psychological and political aims are transparently alike, and the Soviet example and experience was almost certainly responsible for that fact. Both charters spelled out their respective associations' legality, monolithic character and exclusiveness in terms of their right to represent the *whole* body of writers in their country, and both espoused the principle of creating and developing a mass "workers', peasants' and soldiers'" literature and art, meeting the needs of the new society and superseding the allegedly elitist, individualistic, unprincipled art of the past. And, expressing that idealistic, if unrealistic and naïve desire, both attempted psychologically to enlist the spiritual support of their respective writing fraternities. Yet, stripped of all the formalities and idealistic

[4] Goldman, op. cit., calls the ACFLAC "a device for combining all factions and all intellectuals into one body over which the Communist Party could exercise direct supervision."

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trappings, writers were actually expected to change their attitude when necessary, and willingly to devote all their creative efforts and talents to the furtherance of a specific ideological cause.

Apart from their basic similarity, there were a few differences, the two most important of which—resulting from the difference in time and circumstances accompanying the charters' adoption—are discussed here. The Soviet charter begins with a definition of socialist realism which was henceforth to be the sole guiding principle of literary and artistic creativity. It is not necessary to discuss at any length this method, its shortcomings, or the implications it had for the creative process; the actual charter definition will suffice for those insufficiently acquainted with the method:

> Socialist realism, as the basic method of Soviet *belles-lettres* and literary criticism, requires of the artist an accurate, historically concrete portrayal of reality in its revolutionary development. Furthermore, the accuracy and historical concreteness of the artistic portrayal must be combined with the accomplishment of the task of the principled remoulding and nurturing of the toilers in the spirit of socialism.[5]

The requirements understood by or implied in the above definition included the three principles of *partiinost* (Party spirit), *narodnost* (the spirit of the people), and *ideinost* (principled nature), and, further, the requisite amount of didacticism and "life-affirming" optimism, and a "suitable" level of artistic technique. The Chinese, who were to adopt formally the same artistic method at their second congress of 1953, confined themselves in 1949 to vague generalities about the need to build a "new democratic people's literature and art," to assist and guide mass literary activities, and to foster new literary and artistic forces within the ranks of the "workers, peasants and soldiers." The actual difference, however, is less important than would appear on the surface, since one of the tasks listed in the Chinese charter already laid the groundwork for socialist realism at a later date. Chinese writers and artists were exhorted to develop, through their works, the people's political awareness or consciousness (cf. Soviet *partiinost*) and to show the steady growth and significant achievements of the masses (cf. the Soviet requirement of a "historically concrete portrayal of reality in its revolutionary development"). Apart from the charter, the Chinese emphasis, since the 1930s, on folk literary and artistic forms and traditions—a policy resurrected and reinforced in the late 1950s—has something in common with Soviet *narodnost*. It goes without saying that *ideinost*, the third pillar supporting the edifice of socialist realism, was accepted beyond any question, since Chinese writers were expected to take a "principled," partial, proudly tendentious stand on all fundamental issues of the day.

[5] *Pervyi vsesoyuznyi* . . . , p. 716.

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The question remains: why did those who drafted the Chinese charter in 1949 not mention explicitly socialist realism? The question is debatable, but several explanations can be advanced for the omission. First, during the 1940s, factions present within the body of writers took at times radically different stands on the question of the proper place, purpose and form of art and literature, and the cause of unity would have suffered in 1949, had one exclusive method been immediately established and enforced. Second, the official leadership itself was not yet convinced of the necessity of formally endorsing the Soviet artistic method, since the direction for Chinese literature and art had supposedly been laid down by Mao Tse-tung in his 1942 talks (which, in any case, differed little from Zhdanov's prescriptions of 1934). Third, the Chinese—very much the "junior" partner at the time—could have wished to show deference towards the Soviet Union by implicitly confessing its lack of the necessary "maturity" for an immediate adoption of full-blown socialist realism.

A second fundamental difference lay in the membership principle adopted by the two associations, although even in this connection the difference in practice was more apparent than real. The USW set out, in detailed form, requirements for admission, application procedures, and expulsion and withdrawal provisions for writers as *individuals*, and thereby recognized, at least formally, the writer's individuality. The Chinese document made no such formal concession, but, through its explicit endorsement of the *collective* membership principle, bluntly asserted its desire to collectivize writers. The writer within the collective did not have any status in his own right, since only the will, desires and preferences of his own collective were recognized. In that respect, as in a number of others, the Chinese charter was much more radical and revolutionary. The perfunctory and matter-of-fact statements on admission procedures and expulsion provisions also contrasted sharply with those in the Soviet document, i.e. collective membership was virtually automatic upon request, withdrawal was a pure formality, and reprimand and expulsion were penalties for unspecified acts or behaviour adversely affecting the work of other members.

Congresses of the All-Union USW have been held, despite the provisions in the original charter, only five times to date: on 17 August–1 September 1934, 15–26 December 1954, 18–23 May 1959, 22–30 May 1967, and on 28 June–3 July 1971 (with respective gaps of 20, 5, 8, and 4 years between consecutive congresses). The Chinese also staged their congresses at irregular time intervals: on 2–19 July 1949, 25 September–6 October 1953, and 22 July–13 August 1960 (with intervals of 4 and 7 years). In both cases, congresses have been postponed. One can speculate, with some degree of certainty, on the particular reasons or special circumstances which, in the eyes of the cultural adminis-

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trators and spokesmen, made delay advisable. Thus, the second Soviet congress was postponed for 17 years, first by the Great Purge of 1937 and subsequent years, when, for many intellectuals in Soviet society, sheer physical survival, rather than literary and cultural problems, was the issue; then by the devastating holocaust of war; and finally by the Soviet political hierarchy's choice of exercising direct and open control over the arts through the offices of Andrei Zhdanov and his successors.[6] The third congress was postponed for one year, probably because of the general ferment among Soviet writers caused by the de-Stalinization policy of 1956 and the subsequent partial retreat from liberalization; and the fourth was delayed, again, by dissension in writers' ranks caused by renewed Party rigidity and hostility towards the "liberal" writers. In China, the third congress was postponed for three years, officially because of the Anti-Rightist Campaign of 1957 and early 1958, the thought rectification drive, and the campaign against the so-called "Ting Ling–Chen Ch'i-hsia clique." The second congress of the ACFLAC was held one year later than the time stipulated in its charter.

Developments in Soviet and Chinese literature during the 1950s were quite understandably the focus of attention at the USW and ACFLAC congresses of that period and in the intervals between the congresses. A process of alternate relaxation and tightening of ideological controls was common to both literatures and even coincided to some extent, at least until the last years of the decade, although the ups and downs were more drastic and pronounced in the Chinese case. The death of Stalin resulted in a period of relaxation in Soviet literature which witnessed not only works on subjects which had previously been taboo, but articles critical of the sacred cow of socialist realism itself and of the bureaucratic *modus operandi* of the USW.[7] This crucial issue

[6] This was illustrated by the Soviet Communist Party's resolutions on literature and the arts during the last half of the 1940s. The most famous of the resolutions was published in 1946 in condemnation of the editorial policy of the two literary journals *Zvezda* (*Star*) and *Leningrad*. See Andrei A. Zhdanov, *Doklad o zhurnalakh "Zvezda" i "Leningrad"* (Moscow, 1952). Specifically, the satirist Mikhail Zoshchenko and the poetess Anna Akhmatova were censured for consistently writing works either "inimical with," or downright "harmful to," the interests and needs of the Soviet people, and both were subsequently expelled from the Union of Soviet Writers. The editorial staff of *Zvezda* was thoroughly reorganised, and *Leningrad* was discontinued. In the same year, Zhdanov censured recent Soviet drama and the famous director Eisenstein, and in 1948 he attacked modernist trends in Soviet music as a manifestation of "cosmopolitanism."

[7] The two most important articles were V. Pomerantsev's "Ob iskrennosti v literature," *Novyi mir*, No. 12 (1953), pp. 218–45, and I. G. Ehrenburg's "O rabote pisatelya," *Znamya*, No. 10 (1953), pp. 160–83. With regard to the USW, its structure and its operative principles, the official organ of the Union, *Literaturnaya gazeta*, printed on 26 October 1954 an open letter from a group of writers, including E. Kazakevich, M. Lukonin, K. Paustovsky, V. Kaverin, S. Shchipachev and S. Marshak, in which they condemned the bureaucracy of the USW and proposed the transfer of all executive work to the magazines and publishing houses, and the abolition of the Board and its commissions. The "Literary Fund" was to remain, of course, to support

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of socialist realism, whether referred to explicitly or implicity, was debated at the second congress of the USW, and in subsequent years continued to be the one which separated the " liberal " and " conservative " camps of writers. The congress of 1954 officially reaffirmed it, and there was a tactical retreat of the " liberals " in 1955. The twentieth congress of the CPSU, in February 1956, unleashed even more powerful " fresh winds of change " in the cultural sphere, which were stilled by Khrushchev's personal intervention in 1957, after the disasters of Poland and Hungary.[8] From that time until the third congress of Soviet writers in 1959, the " conservatives " had the upper hand, at least nominally, but the " liberals " were far from silent,[9] believing that time was on their side, and expecting a new " thaw " to occur in the near future. Their hopes were justified by the anti-Stalinist twenty-second CPSU congress of 1961.

The Chinese experience paralleled that of the Russians for much of the decade. After the period of political entrenchment and consolidation of the regime in the first years of the 1950s, during which various " rectification " campaigns, aimed at the intellectuals among other groups, took place,[10] a period of limited and conditional relaxation occurred in 1953 and 1954 (reflected in the comparatively self-assured and relaxed atmosphere of the second congress of the ACFLAC in 1953). This was followed by the massive " freeze " of the Hu Feng

writers' activities. Polemics ensued before the second congress, as a result of the open letter, and V. Azhaev, chairman of the commission for work with young writers, especially condemned the proposal to truncate the " Gorky USW." He was answered by the same group of liberals: see " Otvet Azhaevu," *Literaturnaya gazeta*, 23 November 1954.

[8] N. S. Khrushchev's stern lectures to writers, artists and intellectuals were published in *Literature, The Arts, and the Life of the People* (London: Soviet News, 1957).

[9] At the time, the Chinese did cite the views of unorthodox Soviet writers such as Ehrenburg and Pasternak as negative examples, and in support of the official Soviet cultural line. For example, A. Dymshits' article critical of Ehrenburg was translated and published in *Wen I Pao*, No. 23 (1959), pp. 26–32. (*Wen I Pao* was the official organ of the ACFLAC).

[10] For example, the ACFLAC, at an enlarged session of its Standing Committee held on 17 November 1951, decided to organise a remoulding and study movement for ideological reform, first in Peking and then throughout the whole of China. The method to be used in the movement was to listen to reports, study certain documents (Chairman Mao's " On Practice," the Yenan talks, various decisions of the CPSU, Zhdanov's 1946 reports), exercise criticism and self-criticism, examine one's ideology and style of work and discuss methods of improvement. See " Remoulding and Study Movement Unfolded Among Literary and Art Circles," *Survey of the China Mainland Press*, No. 227 (Hong Kong: United States Consulate-General), 1 December 1951, pp. 10–13. University professors especially were the object of the thought rectification campaign of the summer of 1951. This was to eliminate the " pernicious " influences of Hu Shih philosophy with its alleged pragmatism and westernism. The same year witnessed the " 3-Anti " campaign against bureaucratism, and the " 5-Anti " campaign against private industry and commerce. For a detailed account of the thought rectification process used in China in the 1950s and earlier see Theodore H. E. Chen, *Thought Reform of the Chinese Intellectuals* (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 1960); Harriet C. Mills, " Thought Reform: Ideological Remoulding in China," *Atlantic*, December 1949, pp. 71–7; and Robert J. Lifton, *Thought Reform and the Psychology of Totalism: A Study of " Brainwashing " in China* (New York: Norton, 1961).

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campaign in 1955.[11] The CCP-sponsored "Hundred Flowers" campaign of much of 1956 and, in particular, of five short weeks in May and June 1957[12] (cf. the Soviet "Thaw" and de-Stalinization of the same period) was demolished by the savage Anti-Rightist Campaign of the last half of 1957 and early 1958.[13] The "mass literature" campaign of the Great Leap Forward (GLF) period and the *hsia fang* ("transfer down") movement of intellectuals that ensued was not only an official and enthusiastic re-endorsement of the orthodox Maoist position on literature and the arts,[14] but was contrasted sharply

[11] The "trigger" unleashing the campaign against Hu Feng was his famous "five daggers" report to the CC of the CCP in December 1954. In it Hu claimed that "five daggers" had been thrust into the brain of the writer, which were: the unquestioning acceptance of communist ideology, the mandatory duty of the writer to "penetrate" the ranks of the workers, peasants and soldiers, the need to undergo ideological reform and re-education, the need for works to be in a form prescribed by the Party, and on subjects designated by the Party. Specific remedies advocated by Hu, besides the reorganization of the Federation, included voluntary self-study in the place of compulsory remoulding sessions, an end to the publication of cultural magazines by the Party, the establishment of seven or eight new national journals edited by professionals, with two dozen or so regular contributors and with full freedom of editorial policy, and the freedom of literary projects. See K. E. Priestley, *China's Men of Letters: Yesterday and Today* (Hong Kong: Dragonfly Books, 1962), pp. 67–8.

[12] Lu Ting-yi, "Let a Hundred Flowers Bloom, a Hundred Schools of Thought Contend!" *People's Daily*, 13 June 1956. For an interesting comparison of the basic differences between the "Thaw" phenomenon in Soviet literature following Stalin's death and the "Hundred Flowers" movement of 1956–57 see S. H. Chen, "Artificial 'Flowers' during a Natural 'Thaw,'" in *Soviet and Chinese Communism: Similarities and Differences*, D. W. Treadgold (ed.) (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1967), pp. 219–54. In his introduction to the same volume, Victor Erlich points out that despite the differences between the "Thaw" and the "Hundred Flowers," indicated by Chen, those events had one thing in common, i.e. the "residual conflict of interest between the intellectual and the communist *apparatchik*," the former standing for "integrity and autonomy," the latter for "maximising control and uniformity" (p. 216). See also *Communism in China* (Union Research Institute, Hong Kong, 1959), in particular the tenth chapter (pp. 162–96) devoted to the social and cultural life of China, for the view that the "Hundred Flowers" movement was launched for two reasons: to ease domestic tensions among intellectuals in particular which had reached a high level because of the anti-Hu Feng campaign of 1955, and to adjust to the new "liberal" position of the Soviet leadership following the twentieth Party congress in the Soviet Union. On the same subject is Roderick MacFarquhar's *The Hundred Flowers Campaign and the Chinese Intellectuals* (London: Stevens and Sons, 1960).

[13] The "anti-revisionist" line of the Anti-Rightist Campaign was strengthened by the Moscow Declaration of November 1957, which, together with Khrushchev's attacks on non-conformists in the Soviet Union at the time, led to improved relations between the two countries, relations that had been strained by the 1956 de-Stalinization policy. At the time, a special issue of *I Wen* ("Translated Literature") was devoted to Soviet and Russian literature, in celebration of the fortieth anniversary of the Russian Revolution; writers represented included Fedin, Gorky, Lavrenyov, Malyshkin, A. K. Tolstoy, Surkov, Ehrenburg, Bedny, Bryusov, and Yesenin.

[14] In line with the rectification campaign, writers were exhorted to leave Peking for rural areas to study and to live the life of the masses; further, the Secretariat of the CWU was to desist from assigning writers to stay at the Union headquarters in Peking and from the policy of training writers in the classroom; it was also estimated that 45–50 per cent of operational personnel of the WU sub-organs could be "transferred down" to the countryside. See "Writers Enter New Correctional Phase," SCMP, No. 1671, 13 December 1957, pp. 21–3. In May 1958, with China's literary journals competing for workers' and peasants' writing, *Renmin Wenhsüeh* ("People's Literature") gave itself over entirely to the publication of the poems and songs of the workers and peasants. The ACFLAC announced that its central task was to collect, edit and

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with the rather uncertain and defensive stance of the Soviet orthodox cultural establishment at about the same time (here the divergence in the paths of cultural development can be seen clearly). Interestingly, despite a few concessions made to the Chinese "liberals" in 1959 because of the failures of the GLF, the next real, but not extensive, relaxation in the Chinese cultural realm occurred in 1961 (cf. the "liberal renaissance" in Soviet letters in the same year).

Sino-Soviet cultural contacts of the 1950s—to which the ideological break put an end—were extensive in scale and diverse in terms of the means through which they were administered.[15] Contacts and influences included ongoing exchanges of official and unofficial spokesmen of the respective associations, ambitious programmes for the exchange of publications and, during the first half of the 1950s in particular, extensive co-operation in the field of translation. The means used for the formalization and administering of those contacts were, variously, political, educational, governmental and social, as well as purely cultural. Thus, apart from the significant association-to-association relationship, a role in the promotion of cultural contacts and co-operation was played by such bodies as the World Peace Congress,[16] the Ministries of Education and Culture of both countries [17]

publicize folk literature. The literary event of 1958 was the publication of the collection *Songs of the Red Flag*, edited by Chou Yang and Kuo Mo-jo. See also S. H. Chen, "Multiplicity in Uniformity" in Roderick MacFarquhar (ed.) *China under Mao: Politics Takes Command* (M.I.T. Press, Cambridge, Mass. and London, 1966), pp. 392–406, on GLF poetry.

[15] For an interesting account of Soviet influence on Chinese communist literature, particularly during the last half of the 1950s, see D. W. Fokkema, *Literary Doctrine in China and Soviet Influence 1956–60* (The Hague: Mouton and Company, 1965).

[16] An indication of the degree of involvement of USW and ACFLAC personalities in World Peace Council activities is given in the following factual statements: in September 1951, Ilya Ehrenburg and the Chilean poet Pablo Neruda, both members of the Stalin Peace Prize Committee, visited Peking to present the prize to Mme Soong Ching-ling, widow of Sun Yat-sen. The SSFA gave a tea for Ehrenburg and Neruda, at which the latter recited a poem he had written about exploitation of the common people in Latin America. (See Daily News Release, Chinese Information Bureau, Press Administration, No. 804, 17 September 1951, p. 85). In November 1952, N. Tikhonov, Deputy General Secretary of the Union of Soviet Writers, visited Peking as head of a Soviet Cultural delegation and Chairman of the Soviet Peace Committee, at the request of the Chinese Peace Committee, and made a report to an audience of 1,500 representatives of the democratic parties and people's organizations. In early March 1955, the Soviet writers A. Korneichuk and his wife, Wanda Wasilewska, visited China as members of the Soviet Peace Committee, at the invitation of the Chinese Peace Committee and the Chinese People's Association for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries. Kuo Mo-jo and Mao Tun were in the welcoming party. (SCMP, 1001, 5–7 March 1955, p. 11). In October 1959, Mme Soong and N. Tikhonov, chairmen of their respective Friendship Associations, attended a mass rally in Peking, celebrating their tenth anniversary. Lu Ting-yi and Kuo Mo-jo were prominent among the 1,600 present.

[17] Concerning educational exchange, see SCMP, No. 1958, 20 February 1959, for the note that the National Library of Peking had established exchanges with 52 public and university libraries, scientific and research organizations and institutes, and publishing houses of the Soviet Union. The Ministries of Culture of both countries negotiated each year comprehensive Cultural Co-operation Agreements, which provided for the exchange of writers, artists, folk troupes, specialists in all fields, films, and

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and the Sino-Soviet Friendship Association,[18] in all of which leading spokesmen from the cultural realm were prominent through their activities and responsibilities.

THIS was the experience of cultural co-operation between the Russians and Chinese during the 1950s—the "flow" of the warm tide of comradeship, fraternal assistance, beneficient influence and sympathetic understanding. The intimacy of the 1950s, however, was washed away by an ebb-tide of profound distrust and mutual recrimination in the early 1960s, which betrayed a rocky shore truly bleak and desolate in its prospects for further co-operation. Literary and cultural development thenceforth proceeded along mutually exclusive channels. The Soviet Communist Party reaffirmed in 1961 its opposition to Stalinism and inclined toward the "liberal" wing of the Soviet writing establishment, at least to a degree. True, official endorsement of the position of the conservatives continued in force, e.g. opposition to "ideological co-existence," but the fact that differing views could be expressed on literary matters and approaches, such as modernist trends in twentieth century European and American literature, was a concrete indication of more tolerance. In the mid-1960s, with the overthrow of the Khrushchev leadership, a policy reversal in favour of the "conservative" camp took place, which was reflected in the arrest of a number of the more daring and outspoken writers (who, incidentally, were not without support), and in the proceedings of the 1967 and 1971 congresses of the USW which were an endorsement of the orthodox position. The harassment and forced exile of Solzhenitsyn, and the official support for socialist realism and its exponents are testimony to the continued predominance of the orthodox cultural line and to the pre-eminence of politics and ideology in the realm of culture. The USW, with its prescriptions, tasks, bureaucratic administration and present "conservative" outlook, is not likely to undertake any fundamental changes—certainly not its own dissolution—in the foreseeable future. Minor changes only, in the organizational structure, or in emphasis on and interpretations of literary theory and practice, can be expected; as in the past, these will undoubtedly reflect the views and preferences of highly-placed individuals in the Party hierarchy, or changes in the power relations at a high level.

for many kinds of cultural co-operation and liaison. In this regard see SCMP, No. 1653, 18 November 1957, p. 53, for the note that Mao Tun was in Moscow to negotiate the 1958 Agreement, and SCMP, No. 1659, 26 November 1957, pp. 39–40, for information to the effect that co-operation on a much broader scale was envisaged for the new agreement.

[18] For detailed information on the SSFA, see the unpublished MA thesis by Klaus H. Pringsheim, "The Sino-Soviet Friendship Association (October 1949–October 1951)," Faculty of Political Science and the East Asian Institute, Columbia University. Duplicated in 1960 by the U.S. Information Service, Hong Kong. See also Ch'en Ying-nan, "The Interflow of Sino-Soviet Publications during the Past Two Years," *People's Daily*, 14 February 1952; the books, periodicals, newspapers, pictures were received by the Chinese SSFA.

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The Chinese cultural experience since the break has been incomparably more taxing, traumatic and tortuous. The years 1961–2 were marked by a definite lull in ideological campaigns which evoked what one writer calls " faint echoes of the Hundred Flowers " campaign of 1956–57.[19] In this instance, fairly free debate on academic subjects of a non-political nature and even some criticism of the lower-level CCP cadres was permitted, provided, in all cases, that the political position of the debater was beyond reproach. In the autumn of 1962, a change occurred in which a definite re-emphasis on the class-struggle in attitudes and in " revolutionary " literary and art works was demanded. This coincided with heated frontal attacks on Soviet " revisionism " in general and on the artistic views of " revisionist " writers like Yevtushenko and Ehrenburg in particular.[20] All was not well within the Chinese cultural realm either, for at about the same time, competition for authority ensued between, on the one side, the Ministry of Culture and the Propaganda Department of the CC of the CCP) represented by the previously politically impeccable and unassailable pillars of the Chinese writing establishment, Chou Yang and Mao Tun) and, on the other, Lin Piao and his cultural propaganda teams of the People's Liberation Army (PLA). Chairman Mao threw his weight behind the latter in June 1964, by denouncing the " bureaucrats " of the cultural establishment for distorting his artistic line, adhering to a bourgeois-revisionist position, and giving insufficient importance to the class struggle. The years 1964 and 1965 witnessed a number of events that utterly destroyed the elaborate apparatus of a cultural administration that had been erected a decade and a half earlier. The attacks on such artistic " luminaries " as Shao Ch'üan-lin, Lin Mo-han, Yuan Shui-p'o and Ouyang Shan in 1964 and 1965, and on their mentor, the redoubt-

[19] See D. W. Fokkema, " Chinese Criticism of Humanism: Campaigns Against the Intellectuals 1964–65," *China Quarterly*, No. 26 (April–June 1966), pp. 68–81.

[20] Examples of the difference in position between the Soviets and Chinese was the conference held in 1963 in Peking which was devoted to attacks on Soviet " revisionism," the Soviet interpretation of human nature, and the " modernist " trends of Soviet writers such as Yevtushenko. See Lucas, *The Role of Writers in China* (Hong Kong: International Studies Group, 196(4)), pp. 8–9. See also a lengthy article in the *People's Daily* of 13 July 1964, entitled " The Khrushchev Revisionist Clique's Latest Anti-Chinese Pronouncements," pp. 5–6. In this article, excerpts from Soviet pronouncements on Chinese literary developments were published. The Russians accused the Chinese cultural bureaucracy of dogmatism and sectarianism; denounced the loudly proclaimed " Hundred Flowers " movement as a restoration of the capitalist literary and art viewpoint, and of nationalism and great power chauvinism; and condemned the struggle against " poisonous weeds," i.e. the " rightists " during the Anti-Rightist Campaign of 1957–8, as an " ingenious justification of the persecution of the independence of writers and artists." They also claimed that there was no realism in Chinese literature and art, since all human qualities had been emasculated in an attempt to create a " mass figure," that the hyperbolic glorification of Mao and the usual comparison of him and the sun was ridiculous, as was the claim that revolutionary realism and revolutionary romanticism were great contributions to Marxist literary and art theory. The Chinese, with their revolutionary romanticism slogan, were, according to the Russians, attempting to elevate art and literature above real life, to idealize, i.e. falsify reality.

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able Chou Yang, in the summer of 1966,[21] the dismissal of Mao Tun as Minister of Culture in January 1965[22] and the abolition of the Ministry itself in 1966—all these events served as a preliminary for the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution (GPCR) which began in the same year.[23] Following the decimation of the entire leadership of the ACFLAC with its affiliated branches (such as the Chinese Writers' Union) and the dissolution during the years 1966–69 of the GPCR of those bodies then led by Chou Yang's erstwhile colleague in the Propaganda Department, Ch'en Po-ta, overall responsibility for what cultural activity still remained fell to Lin Piao, T'ao Chu and Hsiao Wang-tung of the PLA and to Chairman Mao's wife, Chiang Ching. The change from the cultural direction of the past was formalized in the document *Summary of the Forum of Work in Literature and Art in the Armed Forces Entrusted by Comrade Lin Piao to Comrade Chiang Ching*, which appeared in 1967.[24] In line with the then policy of denying China's traditional cultural heritage and eliminating all Western and Soviet influences (to which the former mentors of the artistic establishment had allegedly succumbed), the document stressed the performing and visual arts (as opposed to the written forms), and a mass, " do-it-yourself," " proletarianized " approach to the creative process. The artistic results which were supposed to emerge spontaneously from the unbounded enthusiasm and activities of the masses were insignificant in both quantity and quality. The years 1970 and 1971 were marked by a return to some semblance of normalization in literature and art with the establishment in May 1970 of the Cultural Group of the State Council, a body responsible only for determining the proper theory and general direction of artistic endeavours, and with overall responsibility for a campaign to popularize model " revolutionary " operas. Provincial and local cultural teams of the PLA, however, were granted much more scope and autonomy in the actual

[21] See Yao Wen-yuan, " On the Counter-revolutionary, Two-Faced Chou Yang," *Hung Ch'i*, No. 1, 1967, pp. 14–36. Yao referred to Mao's 1964 criticisms of the professional associations and the vast majority of their publications; these charges included failure to carry out the Party's policies, bureaucratism, alienation from the workers, peasants and soldiers, failure to reflect revolutionary socialist construction in literary and artistic works. Chou was accused of promoting " liberalism " and " revisionism." The Red Guards during the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution accused Chou Yang of sharing Liu Shao-ch'i's views. See also Merle Goldman, " The Fall of Chou Yang," *China Quarterly*, No. 27 (July–September 1966), pp. 132–48.

[22] For a thought-provoking account of Mao Tun's activities as a literary critic in the roles of " theorist," " polemicist," and " doctrinaire," see Vincent Y. C. Shih, " Mao Tun: The Critic (Part I)," *China Quarterly*, No. 19 (July-September 1964), pp. 84–98, and " Mao Tun: The Critic (Part II), " in the same journal, No. 20 (October–December 1964), pp. 128–62.

[23] For detailed information on former literary and art celebrities attacked and removed during the GPCR see: *The Great Cultural Revolution in China* (Hong Kong: Asia Research Centre, 1967), pp. 116–93, and *Fei Ch'ing Shou T'su* (Political Institute of the Republic of China, Taipei, Taiwan, 1968), for an article devoted to literature and art, pp. 319–24.

[24] The " Forum " was held in Shanghai on 2–20 February 1966, and the *Summary* was published in the *People's Daily*, 29 May 1967.

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implementation of a policy based on the theory of the "struggle between two lines" (i.e. "art for the workers, peasants and soldiers" was pitted against the bourgeois-revisionist "art for all the people") centrally arrived at by the Group. There was, therefore, no return to the pre-1966 bureaucratization of literature and the arts, and emphasis was definitely on decentralization of authority, particularly with respect to actual practice. Other changes effected included a renewed *hsia fang* campaign, in a more genuine and comprehensive (in terms of elitist and professional participation) manner than the one that occurred during the GLF campaign; it involved the dispatch of PLA propaganda teams and groups of professional writers, artists and actors to the countryside to teach and learn from the masses of workers, peasants and soldiers. Further, as a contrast to the GPCR period with its stress on the historical mission of the individual hero, e.g. Mao, emphasis was shifted to the masses as the prime movers of history and, hence, the most worthy heroes of artistic works. In 1972 and 1973, priority was given to practice over theory, i.e. more attention was paid to actual artistic work (e.g. the writing of novels by writers' collectives and the performance throughout the country of amateur theatricals) than to theorizing and postulating. This resulted in much greater involvement and participation by amateur artists—a major goal of the cultural authorities—and works written and performed reflected the extension in the allowable limits of theme and subject matter and, hence, were more varied, interesting and effective. Along with a partial rehabilitation of some aspects of classical operas (e.g. music and traditional acting techniques) the policy of "national nihilism"—the total denial of the artistic traditions and legacy of the past—in vogue during the GPCR was rejected. According to one knowledgeable reviewer, on the basis of his observations and his discussions with a "responsible person" of the literary and arts section of the *People' Daily* in 1973, traditional operas are likely to be staged again in the near future; if this happens, it will indicate, at least partially, a return to the situation of the early 1960s when the classical Chinese heritage was given prominence by the "unholy quartet" of Chou Yang, Shao Ch'üan-lin, Lin Mo-han and Yuan Shui-p'o, among others.[25]

In retrospect, although formal cultural relations between the Soviet Union and China during the post-1960 period virtually ceased to exist, the general direction taken by Soviet literature since 1965 and by Chinese literature since the GPCR has been similar in terms of the application of an orthodox line as interpreted by their respective political authorities, a line that was essentially conservative. "Normalcy" is perhaps the most applicable term here, defined as a re-endorsement by the Soviets of "socialist realist" literature and art,

[25] For much of the information on cultural developments in China since the GPCR, the present writer is indebted to Colin Mackerras for his informative article, "Chinese Opera after the Cultural Revolution (1970–72)," *China Quarterly*, No. 55 (July–September 1973), pp. 478–510.

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and as "revolutionary" or "class-struggle conscious" works of collective production and mass participation by the Chinese. Unnecessary, disquieting and harmful upheavals in the cultural realm are, for the present, to be eschewed in both cases, with writers and artists left to pursue their activities, to "get on with the job," provided, of course, that they subscribe to the currently rather well-defined cultural prescriptions and do not overstep the bounds of the permissible in style, form and subject matter.

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Soviet Interest in Ireland *

Marcus Wheeler

SOVIET policy towards Ireland entered a new, formalized phase with the agreement, signed by the Foreign Ministers of the USSR and the Republic of Ireland in New York on 29 September 1973, "to exchange diplomatic missions at Embassy level."[1] The interest of the Soviet State and of Russian communists in Ireland has, however, a rather longer history, which may conveniently be seen as falling into two active phases—from 1916 to 1921 and the period since the death of Stalin—separated by a long interval characterized by disillusionment, preoccupation with more pressing problems, and inaction.

Pre-history

The "pre-history" of the first phase shows a priority of ideological over practical interest in the attitude of the Russian communists. For Marx, and still more for Engels, Ireland—Britain's "oldest colony"—provided a classic example of great-power colonialist exploitation. By 1914, their Russian followers could have observed the makings in Ireland of what would now be termed a "national liberation struggle." In this there were two strands—nationalism and socialism. The nationalist movement, always the stronger of the two, was based on the Irish Republican Brotherhood (founded in 1858), the Gaelic Athletic Association (1884), the Gaelic League (1893) and the first Sinn Fein party (1905). The Socialist movement, dominated by the figures of James Connolly and Jim Larkin (both of significance transcending the purely Irish scene), embraced the formation of the first Irish Marxist party—Connolly's Socialist Republican Party (1896–1903)—and the first Irish workers' organisation—the Irish Transport and General Workers' Union set up by Larkin in 1909. Briefly, the two strands coalesced in the Easter 1916 Rising in Dublin. To Lenin, this event was of interest both as an unexpected application of his slogan calling for conversion of imperialist war into civil war, and in the context of the Bolsheviks' internal debate on the role and destiny of small nations and ethnic groups in a revolutionary situation. These two aspects of the event led him, in the essay *Itogi diskussii o samoopredelenii* on which he was engaged in July 1916, to comment:

> A blow of identical strength, delivered against the power of the British imperialist bourgeoisie by a rising in Ireland, has a hundred times greater political significance than one in Asia or Africa. . . .

* This article is based on seminar papers read at the School of Slavonic and East European Studies and the London School of Economics, University of London.

[1] From the text as published in *The Irish Times*, 1 Oct. 1973; the Russian text of the communiqué appeared in *Pravda* for 30 Sept.

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> The misfortune of the Irish is that they rose prematurely—when a European-scale rising of the proletariat had not yet matured.[2]

The Easter Rising was not, it seems, unanimously approved by the Bolsheviks, but Stalin, in April 1917, defended it as follows:

> Comrades Pyatakov and Dzerzhinsky tell us that any national movement is a reactionary movement. This is untrue, Comrades. Is not the movement against British imperialism in Ireland a democratic movement which is inflicting a blow against imperialism?[3]

The First Phase of Soviet Interest in Ireland

A contemporary Soviet specialist on the history of Ireland, Professor A. D. Kolpakov, asserts that "the national revolution in Ireland was in essence the first anti-imperialist revolution in an under-developed colonial country."[4] In Soviet writing in general, the "Irish revolution," though regarded as having been sparked off by the Easter Rising, is defined as co-extensive with the period of the Anglo-Irish War (1919–21), otherwise described as "the national liberation war of the Irish people against British imperialism."[5] Meanwhile, the Socialist strand in the anti-British movement had been gravely weakened by the execution, for his part in the Rising, of Connolly and the continued absence in America[6] of Larkin (although the "Socialist Party of Ireland," set up in 1908 as successor to Connolly's Socialist Republican Party, maintained a shadowy existence). Now, however, two events conspired briefly to bring great Russia and little Ireland together: the 1917 revolutionary events in Russia, and the "khaki" British general election of December 1918, following which the 73 Sinn Fein members elected from the South of Ireland constituted themselves the first *Dáil Éireann* and announced the realization of the "Irish Republic" proclaimed in 1916. The February Revolution in Russia is said to have been followed speedily by a Bolshevik statement of support for Irish independence,[7] and the subsequent Bolshevik triumph to have been welcomed by Irish workers. In the following year (1918), according to Kolpakov,[8]

> . . . in many towns in Ireland there were demonstrations of solidarity with the land of the Soviets. A meeting in Dublin—one of the largest in the history of the Irish workers' move-

[2] V. I. Lenin, *O natsionalnom i natsionalno-kolonialnom voprose* (Moscow, 1956), p. 347.

[3] Quoted in P. Kerzhentsev, *Irlandiya v borbe za nezavisimost*, 3rd ed. (Moscow, 1936), p. 209.

[4] A. D. Kolpakov, *Irlandiya—ostrov myatezhnyi* (Moscow, 1965), p. 42.

[5] *Bolshaya Sovetskaya Entsiklopediya* (3–e izd.) [hereinafter cited as: BSE (3)] t.10 (Moscow, 1972), p. 439 (article: "Irlandiya").

[6] Whither he had gone in 1914 on a speaking tour on behalf of the ITGWU.

[7] See C. D. Greaves, *Liam Mellows and the Irish Revolution* (London, 1971), pp. 134–35.

[8] Op. cit. p. 35.

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> ment—adopted a resolution expressing gratitude to the Soviet government headed by V. I. Lenin for advancing the principle of national self-determination.

The scene now shifts to the United States of America. Here Larkin, who on his arrival had declared himself to be simultaneously a Catholic and a Socialist—" I stand by the cross and Marx. I belong to the Catholic Church. In Ireland this is not held against a Socialist " [9]—was infected by John Reed with enthusiasm for the Bolshevik cause; and, at a rally in April 1918, bravely declared that " the Irish are with the Russians." [10] Larkin was by now cut off from events in Ireland, but he had been associated with the establishment in the USA in 1917 of a " James Connolly Club " and of the Irish Progressive League; and he chaired a meeting at which Liam Mellows, outstanding as a left-winger among Irish Republicans, stated: " . . . Ireland wants to continue her old civilization along the lines of socialism, communism or co-operation." [11]

In 1918, new arrivals from Ireland included Dr Patrick McCartan, in the capacity of unofficial Sinn Fein envoy to the United States [12]; while in June 1919, De Valera himself (now head of the government of the self-styled " Republic ") came to America with the aim of seeking support, in particular that of President Wilson, for international recognition of Irish independence. De Valera, while ideologically no friend of the Bolsheviks,[13] appears to have been prepared to solicit aid from any quarter and thus, in 1920, to have commissioned McCartan to enter into negotiations with L. K. Martens, the official Soviet Russian plenipotentiary in the United States. From this contact stems the oft-repeated claim that Ireland was the first foreign country to recognize the Soviet regime. Soviet historians are inclined to view the matter from the opposite point of view. Kolpakov, who sees De Valera's approach to the Russians as a direct consequence of his failure to move the American President, writes:

> The only state to express a willingness to recognize the Irish Republic and establish diplomatic and commercial relations with her was the land of the Soviets.[14]

It is true that, as a material demonstration of their support for Soviet Russia, the Irish Republicans allocated from their funds a sum, eventually repaid in 1948, of $20,000, against the security of some pieces

[9] Quoted by E. Larkin, *James Larkin, Irish Labour Leader, 1876–1947* (London, 1965), p. 195.

[10] Ibid. p. 224.

[11] Greaves, op. cit. p. 155.

[12] Larkin, in a letter, unkindly described McCartan as " a rank reactionary " (quoted by E. Larkin, op. cit. p. 221).

[13] He is alleged on one occasion to have said: " Lenin and Trotsky are just politicians like Lloyd George " (M. K. Connery in *Irish Workers' Voice*, 18 Mar. 1933, quoted by *Communist Party of Ireland Outline History* (Dublin, 1975), p. 34).

[14] Op. cit. p. 52.

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of Imperial Russian jewellery.[15] The negotiations centred, however, on a proposed Treaty between the RSFSR and the Republic of Ireland, a copy of a draft of which was seized in Dublin and published by the British Government.[16] This draft Treaty envisaged reciprocal efforts to secure recognition for each other and to prevent the movement of arms for use against their respective territories; various measures of trade and aid between the two countries; a special role for "the accredited representative of the Republic of Ireland in Russia" as guardian of "the interests of the Roman Catholic Church within the territory of the RSFSR"; and finally—and perhaps most remarkable—an agreement to set up, with other nations interested in bringing to an end "imperialistic exploitation," a form of rival League of Nations. The negotiations were continued in 1921 in Russia, but came to nothing. Kolpakov lays the blame for this outcome squarely on De Valera:

> The head of the Irish Government De Valera did not give his representatives authority to sign the Treaty. In the opinion of a participant in the negotiations, Dr Patrick McCartan, De Valera apparently did not want support on the part of the Russians.[17]

An explanation which, while not incompatible with this, may be a little more realistic is offered by the Marxist historian C. D. Greaves. McCartan, he says, was told by Chicherin (the Russian Commissar for Foreign Affairs) that "the Russians did not propose to jeopardize their relations with Britain for the sake of a Republic the Irish did not seem sure about themselves."[18] There is, indeed, a certain poignancy in the coincidence of the date of McCartan's return—October 1921—with the opening of the Downing Street conference of British and Irish representatives which resulted in the Anglo-Irish "Treaty"—the agreement establishing the Irish Free State.

"The thread uniting Ireland with the focus of the new, Socialist world had been precipitately severed."[19] The question of reciprocal diplomatic recognition was now deferred *sine die*, and Soviet sources see the Irish civil war of 1922–23 (between those accepting and those, now led by De Valera, rejecting the "Treaty") as bringing the "bourgeois-democratic" stage of the Irish revolution to a halt.[20] Before passing to the "second phase" of direct Soviet interest in Ireland, however, it may be appropriate to mention briefly two indirect manifestations of the influence which Soviet historians claim was exerted on Ireland by the Russian Revolution—the Soviets and the Communist groups (together with the links of the latter with the Comintern).

[15] See Mary C. Bromage, *De Valera and the March of a Nation* (London, 1956), pp. 94, 294.
[16] *Intercourse between Bolshevism and Sinn Fein*, Cmd. 1326 (London, 1921).
[17] Op. cit. p. 53.
[18] Op. cit. p. 257.
[19] Kolpakov, op. cit. p. 53.
[20] *BSE* (3), t. 10, loc. cit.

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The Irish Soviets

The best-known of the Irish "Soviets" was the one which took over the administration of the city of Limerick in April-May 1921,[21] following proclamation of a general strike by the local Trades Council. Other "Soviets" were, for the most part, essentially cooperatives of producers temporarily, in the chaotic conditions engendered by the Anglo-Irish War, taking over their workplaces—for example, the creamery at Knocklong, Co. Limerick in May 1920 (famed for its slogan "We make butter not profits"); the Arigna coal mines in Co. Leitrim (May 1921); a mill and bakery at Bruree, Co. Limerick (August 1921); a foundry in Drogheda and the port of Cork (September 1921).[22] Imitation of the Russian experience has been claimed[23] also for the activities of a "Soviet" of small farmers in Co. Clare who began expelling "kulaks" and removing landmarks in primordial populist fashion until restrained by the Free State Army. It is questionable, however, whether more than the name was consciously borrowed from Russia, and the suggestion of one authority[24] that the hand of foreign Communists—"notably Polish and Russian Jews from Glasgow"—is to be seen beneath these generally spontaneous actions is open to dispute.

Irish Communism

Controversy surrounds, too, the precise date of birth and the paternity of the Communist Party of Ireland. Authoritative retrospective documents—notably, the article "Kommunisticheskaya Partiya Irlandii" in the third edition of the *Bolshaya Sovetskaya Entsiklopediya*[25] and the Programme of the CPI adopted at its fifteenth national congress in 1971[26]—refer unequivocally to its foundation in 1933 (on the basis of a number of Revolutionary Workers' Groups which had been operating in the principal Irish cities since 1930). A more historically exact version, however, may be that of the recently-published *Communist Party of Ireland Outline History*[27] which sees the foundation of the Party as occurring in October 1921 when the rump of the old Connollyite Socialist Party of Ireland formed itself into the "Communist Party of Ireland" with James Connolly's son, Roderick, as its secretary and a revived version of James's *Workers'*

[21] See Greaves, op. cit. p. 176.
[22] See Greaves, op. cit. pp. 189, 256; D. R. O'Connor Lysaght, *The Republic of Ireland* (Cork, 1970), pp. 66–67.
[23] By P. Kerzhentsev, op. cit. p. 237.
[24] W. Alison Phillips, *The Revolution in Ireland 1906–1923* (London, 1923), pp. 260 ff.
[25] *BSE* (3), t.12 (Moscow, 1973), p. 537.
[26] Communist Party of Ireland, *A Democratic Solution* (Belfast, 1971), p. 1; The Assistant General Secretary of the CPI, Mr J. Stewart, has recently reaffirmed that "our party was founded back in 1933 . . ." (quoted by *Belfast Telegraph*, 16 Apr. 1975).
[27] *Communist Party of Ireland Outline History* (hereinafter cited as: *CPIOH*) (Dublin, (1975), pp. 2, 6.

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Republic as its organ. Little is known of the infant Party's activities, save that it sided with the IRA in opposing the Anglo-Irish settlement [28] and that it despatched Roddy Connolly as its delegate to the fourth Comintern congress in the spring of 1923. It would appear, however, that soon after this, the Executive Committee of the Comintern (ECCI) demanded its disbandment.[29] Meanwhile, on 17 January 1923, Larkin, who had been arrested in November 1919 in a police raid in New York and jailed for violating the statute on "criminal anarchy," was released and granted a free pardon by Governor Smith; and on 30 May he returned to Dublin. Finding himself at odds with his own ITGWU (which had fallen into the hands of "reformists"), he proceeded to organize a rival "Workers' Union of Ireland," [30] while filling the political vacuum on the Left with an "Irish Workers' League." At this point, still apparently enjoying the confidence of Zinoviev (who had publicly espoused his cause while he was imprisoned in America), he secured affiliation of his IWL to the Comintern, while he himself was elected a candidate member of ECCI at the fifth Comintern congress in 1924. However, the promotion of an Irish Marxist party which could retain the confidence of the Comintern was henceforward impeded by two factors: the factionalism associated with the outstanding figures of Larkin and Roddy Connolly, and a new leftward turn on the part of some influential elements of the IRA (which, as an organization, never suffered, as did any group or party labelled "communist," the crippling stigma of "Godlessness").

In 1926, the indefatigable Roddy Connolly sought to revive the dissolved CPI under the guise of a "Workers' Party of Ireland" and applied for affiliation to the Comintern; but a resolution of the latter transmitted in February 1927 declared that Larkin's IWL was "the only organization which under present conditions gives expression in Ireland to the International Communist movement," though warning that the IWL, ". . . if it is treated as a regular section of the Communist International, must hasten its transformation into a real Party." [31] It failed to do so; and Larkin himself, although returned to the *Dáil* in the first of two general elections held in 1927 (thereby gaining a place in Irish records as the only "communist" to have sat in that body [32]), broke with the communist movement soon after a second visit to the USSR (in February 1928) and had no part in the establishment of what should properly be termed the *second* CPI in 1933. In retrospective Soviet writing, he is honoured as an outstanding labour leader, but criticized as "on many questions taking up anarcho-

[28] *CPIOH*, pp. 6–7.
[29] Cf. Kerzhentsev, op. cit. p. 240.
[30] Which later shared with the Kilkenny Miners' Union the honour of direct affiliation to the Profintern (*CPIOH*, p. 7).
[31] Quoted by Jack Lane in *The Irish Communist*, No. 83 (Nov. 1972), pp. 20 ff.
[32] See M. Manning, *Irish Political Parties—Studies in Irish Political Culture 3* (Dublin, 1972), p. 108.

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syndicalist positions." [33] Roddy Connolly, after being snubbed by the Comintern, also distanced himself from the Moscow-oriented Communist movement; and, though he re-appeared in 1934 as a prominent sponsor of the short-lived "Popular Front" Republican Congress Party, in advocating working for the immediate realization of his father's goal of the "Workers' Republic" rather than of the vaguer concept of a "People's Republic," [34] he found himself opposed by the new CPI leadership of Sean Murray (General Secretary of the CPI 1933–40) and James Larkin junior, both of whom had, significantly, completed a two and a half-year course at the Lenin School for training political cadres in Moscow between 1928 and 1931. It seems likely that the relative downgrading in Soviet writing of the "first" CPI and of the various Communist "groups" of the 1920s reflects criticism of the exclusive role played in them by Larkin and Connolly; the fact that both men (as also, later, Larkin junior) transferred their allegiance to the Irish Labour Party may also be relevant.[35]

Soviet and Communist Attitudes to the IRA

The IRA has always posed a problem for Soviet policy-makers and publicists.[36] On the one hand, the latter could not but applaud its chief perennial negative aim—to rid all 32 counties of Ireland of the authority of the British and of collaborators with the imperial power. On the other hand, its positive concept of an independent united Ireland has been at best shadowy and imbued with a romantic nationalism of a kind associated elsewhere with movements of the Right rather than of the Left; it has at times (for example, in 1933) taken up an explicitly anti-Communist position, and it has appeared—until its 1970 split—to reject any kind of class appeal in favour of continued exploitation of sectarian hatred; similarly—again, prior to 1970—it has appeared indifferent to arguments for political methods of action or the formulation of a political programme, and it has regarded as renegades those who from time to time advocated exchanging the bullet for the political speech. Nevertheless, within the IRA's ranks there have appeared individuals or groups with left-wing sympathies, and during the 1920s and 1930s there were isolated contacts. In 1921 (as indicated above), the CPI declared its support for the intransigent anti-"Treaty" position of the Republicans. In

[33] *BSE* (3), t.14 (Moscow, 1973), p. 168 (article: "Larkin").

[34] The very scholastic debate at the Republican Congress is summarized in *CPIOH*, pp. 23–24.

[35] The dominance of personality, and of adherence to personality rather than to programme is an outstanding feature of the politics of Ireland, as of some other small European states. Only Greece, perhaps, has rivalled Ireland for the influence of political family "dynasties," such as the Connollys and Larkins or, elsewhere in the political spectrum, Cosgraves and Fitzgeralds.

[36] The problem is not a unique one; an analogy may be seen in the problem posed for the Comintern and the Bulgarian Communists in the 1920s by the IMRO in Macedonia.

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1925, a three-man deputation led by a future IRA Chief of Staff, Sean Russell, went to Russia to seek arms but, seemingly, failed to impress Stalin as competent or trustworthy revolutionaries.[37] In 1927, however, a new situation was created when De Valera and a large part of the Republican movement decided to come in from the underground and form themselves into an opposition political party, *Fianna Fail.* Of those who remained outside, a number had contacts with left-wing international organisations such as the Anti-Imperialist League and the European Peasants' Committee—notably Sean MacBride (who, from IRA Chief of Staff in the mid-1930s, graduated to become Irish Foreign Minister in 1948 and has since had a distinguished international career[38]), Peadar O'Donnell and Frank Ryan (who later fought on the Republican side in Spain, was taken prisoner and transferred to custody in Germany, where he died in 1944). Men of this type sponsored the establishment, in September 1931, of *Saor Eire*, intended as a radical anti-capitalist party based on the IRA; but, under a Constitutional amendment (popularly known as the "Law on Public Safety" or "Coercion Act") introduced the following month by the government of W. T. Cosgrave, it was declared illegal (together with the IRA itself, the "Friends of Soviet Russia" and nine other organizations).[39] In the following year, however, both the law and the entire balance of forces were changed by the election victory of De Valera's *Fianna Fail*, which now governed without a break until 1948. This made possible the legal establishment, in 1933, of the "second" CPI (many participants in the constituent congress of which were ex-IRA men); but, by the same token, it would seem to have influenced the IRA to reject the idea of alliance with Communists and, when, in April 1934, the Republican Congress Party was founded with the slogan "Workers and working farmers unite on to the Workers' Republic!", the Army Council forbade its members to involve themselves with it in any way—by contrast, the CPI, at the 1936 elections, gave support to RCP candidates.[40] In the mid-1930s, it may be noted, the CPI, according to a Soviet source,[41] played "an important role" in scotching the Irish variant of fascism, General O'Duffy's "Blueshirts"; but it is conceded[42] that it gradually lost support, and harassed under emergency powers brought in by De Valera in 1940 to safeguard Eire's precarious neutrality, it went into liquidation.

[37] See T. P. Coogan, *The I.R.A.* (London, 1971), pp. 125–27.

[38] In particular, as Secretary-General of the International Commission of Jurists. He also appeared in Moscow in Oct. 1973 as a promoter of the World Congress of Peace-loving Forces, which he opened (*Pravda*, 26 Oct. 1973).

[39] In addition, a pastoral message issued by the Roman Catholic Church hierarchy in Nov. is said to have threatened with excommunication "all Communists" and also IRA members (Kolpakov, op. cit. p. 108).

[40] Coogan, op. cit. p. 112.

[41] *BSE* (3), t.10 (Moscow, 1972), p. 440.

[42] By Kolpakov, op. cit. p. 130. Cf. Coogan, op. cit. p. 113.

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After the second world war, two communist organizations—the Communist Party of Northern Ireland and a new "Irish Workers' League" (from 1962, "Party")—functioned separately in the North and South respectively until 1970, when a merger between them brought the "third" CPI into existence. The 1971 CPI Programme, without mentioning the IRA as such, sharply criticized its activities:

> Continued repression by the British will fail, as in the past, to solve the "Irish Question." Likewise, blind acts of violence by "elitist" anti-Unionist groups will not win national independence and unity for the Irish people. The state terror inaugurated by the British cannot be defeated by such acts of counter-violence directed at civilians in their places of work, their centres of social gatherings and in other public places. Such acts only help to grievously divide the working people, leading to a deepening of sectarianism, to the strengthening of that basis of division on which the British have been able to hold on to the country. Such acts must be unequivocally condemned as outrages on the people's cause.[43]

For its part, the Soviet Union, owing to the developments in state policy described below, largely ignored the IRA until the revival of and split within the latter in 1970. The split itself occurred because one faction (those subsequently known as the "Officials") had begun advocating termination of the taboo on political methods of struggle and political activities; and Soviet commentators were not slow to pick up Socialist "signals" in the Officials' political utterances. An important indicator of Soviet acceptance came with the appearance in 1972 of an interview with the Official IRA Chief of Staff, Cathal Goulding, conducted by a *Pravda* special correspondent, Yu. Yasnev, in which Goulding was quoted as making such eminently digestible statements as:

> . . . We are an army of serious-minded revolutionaries and not of youths brandishing rifles or aged fanatics living on memories of the past. . . . The reactionary press has begun to call us all but Communists. . . . We consider ourselves a part of the common struggle of all progressive humanity against imperialism.[44]

Another correspondent, Vitalii Kobysh of *Izvestiya*, noted the Officials' use of the term "Comrade." "You will hardly hear the word 'Comrade' from the Provisionals. Their nationalistic right wing represents mainly the Irish bourgeoisie, but many of the Officials openly call themselves Marxists."[45]

The Second Phase of Soviet Interest

On the level of State relations between the USSR and Ireland, no perceptible progress was made between 1921 and the death of Stalin.

[43] *A Democratic Solution* (Belfast, 1971), p. 6.
[44] "IRA—s bomboi i bez bomby," *Pravda*, 23 and 25 Apr. 1972.
[45] V. Kobysh, *Vzryv stal neizbezhen* (Moscow, 1974), p. 80.

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The latter's policy (or absence of it) may tentatively be reconstructed thus:

1. Acceptance by the *Dáil Éireann* of the Anglo-Irish settlement and of the Free State status which it proposed, followed by the very vigorous use of force by the Free State against the IRA "rebels,"[46] suggested that "national liberation" had been halted and, in ideological terms, that the Irish national bourgeoisie had accepted a neo-colonial status for their country;

2. In the context of implementing "Socialism in one country," there appeared more to be gained from establishing and maintaining correct relations with the United Kingdom, a major capitalist power still, than from fomenting trouble via its Irish back door;

3. In the 1930s and 1940s, De Valera made more impression as an upholder—not least in his 1937 Constitution—of a theocratic State embodying a totally anti-Communist ideology than as a resourceful and not unsuccessful adversary of British imperialism;

4. Accordingly, throughout this period, it seemed more appropriate to back the local Communists, however hopeless their cause, than actively to pursue an accommodation with a "bourgeois nationalist" government or to lend support to its more extreme Republican critics. In short, Stalin's policy towards Ireland conformed to the general pattern of his policy towards small, economically under-developed, ex-colonial states.

The event which caused a re-appraisal, even if it was delayed until after Stalin's death, of this policy was the defeat of De Valera's party in the 1948 elections by the seemingly implausible combination of the conservative *Fine Gael*, the Labour Party and a new, radical, "populist" party headed by Sean MacBride—*Clann na Poblachta.* MacBride was Foreign Minister in the resultant coalition government (which lasted until 1951), and the formal severance of the Commonwealth link and proclamation of the Republic of Ireland in 1949 provided the cue for him to initiate a fully independent foreign policy. He made it clear that, until or unless the partition of Ireland were to be ended, the Republic could not contemplate, for example, entering NATO; the position of "non-alignment" which this implied has been maintained ever since and has been, in particular, the source of Irish influence, disproportionate to the country's size, in the United Nations.[47] Ironically, until 1955, when she was accorded membership under a "package" arrangement involving fifteen states, Ireland's applications to join had been consistently vetoed by the USSR, on the ground that no diplomatic relations existed between the two countries.

[46] It is of interest in this connection that Michael Collins, outstanding among Republican leaders who accepted the Treaty, should appear in Soviet eyes as "the Napoleon of the Irish revolution" (Kolpakov, op. cit. p. 43).

[47] See the assessment of F. S. L. Lyons, *Ireland since the Famine*, rev. ed. (London, Fontana, 1973), pp. 592–94.

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There can be little doubt that the wish to be seen to enjoy normal relations with a small, but increasingly internationally respected neutral state provided a sufficient motivation for the Soviet Union to seek actively the establishment of diplomatic relations. The possibility may also have been envisaged of gaining some influence at a time when the passing of the De Valera era and some modest moves towards secularization perhaps presaged more fundamental social and political change. In the event, the signing of the agreement was attended by little or no publicity in either country.[48] The text of the agreement specified as its basis " the desire to promote friendly relations between the two states and to develop cooperation in the economic, social and cultural fields between them." [49] While it is too early to assess confidently how far this vague undertaking has been implemented, the year 1974 showed at least an impressive advance in the volume of trade between the two countries, with a fourfold increase, as compared with 1973, in the value of Irish imports from the USSR and a still greater increase—though still falling well short of parity—in the value of Irish exports to the USSR.[50]

The Soviet Attitude to Northern Ireland

This survey would not be complete without some reference to the Soviet attitude, as revealed by press comment, to the post-1968 troubles in Northern Ireland. The conflict has been presented, with the minor but important modifications indicated below, as a struggle between oppressed fighters for " freedom " or " civil rights " and the armed might of British imperialism abetted by " loyal " Ulster supporters of the *status quo* in the Province—in a sense, a resumption, in that part of Ireland still ruled by Britain, of the national liberation struggle heroically launched in 1916 in Dublin. The following comments by Yu. Yasnev, *Pravda* special correspondent, are not untypical:

> The entire blame for the dramatic situation which has come into being in Northern Ireland rests with British imperialism which for centuries oppressed Ireland and then brought about its division. . . . The demarcation line in the struggle in Northern Ireland runs not between Catholics and Protestants, but between the forces of progress and democracy on the one hand and the forces of Ulster reaction and British imperialism on the other hand.[51]

[48] On the immediate circumstances, see the present author's note " The Dublin-Moscow Accord " in *The World Today*, Vol. 29, No. 11 (Nov. 1973), pp. 458–60.

[49] From text published in *The Irish Times*, 1 Oct. 1973.

[50] *Trade Statistics of Ireland* (published monthly by the Stationery Office, Dublin). The increase, rather than the absolute volume, is significant. Even in 1974, the value of imports from the USSR was comparable with that of imports from Poland; while what appears to be the principal commodity (a full break-down is not given)—conifer lumber and sawn—is bought in larger quantities from both Finland and Sweden.

[51] *Pravda*, 7 Mar. 1972.

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This analysis correctly perceived that the conflict was a communal and no longer, in the strict sense, a religious one. Nevertheless, it crudely over-simplified reality in mechanically (and puzzlingly, perhaps, for the less sophisticated Soviet readers) identifying the victims of British repression as being exclusively Catholics, while conversely seeming to brand the entire Protestant community as supporters of the " ultra-rights " and " extremists." This rigidity has on some occasions led to blatant mis-description, most notoriously of events in August 1969, when the British Army was manifestly operating, if only briefly, in defence of the Catholic communities in Belfast and Londonderry against Protestant attack. A commendable reluctance to vindicate the role of the IRA has also resulted in much obfuscation of the state of affairs in the camp of the " freedom fighters "; some reports [52] have melodramatically exaggerated the part played by the CPI, but a more subtle approach has been to present the Civil Rights Association as being at the helm of the struggle. Individual Communists have genuinely become prominent within the CRA, but Soviet accounts appear to overlook the fact that, in the early days of the civil rights campaign (1967–69), the main political thrust associated with it came from the " People's Democracy " group (later, Party).[53] This and other non-communist left-wing groups are generally ignored; though Kobysh, interviewing the best-known individual figure among these—Bernadette (Devlin) McAliskey—in 1971, somewhat patronizingly notes an improvement in her political attitudes:

> She had very much changed and . . . matured. Three years ago, when she was only just beginning her political activities, her ardour often turned out to be naïveté, her fury—blindness. At the time she took the liberty of making some rather unfriendly statements about our country and of criticizing Communism. She was increasingly surrounded by Trotskyists. . . .[54]

Since 1972, some Soviet commentators have begun to admit (as befits Marxist analysts) that the class differences within the Protestant community may have no less political significance than the sectarian division within Northern Ireland as a whole. Thus Edgar Cheporov, in a very perceptive report published in 1973,[55] having compared the UDA (Ulster Defence Association) with Nazi Storm Troopers, added: " Yet the UDA and its thugs . . . are more complex than one might think." [56] Even UDA members, he suggested, were beginning to realize that the bosses were their enemies and to use socialist terminology. In general, the repeated characterization of the Protestant para-

[52] Especially that of Kobysh, op. cit. pp. 51 ff.

[53] On relations between People's Democracy and the Communists, see P. Arthur, *The People's Democracy 1968–73* (Belfast, 1974), p. 61.

[54] Op. cit. p. 79.

[55] " Report from Ulster " in *New Times* (Moscow, 1973), Nos. 11 and 14.

[56] Op. cit. No. 14, p. 28.

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military bands as extremists of the Right may well be warranted [57]—particularly in the context of their behaviour during the political general strike organized by the "Ulster Workers' Council" in May 1974. Regrettably, the systematic belittling [58] of the UWC as totally unrepresentative of Ulster workers was much less realistic.[59] To sum up, the net effect of inaccuracies in Soviet analysis of the situation may prove to be a serious under-estimation of the force of Protestant working-class Ulster nationalism—a force which, in two weeks, came nearer to smashing the British administration of Northern Ireland than had the "freedom fighters" in 50 years of struggle. No Soviet commentator acclaimed the "Belfast Soviet."

[57] One of these groups in particular, the UVF (Ulster Volunteer Force), has been sensitive to rumours that it was adopting a *left*-wing political orientation, and in Apr. 1975 issued a rebuttal which included the statement: "whatever we in the UVF may be, we are not Marxists or Communists . . ." (*Sunday News*, 13 Apr. 1975).

[58] For example, by G. Vasiliev in *Pravda* of 22 May 1975 and I. Biryukov in *Pravda* of 24 May 1975.

[59] However, it must be noted that the UWC has taken up a crude anti-Communist attitude, as indicated by the following ostensibly *ex cathedra* statement:

> Q What is your attitude towards Marx-Leninism, Communism and similar Revolutionary movements?
>
> A Our membership embraces a wide range of political sympathies, and inevitably, among individuals there may be some support for extreme ideologies. But just as UWC repudiates the narrow sectarian dogma of Irish Nationalism, it equally rejects the repressive doctrine of Godless Communism hailed as the universal cure-all for the social and economic injustices rife in the world today. . . . There will be no accommodation in this organisation to advance the causes of Marx-Leninism, Communism or similar ideological regimes.

(*UWC Journal* [1975], undated, unnumbered issue).

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Rumania : Background to Autonomy

Graeme J. Gill

THROUGHOUT the sixties, some of the communist regimes of Eastern Europe embarked on a course of loosening their ties with the Soviet Union, thereby taking advantage of the development during that period of increased opportunities to exercise a limited degree of autonomy. Given the intense nationalism of the area, the development of such a course should have caused no real surprise to observers of Eastern European affairs. What did, perhaps, cause surprise was that a leading role in this development was played by the Rumanian regime, previously considered to be a " hard-line " ally of the Soviet Union. An analysis of Rumanian developments will provide an insight into the dynamics of this general search for greater autonomy by some party-states of the region.[1]

An increase in Eastern European autonomy logically entails a decline in Soviet control over the area. This decline in Soviet control was manifested in the Rumanian case more generally by an end to the period in which the Soviet leaders could expect automatic support from Bucharest on all matters of substance and, more spectacularly, by direct opposition from the Rumanians on certain specific questions. An indication of these areas of difference will be given, followed by an analysis of the factors which made independent Rumanian initiatives possible during this period. The situation midway through the seventies will then be surveyed.

A major area where the erosion of Soviet control was clearly visible was in Soviet attempts to convene an international conference of communist parties. During the period of Stalin's rule, Soviet will was enforced on bloc leaders, either through organizational means like the Cominform, or through bilateral meetings between Soviet and Eastern European leaders. Soviet military strength was also obviously an important factor in this. The death of Stalin in 1953 and the disbandment of the Cominform three years later led to bilateral and multilateral meetings becoming more frequent and more important. At such multilateral meetings, the Soviet leadership, at least until the June 1960 Bucharest Congress, had been able to muster the overwhelming, and virtually automatic, support of the Eastern European parties, thus translating the multilateral meeting into a forum for the articulation of common principles and for forcing recalcitrant parties into declarations of unity.[2] This coercive function of the multi-

[1] Not all party-states of the region sought to loosen their ties with Moscow; neither the Bulgarian nor East German parties followed such a course.

[2] See Brzezinski, Z. K., *The Soviet Bloc: Unity and Conflict*, Rev. ed. (2nd), New York, 1960, pp. 460–61.

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lateral meeting assumed prime importance in the eyes of the Soviet leaders as the dispute with China increased in intensity. However, the Soviet leaders experienced great difficulty in convening such a conference, one of the major reasons for this being the opposition of the Rumanians.

Soviet attempts to convene such a conference must be seen in the context of the deterioration of relations with China, in that a major Soviet aim in calling such a conference was the condemnation of the Chinese Party. The Soviet attitude towards a conference was ambivalent during the first years of the decade. However, this position crystallized into one of firm support for the idea in September–October 1963. This is indicated by the printing in *Pravda* of resolutions of pro-Moscow parties calling for a conference,[3] the censoring of less-favourable parts of the resolutions before printing them, the intensification of anti-Chinese polemics, and the application of pressure on pro-Soviet parties to gain public acceptance of the conference plan. However, this Soviet push for a conference lapsed during late October, a major reason for this being the marked reserve with which the conference proposal was greeted in Rumania, Poland and Hungary, whose leaders either made no reply or intimated that the time was not suitable for such a conference.[4]

In early 1964, the Soviet leaders again began to press for an international conference of communist parties,[5] this time leaving no doubt as to the purpose of such a conference:

> . . . difficulties have been evolved by the Communist Party of China's leadership's differences with the international Communist movement. It is therefore completely logical that the collective efforts of all the fraternal parties be exerted in order to determine the means for preserving and strengthening the Marxist-Leninist unity of the Communist ranks. It is perfectly clear to the Communist Party of the Soviet Union that the conference should serve precisely these ends.[6]

This call for collective mobilization against the Chinese must have seemed even more ominous in the light of Khrushchev's call, on the same day, for further consideration of the question of improving "organizational forms" and the "coordination of foreign policy" within the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA) and the Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO).[7] The Russians kept up this pressure for collective mobilization with continuing calls for a con-

[3] *Pravda*, 17 September (British CP), 21 September (Portuguese CP) and 30 September (Paraguay CP).

[4] E.g. Maurer, I. G. (then the Rumanian Prime Minister), "The Inviolable Foundations of the Unity of the International Communist Movement," *World Marxist Review; Problems of Peace and Socialism*, Vol. 6, No. 11, November 1963.

[5] See Suslov, M. A., "The Struggle of the CPSU for the Unity of the World Communist Movement," *Pravda*, 3 April 1964.

[6] Ibid.

[7] *Nepszabadsag*, 4 April 1964.

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ference,[8] and by announcing in July that a meeting of the 26 parties which had formed the drafting committee for the 1960 international meeting of communist parties (which included Rumania) would meet in December to prepare for a new conference. Moreover, it was pointedly emphasized that this meeting would take place even if some of the parties invited did not attend.[9]

The Rumanians firmly opposed these Soviet moves, as is indicated by the contents of the letters they sent to the CPSU and the CPC on 25 March, by their failure to publish Suslov's report, and by the Statement adopted by an Enlarged Plenum of the Central Committee of the Rumanian Workers' Party on 22 April.[10] In this statement, the Rumanians expressed their opposition to the type of conference envisaged by the Russians. While agreeing in principle with the idea of a conference, they opposed any conference in which all communist parties were not represented. In addition, they rejected any concept of " excommunication," and by asserting that

> It is the exclusive right of each party independently to work out its political line, its concrete objectives, and the ways and means of achieving them [11]

they also rejected Khrushchev's calls for tighter organizational unity within the CMEA and WTO. The Rumanians did not formally reply to the July invitation to participate in the drafting committee.

The fall of Khrushchev in October led to a postponement of the drafting committee until March 1965, and to a moderation of the Soviet position: Moscow began to give assurances that no excommunication would occur at the meeting, and it came to be termed " consultative " rather than " preparatory " in nature. However, when it took place in March, the Rumanian Party, along with the pro-Chinese parties, boycotted the meeting.

Soviet pressure for a conference declined after the consultative meeting had affirmed the desirability of an international conference, but had so qualified it as to lead to indefinite postponement. However, this ambivalent attitude hardened in late 1966 with unqualified calls for a conference being made at the Bulgarian and Hungarian Party congresses in November by Bulgarian, Hungarian and Soviet leaders.[12] But there was no positive reaction from the Rumanians who, along with the Yugoslavs and Albanians, demonstrated their opposition to a conference which could in any way be anti-Chinese, by refusing

[8] E.g. letters to the CC CPC of 7 March and 15 June 1964.

[9] Letter to the CC CPC, 30 July 1964.

[10] " Statement on the Stand of the Rumanian Workers' Party Concerning the Problems of the International Communist and Working-Class Movement," *Scinteia*, 26 April 1964.

[11] Ibid.

[12] *Tass*, 14 November 1966, 28 November 1966; *Pravda*, 16 November 1966, 30 November 1966.

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to attend the All-European Conference of Communist Parties at Karlovy Vary in April 1967.

The Soviet drive for a conference appeared to be nearing success with Brezhnev's announcement in November 1967 that a consultative meeting would be held in February 1968 for "a collective exchange of opinions" on the question of calling an international conference.[13] Although the Rumanians publicly ignored this proposal, when the meeting was convened in Budapest over the period 26 February–5 March 1968, the only absentees were the Yugoslavs and Albanians. Rumanian participation was probably gained through Russian and Hungarian (as hosts of the meeting) assurances that the meeting would in no way try to excommunicate or severely criticize other parties.[14] However, at the meeting both the Rumanian Party and the absent Chinese Party came under severe criticism, with the result that the Rumanians walked out. They followed up this action two months later by boycotting the preparatory committee established by the Budapest meeting to prepare for an international conference.

The preparatory committee decided that the international conference should take place on 25 November in Moscow, but the invasion of Czechoslovakia in August caused the postponement of this until the new year. After several further delays caused by administrative and organizational difficulties, the conference opened in Moscow on 5 June 1969 with the Rumanians in attendance. Rumanian participation appears to have been gained through private assurances to Ceausescu that the conference would not attack any party and would concern itself only with the current problems of the movement. Thus the Rumanians attended on the terms which they had espoused since 1963.

The Rumanians thus consistently opposed Soviet conference plans through calling for lengthy preparatory procedures before such a conference, imposing conditions which the Soviet leaders found impossible to fulfil (e.g. attendance by all parties), refusing to attend the March 1965 meeting and the preparatory meeting in April 1968, and by walking out of the February/March 1968 consultative meeting. The Rumanian position was succinctly stated by the delegate to the February/March 1968 meeting:

> The RCP supports a conference that would serve unity and favours the creation of conditions for participation in it by all communist parties without exception. . . . The conference agenda must be confined to discussion of specific problems of the anti-imperialist struggle, without providing for adoption by the conference of programme documents, or for discussion or criticism of any form of activity of the parties present or absent.[15]

This Rumanian opposition to Russian conference plans was a com-

[13] *Pravda*, 25 November 1967.
[14] See *Kommunist*, No. 18, 1967; *Nepszabadsag*, 24 December 1967.
[15] *Izvestia*, 29 February 1968.

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pletely new development in Eastern Europe. Certain of the other parties had also expressed opposition at different times but, apart from the pro-Chinese Albanians, no party was as consistently opposed as the Rumanians. The basic motivation for this opposition was a desire to prevent a return to the practice of excommunication typified by Stalin's treatment of the Yugoslavs, with the concomitant tightening of inter-party discipline of the kind referred to by Khrushchev in April 1964.

Rumanian opposition to Soviet attempts to bring about closer integration also occurred on the economic and military levels. During the fifties, economic activity in the bloc had been co-ordinated on a purely national basis, with no negotiation or adjustment before national plans were enacted; emphasis was placed on bilateral, rather than multilateral, contacts. Bloc co-operation was minimal. However, there was a good deal of dissatisfaction with this situation, and in June 1962, the Russians outlined a scheme for greater economic integration.[16] This would have led to the establishment of a supra-national planning body, centralized joint investment plans, and the joint construction of enterprises that would belong to the bloc as a whole, rather than to the national states.[17] All of these proposals were predicated on the need for a central authority, a role the Russians intended to play. If put into effect, they would have divided the countries of Eastern Europe into industrial and agricultural states, with the latter (mainly Rumania and Bulgaria) providing the food supply and raw materials, while the former developed their economies on the basis of heavy industry. The Rumanians opposed these proposals, simultaneously speeding up the process of their own large-scale industrialization begun in June 1960. Their opposition was based on the view that the integration proposals posed a threat to indigenous control of the economy, represented an infringement of national sovereignty, and involved the reduction of Rumania to the level of a second-class state.[18] The integration proposals were abandoned in December 1962; the inclusion in the CMEA Charter of 1960 of the principle of the need for unanimity among all members before a decision could become operative ensured that the Rumanian point of view prevailed.

The Rumanians also strongly opposed the closer integration of Warsaw Pact forces. During the fifties, these forces did not constitute an integrated whole—the unified command allowed for was not implemented, and the individual states' forces remained under national control. However, throughout the sixties, the Soviet Union tried to bring about a closer integration within the organization—allied armed forces received modern weapons, annual joint manoeuvres rather

[16] " Basic Principles of the International Socialist Division of Labour."

[17] See Jaster, R. S., " The Defeat of Khrushchev's Plan to Integrate Eastern Europe," *The World Today*, Oxford University Press, December 1963, p. 517.

[18] *Agence France-Presse* interview with I.G. Maurer, 3 August 1964.

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than individual ones were held, the Pact's infrastructure and communications network were improved, and the Political Consultative Committee was convened annually and its resolutions published in all member-states. In addition, at various times Soviet leaders have called for a tighter organizational arrangement: Khrushchev's request in April 1964 (see p. 95) was a prime example, while Brezhnev's declaration in September 1965 was even more explicit:

> The present day situation puts on the agenda the task of further perfecting the organization of the Warsaw Treaty . . .[19]

The Soviet desire for greater military integration met stubborn resistance from the Rumanians and this came to a peak in 1965–66, during which time the Bucharest leadership hinted that, without a change in the structuring of the alliance, they may have to examine their continued membership.[20] In the same period, the Rumanians unilaterally reduced the period of compulsory military service from two years to one, gained a reduction in the staff of the Soviet military mission in Bucharest from 16 to three, criticized the Soviet Union's position in the Pact's command structure and the settlement of Pact political and financial questions, and called for an end to the stationing of Soviet troops on Pact-members' soil. Open Rumanian opposition was again demonstrated in 1968 by non-attendance at the Dresden (23 March), Moscow (8 May), Warsaw (14–15 July), and Bratislava (3 August) meetings at which the fate of Czechoslovakia was debated, and by severe criticism of the allies' action in invading Czechoslovakia. The Rumanians also refused to extend the 20-year military treaty of friendship and mutual assistance with the Soviet Union when it expired in April 1968, and declined, as they had done in 1965 and 1966, to participate in Pact maneouvres in 1968, or to allow such manoeuvres to take place in Rumania. Thus, basing their actions once again on the principle of national sovereignty, the Rumanians played a large part in frustrating Soviet attempts to bring about closer military integration.

However, it has not been only on questions of " collective mobilization " and closer integration that the Rumanians opposed the prevailing Soviet line. On many other issues, the Bucharest leadership adopted a position that differed from that of the Soviet Union: the return of the Rumanian ambassador to Albania in January 1963, opposition to Soviet control of the WFTU, the opening of full diplomatic relations with the Federal Republic of Germany in January 1967, refusal to take an anti-Israeli stand in June 1967, continued *rapprochement* with Yugoslavia after the Soviet-Yugoslav break in 1968, Nixon's visit to Bucharest in 1969, an independent voting pattern in the UN, and the neutral position adopted in the Sino-Soviet dispute all indicate an increasingly independent stand by the Rumanians.

[19] *Pravda*, 15 September 1965.

[20] See Ulam, A. B., *Expansion and Coexistence: A History of Soviet Foreign Policy from 1917–1967*, London, 1968, p. 713.

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THUS, during the sixties, the Rumanian Party tended to take a line relatively independent of that of the Soviet Union. That it was able to do so was the result of the convergence in this period of three separate but interrelated broad thematic streams:

1. The Sino-Soviet rift
2. Domestic developments in the Soviet Union
3. Changing positions and perceptions in Eastern Europe.

These three thematic streams will now be examined, with emphasis on the way in which the Rumanian regime used them to build for itself a more independent position than the one it had previously occupied.

The Sino-Soviet rift

The precise course of the dispute between the Soviet and Chinese Parties, with its various lulls and intensifications, is not of major concern here, because it had only a secondary effect on Soviet-East European relations by providing the specific contexts within which some manifestations of autonomy from Moscow could occur. More important as an explanatory factor was the realization by the parties of the region that a rift existed, and that enormous differences separated the two protagonists. Initial recognition of the scale of the rift was important, because it was the impact of this upon the "socialist state system" in Eastern Europe which caused the factors promoting increased autonomy outlined below to develop. After the initial recognition of the existence and intensity of the dispute, subsequent fluctuations in the precise nature of Sino-Soviet relations, unless they approached either total reconciliation with or general ostracism of China, leading to a withdrawal of recognition of her as a "socialist state," could have little real influence on Soviet-East European relations. This is so because the terms within which these relations had to take place had already been largely determined by East European recognition of the opportunities presented by the initial intensity of the dispute. Thus the first open manifestations of the dispute (occurring in 1960) indicated to the East European leaders the seriousness of the rift, and the potential opportunities inherent in it. These opportunities ceased to be potential only when the East European regimes attempted to turn this potentiality into reality.

The onset of the rift showed that the formula which Khrushchev had tried to use to dominate the communist movement—ideological and political unity coupled with institutional diversity (see p. 103)—depended for its success as a control mechanism on the existence of a single ideological centre in the "world socialist system." Up to this time, this centre had indisputably been Moscow. However, the Chinese were now challenging the ideological supremacy of the Russians and claiming to be the true centre of world communism. The acceptance of this claim by many non-ruling communist parties and the inability of the

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Soviet leaders to rally sufficient support among the other communist parties to formally expel China from the movement meant that the Chinese were directly challenging the Soviet position from within the "world socialist system." Thus there were, in effect, two centres of communism, each claiming to be the true exponent of Leninism, and each wishing to assert its supremacy over its adversary and the movement as a whole. With the existence of these two rival centres, some difference of opinion was thereby legitimized. While there had only been one centre of orthodoxy, deviation from Moscow's line was widely interpreted as anti-communist. With the rise of Peking's claims to be the centre of orthodoxy and China's continued membership of the "world socialist system," to oppose Moscow no longer meant *ipso facto* to oppose communism. Thus the limits of ideological diversity were widened, thereby undermining Khrushchev's formula of ideological and political unity, and institutional diversity. The only method of restoring the formula to operational effectiveness was either a total reconciliation between the two opponents, or the removal of China from the "world socialist system," thereby leaving Moscow as the sole guardian of orthodoxy.

The rift showed that there could no longer be only one centre of communism, but it did not imply that the number of such centres had to be limited to two. The Chinese provided the example of a party basing its ideological formulations and positions on the peculiarities of its national conditions. This was an obvious stimulus to the development of "national communism," the effect of this being strengthened by the inability of the Soviet Union to bring the dissidents under control. The Soviet leaders had not accepted the right of the Yugoslavs in 1948 or the Poles after 1956 to actively proselytize the advantages of their systems—the Yugoslavs were expelled from the "world socialist system" and the Poles were quickly brought into line. However, the Soviet leaders could do neither of these things with the rebellious Chinese Party, or the pro-Chinese Albanian Party of Labour. This inability to take decisive action against erstwhile loyal allies who were adopting paths of "national communism" was an obvious stimulus to polycentrism.

The rift with China also promoted increased autonomy from Soviet control in Eastern Europe by causing both sides to seek allies against the other among the world communist parties. This meant that, at least potentially (and actually, in the Albanian case), the Chinese constituted a source of material and moral support for any party opposing Moscow. This desire for allies also limited the Soviet leaders in another way. As indicated above, Moscow tried to deal with the Chinese challenge by mobilizing a majority of the world's communist parties to come together in a multilateral meeting to condemn or "excommunicate" the Chinese. Consequently, it was commonly felt that Soviet ability to act decisively to compel recalcitrant parties to publicly support an

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anti-China conference was limited by the negative effect this would have on the attitudes of the other parties to the Soviet aim. It was felt that any show of force or compulsion in Eastern Europe would so alienate the non-ruling parties that they would not support, and might actively oppose, Soviet conference proposals.[21] Thus there was an element of uncertainty, created by the Soviet leadership's need for allies in the struggle with China, which promoted conditions favouring a loosening of Soviet control in Eastern Europe.

So one result of the dispute with China was increased room for manoeuvre for the parties of Eastern Europe. How have the Rumanians reacted to the opportunities created by Sino-Soviet differences? The Rumanian Workers' Party (after March 1965, the Rumanian Communist Party) basically supported the Soviet theoretical positions in the dispute with China, but it adopted a neutral stance. In keeping with its emphasis on national sovereignty, equality and non-interference in internal matters, the Rumanian Party consistently called for an end to polemics and the public criticism and denunciation of the Chinese, and rejected all Soviet proposals for an anti-China conference. The Rumanians took no part in the public criticism of the Chinese and usually ignored the polemical broadsides from both sides. Where these were acknowledged, both sides were given equal space in the press.[22] The Bucharest leadership criticized both sides for their part in public polemics. Diplomatic relations were maintained with both the Soviet Union and China—attendance by both Russian and Chinese delegations at Rumanian liberation celebrations in August 1964 was a clear demonstration of the Rumanian desire to maintain a position midway between the two antagonists. Rumania also made various efforts to patch up the dispute by acting as an intermediary between the two capitals. Thus the Rumanians adopted a strictly neutral stance in the dispute. In so doing, they, apart from the Albanians, went furthest among the East European parties in breaking away from Soviet control by utilizing the opportunities for manoeuvrability provided by the Sino-Soviet rift. Both the Soviet Union and China wanted total Rumanian support; neither received it. Although supporting the Soviet theoretical position, the Rumanians disassociated themselves from the Soviet operational position. Thus they took advantage of the opportunities for increased manoeuvrability inherent in the rift, by using the influence they possessed in the form of potential for support to gain for themselves a truly neutral position.

[21] That this belief had an element of truth, but was not as important as was probably thought, is indicated by the aftermath of the invasion of Czechoslovakia—the conference was postponed for eight months.

[22] Gross, G., "Rumania: The Fruits of Autonomy," *Problems of Communism*, January/February 1966, p. 19–20.

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Soviet domestic developments

The factors of geopolitics alone ensure that developments in Eastern Europe are always highly influenced by developments within the Soviet Union. However, when the geopolitical element of propinquity is allied to close ideological, political and economic ties between the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, events in the latter region are influenced to an even greater extent by events in the former than would have been the case had geopolitical factors been the only link between the two areas. Consequently, an analysis of certain developments within the domestic Soviet political scene is necessary if the conditions promoting increased East European autonomy during the sixties are to be adequately explained.

When Khrushchev came to power, he realized that the Stalinist system of control in Eastern Europe could not be continued, and that the parties would have to be allowed more individual autonomy if a viable system was to be maintained. Consequently, he implemented the formula of ideological and political unity coupled with institutional diversity. This meant that the parties of Eastern Europe, while having to conform roughly to the Soviet Marxist-Leninist model, were permitted to adapt to a greater extent to local conditions than had been possible under Stalin, as long as these "national deviations" (as in Gomulka's agricultural policy) were not represented as legitimate examples for emulation by other members of the "bloc," and as long as there was complete obedience to Moscow on foreign policy and intra-bloc matters.[23] However, such a formulation was inherently unstable, because the pursuit of different internal policies often dictated a variety of approaches in external affairs which thereby rendered impossible complete ideological and political unity. The Rumanian resolve to pursue a course of industrialization leading to opposition by the Bucharest leadership to Soviet proposals for tighter integration within CMEA is a striking indication of this. Thus the formula by which Khrushchev had hoped to bring about tighter unity in fact stimulated greater autonomy among the East European parties, and was abandoned early in the 1960s.[24] In this way, Khrushchev's inability to develop an efficient control mechanism to replace that of Stalin was an important factor in promoting opportunities for increased autonomy in Eastern Europe.

The Soviet doctrine of peaceful co-existence and *détente* with the West also fostered greater autonomy by making it possible for the party-states of the region to develop wider ties with the West on all levels. The relaxation of the Soviet posture towards the West and the increasing contacts on cultural, scientific, economic and tourist levels provided an example which the Rumanians were not slow to emulate.

[23] See Brown, J. F., *The New Eastern Europe*, London, 1966, p. 166.

[24] Khrushchev even recognized that ideological diversity was possible and probably even inevitable—see his comments at the sixth SED congress in January 1963.

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Trade between Rumania and the West increased enormously during that decade [25]; the commercial contacts they made permitted the Rumanians to continue with their policy of industrialization, despite opposition (e.g. in 1962 and 1967) from the more industrialized members of the bloc. Tourist levels rose and inter-government contacts increased, reaching a new high with the visit of President Nixon in 1969. By thus increasing their contacts with the West, the Rumanian leaders decreased their country's dependence on the Soviet Union through adherence to the letter, if not the spirit, of the Soviet policy of peaceful co-existence and *détente*.

In addition to the inability of the Soviet Union to find an effective control mechanism in Eastern Europe and its policy of peaceful co-existence and *détente* with the West—both of which were specifically concerned with Soviet foreign relations—various internal developments in the Soviet leadership were also of significance for Eastern Europe. One of the most important of these was the reaffirmation of the de-Stalinization campaign at the twenty-second CPSU congress in October 1961.[26] This reaffirmation, first begun in 1956, facilitated greater Rumanian independence in a number of ways:

(a) Gheorghiu-Dej used the reaffirmation of the campaign to blame the evils of Stalinism on pro-Soviet elements within the Rumanian leadership, thereby absolving "national" elements from blame. By putting the blame for past excesses on the "foreign and pro-Soviet" elements which had been purged in 1952 (Pauker, Luca and Georgescu) and 1957 (Chisinevschi and Constantinescu), Gheorghiu-Dej was implicitly stressing the "Rumanian" character of the existing leadership and trying to establish an individual Rumanian—as opposed to Soviet—identity for the Party. He thus used the de-Stalinization campaign to try to associate the Party more closely with the national Rumanian population than with the Soviet Union (see p. 107).

(b) Open denunciations of Stalin served to undermine the edifice of Soviet control in Eastern Europe. Because of the intimacy with which Stalin as a person was connected with the reality of Soviet control in Eastern Europe, open denunciations of Stalin constituted an implicit disapproval of Soviet control in that region. Consequently, with the reaffirmation of de-Stalinization in 1961, continued Soviet dominance again came under intense questioning, as it had in 1956. The impact of this was heightened simultaneously by the inability of the Soviet Union

[25] The following figures from a Radio Free Europe report dated 28 August 1969 give some indication of the move towards the West in total trade terms and imports of machinery and equipment:

1958 Percentage of Rumania's total trade with the West = 17 per cent
1965 Percentage of Rumania's total trade with the West = 30 per cent
1958 90 per cent of machinery and equipment imported from CMEA members
1965 50 per cent of machinery and equipment imported from CMEA members

In *Scienteia* of 18 August 1970, it was reported that 55 per cent of Rumania's total trade was with "socialist countries," which probably means that a lesser amount was with CMEA. Thus a great diversification had occurred.

[26] See Khrushchev's speech: *Pravda*, 29 October 1961.

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to control an erstwhile loyal ally in Eastern Europe, Albania. Thus the whole concept of continued Soviet dominance in Eastern Europe was brought into question at the same time that Soviet inability to control Albania seemed to show that its hold in Eastern Europe was slipping.

(c) The reaffirmation of de-Stalinization also strengthened the desire to follow a more "national" course. The continued disclosure of the crimes committed under Stalin produced a reaction against the type of system that could allow such things to develop, and, consequently, the Soviet model of development was rejected. The reaffirmation of de-Stalinization did not produce the desire to follow a "national" course, but it did reinforce it.

Changes in the Soviet leadership also contributed to the development of greater autonomy within Eastern Europe. The death of Stalin had been of prime importance, because it was his disappearance from the scene that produced the void which, as indicated above, Khrushchev tried unsuccessfully to fill with his formula of ideological and political unity coupled with institutional diversity. Thus Stalin's death was a prerequisite for the events now under examination. But the fall of Khrushchev in October 1964, although not as far-reaching in its implications as Stalin's death, was also important for Eastern Europe. It removed at one blow the most dominant figure in the bloc who, despite his mistakes and failures, acted as a brake on the centrifugal forces through the strength of his personality, his prestige and the debts which certain bloc leaders owed to him (especially Kadar and Novotny). His removal also undermined trust in Moscow, because it was a sign of instability and weakness; it was a sudden reversal which tended to create doubts about Soviet integrity and reliability, to introduce a new unpredictability into Soviet actions, and to dent the prestige of Soviet authority.

The change in leadership type and style which occurred in 1964 also promoted a greater degree of independence from Moscow. Under Khrushchev, the situation had been one of one-man dominance, in the sense that after the fall of the anti-party group, Khrushchev was clearly *primus inter pares*. In such a situation, doubts and disagreements within the Presidium could be quickly overcome by the leader. The decisions made may not have been the best possible, but at least a decision was made. However, in the post-Khrushchev leadership, no one person, at least at first, was dominant, with the result that disputes and disagreements often remained unsolved, the Politburo was divided, and government was to a certain extent by compromise.[27] This led to the leadership being characterized by hesitancy, *immobilisme* and a sense of drift. Such division and disagreement did not occur on all matters, but it was characteristic on matters of extreme importance,

[27] See Leonhard, W., "Politics and Ideology in the Post-Khrushchev Era," in Dallin, A. and Larson, T. B., *Soviet Politics Since Khrushchev*, Englewood Cliffs, 1968 for an examination of this.

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including affairs in Eastern Europe—the hesitancy and obvious disagreement prior to the invasion of Czechoslovakia was a case in point. The existence of this degree of uncertainty in Eastern Europe was a further factor promoting conditions favourable to an increased degree of autonomy from Moscow.

So various Soviet policies, allied to the effects of changes in the leadership in 1953 and 1964, contributed to making conditions in Eastern Europe during the sixties more favourable than ever before for an assertion of greater independence by the party states in that region.

Position and perception in Eastern Europe

The loosening of Soviet control in Eastern Europe was aided by the tendency of some of the parties, including the Rumanian, to identify themselves more with national aspirations, and even traditional national conceptions, than with the principles of " proletarian internationalism." This process of re-identification did not mark a decline in the adherence of these states to " communism." It did indicate a recognition of the need to consolidate at home, to identify with the feelings of popular nationalism. As such, this policy was a complete reversal of the situation that existed under Stalin, and often led to direct criticism of, and sometimes opposition to, Soviet actions and policies. Basically, there was a trend towards a change from the practice of suppressing domestic nationalism from the power base of Soviet support to that of criticizing, and sometimes opposing, the Soviet Union from the power base of domestic nationalism. There was thus an attempt to gain a power base independent of the Soviet Union, and this was being sought in the national population. The possession of such a power base is essential for any sustained opposition to, and independence from, the Soviet Union. However, as well as being a prerequisite for sustained opposition, the possession of such a power base and the means by which it must be obtained were themselves manifestations of a greater degree of independence from Moscow. Consequently, an analysis of the Rumanian Party's actions will have the double effect of aiding the explanation of Rumanian developments and supplementing the account given earlier of the manifestations of Rumanian independence.

Traditionally, historically and culturally, the Rumanian people have looked towards the Christian cultural influences coming from Western Europe, and, particularly, Rome. As a result, they have been anti-Slav, and, therefore, anti-Russian, in orientation. This meant that in order to get into step with national sentiment, the Party had to adopt a similar anti-Russian attitude. This was made easier by the purging of the pro-Russian elements in 1952 and 1957 referred to above, which removed from the leadership all those openly opposed to pursuing a more anti-Russian attitude than had hitherto been adopted. Unsuccessful Soviet attempts in 1966–67 to encourage internal opposition to Ceausescu

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indicate the success of the purges and that the Party had been fully united in its anti-Russian course.

The first overt anti-Russian moves were in the cultural sphere—the Rumanian leaders made a concerted effort to replace predominant Russian cultural influences with Latin culture. The main features of this campaign included the closing of the chief centre for the spread of Russian culture (the Maxim Gorky Institute), the closing of all Russian reading rooms, the abolition of Russian as a required language for all pupils in secondary schools, the discontinuation of publication of the Rumanian edition of the Soviet journal *Novoe Vremya*, the renaming of streets and institutions bearing Russian names, and a favourable re-evaluation of pre-communist Rumanian authors.

As well as this cultural onslaught against the Russians, the Rumanian leaders also began to attack past Soviet policies and actions, and tried to establish for the RWP a firm historical existence independent of the CPSU. A re-interpretation of post-axis Rumanian history greatly downgraded the part played by the Red Army in the overthrow of the fascist Antonescu regime in 1944, and emphasized the role of the indigenous Communist Party in leading a wide popular front which included the traditional bourgeois parties and even the king. The Gheorghiu-Dej "home" communist group was depicted as embodying all that was finest and most progressive in the Rumanian national tradition, while the Russians were accused of subverting that tradition by interfering in Rumanian internal affairs both through the Comintern and by appointing non-Rumanians to positions of leadership in the RWP—the evils of the Stalinist period in Rumania were blamed on the pro-Russian elements purged in 1952 and 1957. The Russians were openly condemned for forcing the Rumanian communists to cease anti-Nazi activities in accord with the Nazi-Soviet pact of 1939, and to acquiesce to Soviet claims to Bessarabia, this last charge being accompanied by calls for the return of the area. Thus, the Rumanian leadership was creating a picture of itself as a small band of nationalists bullied by the Russian Party into anti-national acts.

Through these moves, the Party attempted to give voice to Rumanian nationalism, and, in so doing, to reject the notion of any benefits being gained from previous Soviet interference in Rumanian internal affairs. These actions were coherently defended and justified in the Statement of April 1964[28] which affirmed the inviolability of the principles of national sovereignty and non-interference in the internal affairs of other parties. Continued adherence to these principles in the face of direct Soviet opposition further promoted the development of identity between people and Party—the Rumanian population saw how the Party was firmly giving voice to national sentiment by actively

[28] "Statement on the Stand of the Rumanian Workers' Party Concerning the Problems of the International Communist and Working-Class Movement," *Scinteia*, 26 April 1964.

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opposing the Soviet Union on issues of national importance, and they provided it with a firm national base of support.

Thus, the Party in Rumania successfully managed to build up a power base within the population by associating itself with the demands of Rumanian nationalism. This involved an internal de-Russification and the following of an independent course in foreign affairs. However, significantly, the population was won over without any wide-ranging internal relaxation—Ceausescu tried to bring about greater communication between Party and people by calling for greater public criticism and individual opinion, greater assertiveness on the part of public organizations, a more active role by the General Assembly, and by a strengthening of the position of the individual vis-à-vis the state,[29] but there was little relaxation of internal controls. The resentment that this continued hard line in internal affairs engendered was offset by the conscious association with anti-Russian Rumanian nationalism,[30] and the wide dissemination within Rumania of information concerning the regime's anti-Soviet postures. The numerous meetings in March 1963 between Party functionaries and the general population, at which current differences with Moscow were explained, was the most striking example of the regime's attempts to publicize its anti-Moscow stance within Rumania. Thus, the Rumanian population was made aware of the regime's differences with Moscow, and because the root of these differences lay in an assertion of Rumanian national interest and Rumanian nationalism, the population was easily able to identify with the regime. Consequently, the Rumanian situation was a mutually re-inforcing process: the regime's enactment of nationalist and anti-Russian measures led to a greater identification of the people with the regime, which thereby gave the Party leadership a strengthened base from which to pursue further national objectives.

THUS, during the sixties, Rumania took advantage of the confluence of these thematic streams to strike out for itself a position more independent of Moscow than that of any other state which remained openly aligned with the Soviet Union. However, in the middle of the seventies, it appears that changes in the relationship and configuration of these three tendencies has taken some of the wind out of the Rumanian sails. Certainly, the Bucharest leadership has not rejected any of the principles it espoused or the positions it adopted during the sixties: emphasis on national sovereignty, the abolition of military pacts, the removal of tensions between East and West, and general neutrality in the Sino-Soviet dispute remain elements

[29] See Brown, J. F., "Rumania Today: 1. Towards 'Integration,'" *Problems of Communism*, January/February 1969, pp. 13–14.

[30] There were indications that some form of internal relaxation must take place if discontent was not going to develop in Rumania, e.g., it appears that rising popular pressures for internal relaxation in 1968 were only overcome due to the threat that appeared to be posed by the Czechoslovak invasion.

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of Rumanian foreign policy.[31] However, in some ways, the Rumanians have been forced to moderate their position, while in others changes in the environment surrounding them has brought the position of the Soviet Union and her more " hard-line " allies in Eastern Europe closer to that of Rumania, thereby decreasing the sense of the uniqueness of the Rumanian position.

One of the basic factors in this change is economic. At the turn of the decade, Rumania's internal economic position was not as robust as it had been when it provided a firm basis for independent initiatives during the sixties. Massive investment of capital was by this time no longer providing the planned growth rate that the Rumanian leaders and people had come to expect. The economy was slowing down perceptibly, compared with the second half of the sixties. This problem was exacerbated by the fact that many of the credits which had been gained from the West, and particularly from West Germany, were now falling due for repayment. In addition, the countries in the West were beginning to adopt a more hard-headed " commercial " approach. They made it clear that they were no longer willing to purchase good relations with the countries of Eastern Europe through the provision of favourable credit facilities. Moreover, closely linked to this was the problem that Rumanian exports to the West were not expanding as fast as had been anticipated. On top of all of these factors, in the spring of 1970, floods in the Danube basin caused greater damage to the Rumanian economy than had been caused by the ravages of World War II. All of these factors have meant that the internal economic basis from which the initiatives of the sixties could be launched had, at the start of the seventies, become correspondingly weaker. Not unrelated to this economic down-turn in the Rumanian economy was the compromise reached between the Rumanians and the other members of CMEA at the 25th session of that organization in July 1971. At this meeting, the participants hammered out a programmatic document [32] in which the principle of greater integration of the economies of the member countries was affirmed. However, this integration was to be

> in accordance with the principles of socialist internationalism and on the basis of respect for national sovereignty, independence and national interests, of non-intervention in the internal affairs of nations, and of total equality, mutual advantage, and completely reciprocal aid . . . socialist economic integration is carried out on an entirely voluntary basis and is not accompanied by the creation of supra-national organs. . . .[33]

[31] See, e.g., Ceausescu's speech to the Foreign Policy Association in New York on 22 October 1970. This is excerpted in *Eastern Europe*, January 1971, Vol. 20, No. 1.

[32] " Comprehensive Programme for the Extension and Improvement of Collaboration and the Development of Socialist Economic Integration of the CMEA Countries." Full text in *Ekonomicheskaya Gazeta*, No. 33, August 1971.

[33] Loc. cit.

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Thus, the compromise was achieved on Rumanian terms. However, it is important to note that the Rumanians at that time felt it necessary to come to such a compromise, which put them in the position of supporting a call for greater integration within CMEA.[34] To this extent, the position they held in the sixties has been weakened.

The second change in Rumania's situation concerns her relationship with China. During the early seventies, her position of neutrality in the Sino-Soviet dispute seemed to be changing. The floods in the Danube basin gave the Chinese the chance to step up their drive to gain friends in Eastern Europe. The Chinese mounted a massive relief effort; they were the single largest source of assistance to the Rumanians in overcoming this natural disaster. By comparison, the Russian effort appeared miniscule. This was followed in November 1970 and March 1971 by meetings between Rumanian and Chinese officials at which the Chinese promised an enormous loan to Rumania[35] and also the use of Chinese technicians. The Rumanians thus appeared to be seeking from the Chinese what they could no longer obtain so easily from the West. This appearance of increasing warmth between Peking and Bucharest was enhanced by Ceausescu's visit to the Chinese capital in June 1971. During this visit, Ceausescu seemed to exude enthusiasm for China, while referring to the Soviet Union only casually and in superficial terms. Already outraged by this behaviour, the Kremlin leaders found even more subterfuge in the relative closeness between Ceausescu's and Nixon's visits to Peking. As a result, pressure against Rumania began to mount in Eastern Europe during the summer of 1971.

This period appears to have been crucial for Rumania's independent course as a result of two developments. The first concerns changing perceptions within the Rumanian leadership. Although there were Chinese military delegations in Rumania during this period, it appears to have become obvious to the leadership in Bucharest that, regardless of how much goodwill they had in Peking, if it came to a crunch in Eastern Europe they could expect little help from their Chinese ally. Such considerations led to the conclusion that reconciliation with the Soviet Union was necessary. The second factor was changing perceptions in Peking. With the immense improvement in relations with the United States and the successes of the post-Cultural Revolution Chinese diplomacy (manifested most spectacularly by the increased number of states recognizing China and by her entry into the United Nations), the Chinese leaders took their dispute with the Soviet Union out of the socialist camp into the world arena. As a result, the importance of Rumania as an ally, although still substantial, was not as great as it had been previously. Relations between Peking and Bucharest

[34] One should note that a similar expression of the need for greater integration was made at the 23rd session of CMEA in April 1969, just prior to the international conference in June.

[35] This reportedly amounted to $24,000,000. *Reuters*, 8 March 1971.

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cooled significantly from the heights they had reached during Ceausescu's visit. The net effect for Rumania's position was that she was now very largely without a counterweight to balance the Soviet Union within the communist world. She thus chose reconciliation with Moscow, reverting to the position of a "neutral" in Sino-Soviet encounters.

The third important factor affecting Rumania's position has been the changing Soviet attitude towards the West and, as a corollary, a greater flexibility and adaptability in Soviet relations with Eastern Europe than had been expected. The indecisiveness of the early post-Khrushchev years has largely disappeared, at least in some aspects of foreign policy. As Brezhnev strengthened his position at the top, he staked more of his political prestige on the successful pursuit of a policy of *détente* with the West. This policy has been predicated on the need to establish Western recognition of the inviolability and legitimacy of the post-war boundaries in Europe. With the effective formal recognition by the West in 1970–72 of the position of East Germany, this was achieved. However, allied to this desire for the recognition of the political situation in Eastern Europe has been the wish to minimize the flow of ideas from West to East because of the possible disruptive effects this may have, while at the same time increasing the inflow of Western investment into the area. What effect has this had on the Rumanian position? Western recognition of the political state of affairs has brought home to the Rumanians the certainty that, should they come into conflict with their powerful neighbour, they could expect no help from the West; Eastern Europe has been reaffirmed as Moscow's back-yard. Moreover, the Soviet desire to minimize the flow of ideas from the West was largely shared by the Rumanians, since in internal affairs they remain one of the most orthodox of communist states. As for Soviet desires for increased Western trade and capital, this is what the Rumanians have been seeking for over a decade. One could almost say that the Russians appropriated the course which the Rumanians had been pursuing. The Rumanian position thus effectively moved closer to that of the Russians, becoming less a distinctly independent one.

THESE three changes—the decline in the robustness of the Rumanian economy, the changed position of China, and the increased Soviet pressure for *détente*—have made the basis from which independent Rumanian initiatives could be pursued far more shaky in the mid-seventies than it had been in the sixties. Nevertheless, as indicated above, the formal Rumanian position remains largely unchanged. Within CMEA, the Rumanians continue to emphasize state sovereignty, non-interference in internal affairs and national independence; supra-national bodies remain anathema, while the merging of national economies into a communist world economy is seen as something

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for the remote future.[36] On the wider stage, the Rumanians espoused national sovereignty and independence at the Vienna Mutual Force Reduction Talks and the Geneva Conference on Security and Co-operation during 1973 and 1974.[37] In inter-party matters, Ceausescu made the definitive Rumanian statement at the eleventh congress of the RCP in November 1974: he declared that every communist party had the right to determine its own line without interference from any other party, and that nothing must be done to weaken the unity of any communist party.[38] This formal position has been adopted in the Rumanian attitude towards the renewed calls for an international conference of communist parties. Pressure had begun to mount in favour of a conference in late 1973: on 6 December, Kadar and Zhivkov had openly called for the convocation of a conference in the near future, while throughout December and January, three meetings of secretaries of the Central Committees of the ruling communist parties were held, at which the question of a meeting appears to have been discussed.[39] The nature of the proposed conference was clear from the declaration by Vasil Bilak at the 7–9 January meeting that "a principled and open criticism of Maoism means the defence of the purity of Marxism-Leninism," [40] and from Soviet criticism of those who took a neutral stand in the Sino-Soviet rift.[41] Initially, the Rumanians ignored the conference proposals, apart from publishing the views of parties opposed to the idea of a conference.[42] The formal Rumanian view was stated in March, when Ceausescu approved the idea of a conference in principle, but set conditions for attendance by the Rumanians: the conference was to be organized on the basis of full equality, with the participation of all interested parties; documents should be approved by all parties and be binding on none; and the policies of other parties should not be discussed or criticized.[43] This basic position, which was the same as that adopted in the sixties, was reaffirmed at the Party congress in November 1974, when it was also stated that an international conference was not considered to be "of topical interest" and would be

[36] *Radio Free Europe Research. Eastern Europe. Rumanian Press Survey*, No. 974, 4 June 1974.

[37] At the Vienna talks, the Rumanian delegate, attending as an observer, emphasized that contacts should be between sovereign states rather than power blocs. *RFER.EE. Rumania/46*, 29 November 1973. At Geneva, the Rumanians supported the idea of an "institutional mechanism" to further security and co-operation, but specified that this should not be a "supranational body," but a "framework within which independent, sovereign states, enjoying equal rights and guiding themselves by the democratic regulations adopted by the conference, will be able to consult each other." *Scinteia*, 30 January 1974.

[38] *Scinteia*, 26 November 1974.

[39] Meetings were held on 18–19 December 1973; 7–9 and 23–25 January 1974, *RFER.EE. Rumania/2*, 7 March 1974.

[40] Ibid. 14 January 1974.

[41] *Partiinaya Zhizn*, 20 February 1974.

[42] Views of the Japanese and Spanish Parties were published in *Scinteia*, *RFER.EE. Rumania/12*, 31 July 1974.

[43] See interview in *The Guardian*, 9 April 1974.

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considered at the appropriate time.[44] Thus, despite the weakening of the base from which the Rumanians launched their independent initiatives, their basic positions on national independence and opposition to Soviet hegemony have remained cardinal aspects of Rumanian policy.

Ultimately, the ability of the Rumanians to pursue an independent course rests on the dictates of power politics. Two factors which existed during the sixties and played a part in preventing any open Soviet punitive measures against Rumania remain important today:

(i) The obvious support of the Rumanian population for the leadership, manifested most significantly in an apparent willingness to fight if an invasion on the pattern of the events of August 1968 were to occur.

(ii) The Russians do not seem to consider that Rumania poses a strategic or, given the internal hard line taken by the Rumanians, ideological threat. The apparent reconciliation with Yugoslavia has reinforced this feeling.

It is to be hoped that these factors, as well as success in the policy of *détente*, can offset the deterioration of the Rumanian foreign policy power base outlined above, and permit the Rumanians to pursue their policies according to what they perceive to be their national interests.

[44] *Scinteia*, 26 November 1974.

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Speech by Alexander Solzhenitsyn to the AFL-CIO*

MOST of those present here today are workers: creative workers. And I myself, having spent many years of my life as a stone cutter, foundryman and manual worker, can, in the name of all who have shared this forced labour with me—like the two Gulag prisoners whom you just saw—and on behalf of those who are doing forced labour in our country, begin my speech today with the greeting: "Brothers, brothers in labour!" And not forgetting, too, the many honoured guests present here tonight, let me add: "Ladies and Gentlemen!"

"Workers of the world unite!" Who has not heard this slogan which has been resounding throughout the world for 125 years? Today you can find it in any Soviet pamphlet as well as in every issue of *Pravda*. But never have the leaders of the communist revolution in the Soviet Union applied these words sincerely and in their full meaning. When many lies have accumulated over the decades, we forget the fundamental lie which is not on the leaves of the tree, but at its very roots.

Now, it is almost impossible to remember or to believe. . . . For instance, I recently published—had reprinted—a pamphlet dating back to the year 1918. It was a precise record of a meeting of representatives of the Petrograd factories—Petrograd being the city known in our country as the "cradle of the revolution." This was in March 1918, only four months after the October revolution, and the representatives of the Petrograd factories were cursing the communists who had broken all their promises. What is more, not only had they abandoned Petrograd to cold and hunger, having themselves fled from Petrograd to Moscow, but had given orders to machine-gun the crowds of workers in the courtyards of the factories who were demanding the election of independent factory committees. Let me remind you: this was in March 1918. Now scarcely anyone can recall the crushing of the Petrograd strikes in 1921, or the shooting of workers in Kolpino in the same year.

At the beginning of the revolution, the Central Committee of the Communist Party were all émigré intellectuals who had returned after the uprisings had already broken out in Russia, in order to carry out the communist revolution. One of them, however, was a genuine worker, a highly skilled lathe operator until the last day of his life. This was Alexander Shlyapnikov. Who knows that name today? Precisely because he expressed the true interests of the workers within

* This speech, reproduced by kind permission of the AFL-CIO, was made in Washington on 30 June 1975, at a dinner given in Solzhenitsyn's honour.

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the communist leadership. . . . During the years before the revolution, it was Shlyapnikov who ran the whole Communist Party in Russia—not Lenin, who was an émigré. . . . In 1921, he headed the Workers' Opposition which was charging the Communist leadership with betraying the workers' interests, with crushing and oppressing the proletariat and with becoming a bureaucracy.

Shlyapnikov disappeared. He was arrested some time later and, because he firmly stood his ground, he was shot in prison and his name is perhaps unknown to most people here today. But let me remind you: before the revolution, the head of the Communist Party of Russia was Shlyapnikov—not Lenin.

Since that time, the working class has never been able to stand up for its rights, and unlike the Western countries, our working class only receives what is handed out to it: it only gets handouts. It cannot defend its simplest, everyday interests, and the smallest strike for pay or for better living conditions is viewed as counter-revolutionary. Thanks to the closed nature of the Soviet system, you have probably never heard of the textile strikes in 1930 in Ivanovo, of the 1961 worker unrest in Murom and Alexandrovo, or of the major workers' uprising in Novocherkassk in 1962—this in the time of Khrushchev, after the Thaw. The story will shortly be published in detail in your country in *The Gulag Archipelago*, volume 3, of how workers went in a peaceful demonstration to the Party City Committee, carrying portraits of Lenin, to request a change in the economic conditions. They were fired on with machine-guns and the crowds were dispersed with tanks. No family even dared collect its wounded and dead, but all were taken away in secret by the authorities.

I do not need to explain to those present here that in our country, since the revolution, there has never been such a thing as a free trade union. The leaders of the British trade unions are free to play the unworthy game of visiting the so-called Soviet trade unions and receiving visits in return. But the AFL-CIO has never succumbed to these illusions. The American workers' movement has never allowed itself to be blinded and to mistake slavery for freedom. And today, I, on behalf of our oppressed people, thank you for this! When liberal thinkers and wise men of the West, who had forgotten the meaning of the word "liberty," were swearing that in the Soviet Union there were no concentration camps at all, the American Federation of Labor published in 1947 a map of our concentration camps, and on behalf of all of the prisoners of those times, I want to thank the American workers' movement for this!

But, just as we feel ourselves your allies here, there also exists another alliance—at first glance a strange and surprising one—but, if you think about it, one, in fact, which is well-grounded and easy to understand: the alliance between our communist leaders and your capitalists. This alliance is not a new one. The famous Armand

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Hammer, who is flourishing here today, laid the basis for this when he made the first exploratory trip into Russia, in Lenin's time, during the very first years of the revolution. He was extremely successful in this intelligence mission and, since that time, for 50 years, we have been observing continuous and steady support by the businessmen of the West for the Soviet communist leaders.

The clumsy and awkward Soviet economy, which was never able to overcome its own difficulties by itself, is continually receiving material and technological assistance. The major construction projects in the initial five-year plan were built exclusively with American technology and materials. Even Stalin recognized that two-thirds of what was needed was obtained from the West. And if today the Soviet Union has powerful military and police forces—in a country which is, by contemporary standards, poor—(they are used to crush our movement for freedom in the Soviet Union), we have Western capital to thank for this.

Let me remind you of a recent incident which some of you may have seen in the newspapers, although others might have missed it: some of your businessmen established, on their own initiative, an exhibition of criminological technology in Moscow. This was the most recent and elaborate technology, which is used in your country to catch criminals: to bug them, to spy on them, to photograph them, to tail them and to identify them. This was put on display in Moscow, so that KGB agents could study it—as if the businessmen whose idea it was did not understand *what sort* of criminals, *who* would be hunted by the KGB.

The Soviet government was extremely interested in this technology, and decided to purchase it. And your businessmen were quite willing to sell it. Only when a few sober voices here raised an uproar against it was the deal blocked; only for this reason did it not take place. You must understand how clever the KGB is. The exhibition didn't have to stay two or three weeks in a Soviet building under Soviet guard. Two or three nights were long enough for the KGB to look through it and to copy it. And if, today, people are being hunted down with the best and most advanced technology, for this I can also thank your Western capitalists.

This is something which is almost incomprehensible to the human mind: that burning greed for profit which goes beyond all reason, all self-control, all conscience, just to get money.

Lenin, in fact, foretold this whole process. Lenin, who spent most of his life in the West and not in Russia, who knew the West much better than Russia, always said that the Western capitalists would do anything to strengthen the economy of the USSR. They will compete with each other to sell us goods cheaper and more quickly, so that the Soviets will buy from one rather than from the other. He said: "They will do it themselves without thinking about their future."

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In a difficult moment, at a Party meeting in Moscow, he said: "Comrades, don't panic, when things get hard for us, we will give a rope to the bourgeoisie, and the bourgeoisie will hang itself." Then, Karl Radek, whom you may have heard of and who was a very resourceful wit, said: "Vladimir Ilyich, but where are we going to get enough rope to hang the whole bourgeoisie?" Lenin replied effortlessly, "They'll supply us with it."

Through the twenties, thirties, forties and fifties, the whole Soviet press wrote: "Western capitalism, your end is nigh." But it was as if the capitalists had not heard, could not understand, could not believe this. Nikita Khrushchev came here and said, "We will bury you!" They didn't believe that, either. They took it as a joke. Now, of course, they have become more clever in our country. Now they don't say "we are going to bury you" any more, now they say "*détente.*" Nothing has changed in communist ideology. The goals are the same as they were, but unlike the artless Khrushchev, who couldn't hold his tongue, they now say "*détente.*"

In order to understand this, I will take the liberty of making a short historic survey—the history of such relations which in different periods have been called "trade," "stabilization of the situation," "recognition of realities," and now "*détente.*" These relations are now at least 40 years old. Let me remind you with *what* sort of system they started.

The system was installed by armed uprising. It dissolved the Constituent Assembly. It capitulated to Germany—the common enemy. It introduced execution without trial. It crushed workers' strikes. It plundered the villages to such an unbelievable extent that the peasants revolted, and when this happened, it crushed the peasants in the bloodiest possible way. It shattered the Church. It reduced 20 provinces of our country to a condition of famine.

This occurred in 1921: the famous Volga famine. It is typical communist technique to seize power without thinking of the fact that the productive forces will collapse, that the fields will not be sown, the factories will stop, that the country will decline into poverty and famine—but when poverty and hunger come, then they request the humanitarian world to help them. We see this in North Vietnam today, perhaps Portugal, too, is approaching this state of affairs. The same thing happened in Russia in 1921. When the three-year civil war, started by the communists—and "civil war" was a slogan of the communists, civil war was Lenin's purpose: read Lenin, this was his aim and his slogan. . . . When they had ruined Russia by this civil war, then they asked America, "America, feed our hungry." And indeed, generous and magnanimous America did feed our hungry.

The so-called American Relief Administration was set up, headed by the future President Hoover, and indeed, many millions of Russian lives were saved by this organization of yours. But what sort of

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gratitude did you receive for this? In the USSR, not only did they try to erase this whole event from the popular memory—today it is almost impossible to find in the Soviet press any reference to the American Relief Administration—but they even denounced it as a clever spy organization, a clever scheme of American imperialism to set up a spy network in Russia.

I repeat, the Soviet system was a system which introduced concentration camps for the first time in the history of the world; a system which, in the twentieth century, was the first to introduce the use of hostages, that is to say, not to seize the person whom they were seeking, but rather a member of his family or someone at random, and shoot that person. The system of hostages and persecution of the family exists to this day. It is still the most powerful weapon of persecution, because the bravest person, who does not fear for himself, still shivers at a threat to his family.

The Soviet system was the first—long before Hitler—to employ false registration, that is, to say: "Such and such people have to come in to register." People would comply, and then they were taken away to be annihilated. We didn't have gas chambers in those days. We used barges. 100 or 1,000 people were put into a barge, and then it was sunk. It was a system which deceived the workers in all of its decrees—the decree on land, the decree on peace, the decrees on factories and on freedom of the press. It was a system which exterminated all additional parties; and let me make it clear to you that it not only disbanded the party itself, but destroyed its *members. All members of every other party* were exterminated. It was a system which carried out genocide of the peasantry. 15 million peasants were exterminated. It was a system which reintroduced serfdom: the so-called "passport system." It was a system which, in time of peace, artificially created a famine, causing six million persons to die in the Ukraine in 1932 and 1933. They died on the very edge of Europe. And Europe didn't even notice it. The world didn't even notice it. *Six million*!

I could keep on enumerating these instances endlessly, but I must stop, because I have come to the year 1933 when, with all I have enumerated behind us, President Roosevelt and your Congress recognized this system as one worthy of diplomatic recognition, of friendship and of assistance. Let me remind you that the great Washington would not recognize the French Convention because of its savagery. Let me remind you that in 1933 voices were raised in your country objecting to recognition of the Soviet Union. However, this recognition took place and this was the beginning of friendship and, ultimately, of a military alliance. Let us remember that in 1904, the American press was delighted at the Japanese victories and everyone wanted Russia's defeat because it was a conservative country. I want to remind you that in 1914 reproaches were directed at France and

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England for having entered into an alliance with such a conservative country as Russia.

THE scope and the direction of my speech today do not permit me to say more about pre-revolutionary Russia. I will just say that information about pre-revolutionary Russia was obtained by the West from people who were either not sufficiently competent or not sufficiently conscientious. I will just cite for the sake of comparison a number of figures which you can read for yourself in *The Gulag Archipelago*, volume one, which has been published in the United States, and which, perhaps, many of you may have read. These are the figures.

According to calculations by specialists based on the most precise objective statistics, in pre-revolutionary Russia, during the 80 years before the revolution—the years of the revolutionary movement when there were attempts on the Tsar's life, assassination of the Tsar, revolution—during these years, about 17 persons a year were executed. The famous Spanish Inquisition, when it was at the height of its persecution, destroyed perhaps 10 persons a month. In the *Archipelago*, I cite a book which was published by the Cheka in 1920, proudly reporting on its revolutionary work in 1918 and 1919 and apologizing that its data were not quite complete: in 1918 and 1919, the Cheka executed, without trial, *more than 1,000 persons a month*! This was written by the Cheka itself, before it understood how this would look to history.

If we divide the number of persons executed at the height of Stalin's terror in 1937–38 by the number of months, we get a figure of *more than 40,000 persons shot per month*! Here are the figures: 17 a year, 10 a month, more than 1,000 a month, more than 40,000 a month! Thus, whatever had made it difficult for the Democratic West to form an alliance with pre-revolutionary Russia did not prevent in 1941 *the entire united democracy of the world*—England, France, the United States, Canada, Australia and other small countries—from entering into a military alliance with the Soviet Union. How is this to be explained? How can we understand it? Here we can offer a few explanations. The first, I think, is that the entire united democracy of the world was too weak to fight alone against Hitler's Germany. If this is the case, then it is a terrible portent for the present day. If all these countries together could not defeat Hitler's little Germany, what are they going to do today, when more than half the globe is flooded with totalitarianism? I don't want to accept this explanation.

The second explanation is perhaps that there was simply a fit of panic—of fear—among the statesmen of the day. They simply didn't have sufficient confidence in themselves; they simply had no strength of spirit, and in this confused state decided to enter into an alliance with Soviet totalitarianism. This also is not flattering to the

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West. The final explanation is that it was a deliberate action. Democracy did not want to defend itself. For defence it wanted to use another totalitarian system, the Soviet totalitarian system.

I am not talking now about the moral evaluation of this; I will talk about that later. But, in terms of simple calculation, how shortsighted! What profound self-deception! We have a Russian proverb: "Do not call a wolf to help you against the dogs." If dogs are attacking and tearing at you, beat the dogs! Fight against the dogs, but do not call a wolf for help. Because when the wolves come, they will destroy the dogs, but they will tear you apart as well. World democracy could have defeated one totalitarian regime after another, the German, then the Soviet. Instead, it strengthened Soviet totalitarianism, helped bring into existence a third totalitarian state, China, and all this finally precipitated the present world situation.

Roosevelt said in Teheran, during one of his last toasts, "I do not doubt that the three of us"—meaning Roosevelt, Churchill, and Stalin—"lead our peoples in accordance with their desires, in accordance with their aims." How are we to explain this? Let the historians worry about that. At the time, we listened and were astonished. We thought, "When we reach Europe, we will meet the Americans, and we will tell them." I was among the troops that were marching towards the Elbe. A little bit more, and I would have reached the Elbe and would have shaken hands with your American soldiers. But just before that happened, I was taken off to prison and the meeting did not take place. But now, after all this great delay, the same hand which imprisoned me has thrown me out of the country and here I am, instead of at the meeting at the Elbe. After a delay of 30 years, my Elbe is here today. I am here to tell you, as a friend of the United States, what, as friends, we wanted to tell you then, but which our soldiers were prevented from telling you on the Elbe.

There is another Russian proverb: "The yes-man is your enemy, but your friend will argue with you." It is precisely because I am the friend of the United States, precisely because my speech is prompted by friendship, that I have come to tell you: "My friend, I'm not going to tell you sweet words. The situation in the world is not just dangerous, it isn't just threatening, it is *catastrophic*."

Something incomprehensible to the ordinary human mind has taken place. We over there, the powerless, average Soviet people, couldn't understand, year after year and decade after decade, what was happening. How were we to explain this? England, France, the United States, were victorious in the second world war. Victorious states always dictate peace, they receive firm conditions, they create the sort of situation which accords with their philosophy, their concept of liberty, their concept of national interest.

Instead of this, beginning with Yalta, your Western statesmen have, for some inexplicable reason, signed one capitulation after

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another. Neither the West nor your President Roosevelt imposed any conditions on the Soviet Union for receiving aid. Roosevelt gave unlimited aid, and then unlimited concessions. At Yalta, without any necessity for it, the occupation of Mongolia, Moldavia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, was silently recognized. Immediately after that, almost nothing was done to protect Eastern Europe, and seven or eight more countries were surrendered. Stalin demanded that the Soviet citizens who did not want to return home be handed over to him, and the Western countries handed over a million and a half human beings. How was this done? They took them by force. English soldiers killed Russians who did not want to become prisoners of Stalin, and drove them into Stalin's hands by force, to be exterminated. This has recently come to light—just a few years ago. A million and a half human beings! How could the Western democracies have done this? After that, for another 30 years, there has been a constant retreat, the surrender of one country after another, to such a point that there are Soviet satellites even in Africa, and almost all of Asia is taken over by them. Portugal is now rolling down the precipice. During those 30 years, more has been surrendered to totalitarianism than has ever been surrendered after any war in history. There has been no war, but there might just as well have been.

For a long time, we in the East couldn't understand this. We couldn't understand the flabbiness of the truce concluded in Vietnam. The ordinary Soviet citizen understood that this was a sly device making it possible for North Vietnam to take over South Vietnam when it so chose. And suddenly, this was rewarded by the Nobel Prize for Peace —a tragic and ironic prize. A very dangerous attitude may develop as a result of this 30 years of retreat: give in as quickly as possible, give up as quickly as possible, peace and quiet at any cost. Many Western papers wrote: "Let's hurry up and put an end to the bloodshed in Vietnam, and have national unity there." But at the Berlin Wall no one talked of national unity. One of your leading newspapers, after the end of Vietnam, had a full headline: "The Blessed Silence." I would not wish that kind of "blessed silence" on my worst enemy. I would not wish that kind of national unity on my worst enemy.

I spent 11 years in the Archipelago, and for half my lifetime I have studied this question. Looking at this terrible tragedy in Vietnam from a distance, I can tell you, a million persons will be simply exterminated, while four to five million (in accordance with the scale of Vietnam) will find themselves in concentration camps and will be rebuilding Vietnam. And you already know what is happening in Cambodia. It is genocide. It is full and complete destruction, but in a new form. Once again, their technology is not up to building gas chambers. So, in a few hours, the entire capital city—the guilty capital city—is emptied out; old people, women and children, are driven out without belongings, without food: "Go and die!"

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It is very dangerous for one's attitude to the world when the feeling "go ahead, give it up" comes on. We already hear voices in your country and in the West: "Give up Korea and we will live quietly. Give up Portugal, of course; give up Japan, give up Israel, give up Taiwan, the Philippines, Malaysia, Thailand, give up 10 more African countries. Just let us live in peace and quiet. Just let us drive our big cars on our splendid highways; just let us play tennis and golf in peace and quiet; just let us mix our cocktails in peace and quiet as we are accustomed to doing; just let us see the beautiful toothy smile with glass in hand on every advertisement page of our magazines." But look how things have turned out: Now, in the West, this has all turned into an accusation against the United States, Now, in the West, we hear countless voices saying, "It's your fault, America." And, here, I must decisively defend the United States against these accusations!

THE United States, of all the Western countries, is the least guilty in all this and has done the most to prevent it. The United States has helped Europe to win the first and second world wars. It twice raised Europe from post-war destruction—twice. For 10, 20, 30 years, it has stood as a shield protecting Europe, while European countries were counting their nickels, to avoid paying for their armies (better yet to have none at all), to avoid paying for armaments, thinking about how to leave NATO, knowing that America will protect them anyway. These countries started it all, despite their thousands of years of civilization and culture, even though they are closer and should have known better.

I came to your continent, for two months I have been travelling in its wide open spaces and I agree: here you do not feel the nearness of it all, the immediacy of it all. And here it is possible to miscalculate. Here you must make a spiritual effort to understand the acuteness of the world situation. The United States of America has long shown itself to be the most magnanimous, the most generous country in the world. Wherever there is a flood, an earthquake, a fire, a natural disaster, disease, who is the first to help? The United States. Who helps the most and unselfishly? The United States. And what do we hear in reply? Reproaches, curses, "Yankee Go Home." American cultural centres are burned, and the representatives of the Third World jump on tables to vote against the United States. But this does not take the load off America's shoulders. The course of history—whether you like it or not—has made you the leaders of the world. Your country can no longer think provincially. Your political leaders can no longer think only of their own states, only of their parties, of petty arrangements which may or may not lead to promotion. You must think about the whole world: when the new world political crisis arises (I think we have just come to the end of a very acute crisis and

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the next one will come at any moment), the main decisions will fall on the shoulders of the United States of America.

While here, I have heard some explanations of the situation. Let me quote some of them: "It is impossible to protect those who do not have the will to defend themselves." I agree with that, but this was said about South Vietnam. In half of today's Europe and in three-quarters of today's world, the will to defend oneself is even less than it was in South Vietnam. We are told: "We cannot defend those who are unable to defend themselves with their own human resources." But no country can defend itself with its own resources against the overwhelming powers of totalitarianism, when all of this power is thrown against a country. Japan, for instance, does not have a standing army. We are told, "We should not protect those who do not have full democracy." This is the most remarkable argument of the lot. This is the *Leitmotiv* I hear in your newspapers and in the speeches of some of your political leaders. Who in the world, ever, on the front line of defence against totalitarianism, has been able to sustain full democracy? *You*, the united democracies of the world, were not able to sustain it! America, England, France, Canada and Australia, together could not sustain it. At the first threat of Hitlerism, you stretched out your hands to Stalin. Do you call that sustaining democracy? No!

There is more in the same vein (there have been many such speeches): "If the Soviet Union is going to use *détente* for its own ends, then we . . . ." But what will happen then? The Soviet Union has used, is using now and will continue to use *détente* in its own interests! China and the Soviet Union, both actively participating in *détente,* have quietly grabbed three countries in Indochina. Perhaps as a consolation, China will send you a ping-pong team. The Soviet Union has sent you the pilots who once crossed the North Pole. In a few days you will be flying into space together. A typical diversion. I remember very well the year: it was 1937, June 1937, when Chkalov, Baidukov, and Beliakov heroically flew over the North Pole and landed in the State of Washington. This was the very year in which Stalin was executing more than 40,000 persons a month. And Stalin knew what he was doing. He sent those pilots and aroused in you a naïve delight: the friendship of two countries across the North Pole. The pilots were heroic; nobody can say anything against them. But it was a show, a show to divert you from the real events of 1937. And what is the occasion now? Is it an anniversary, 38 years? Is 38 years some kind of an anniversary? No, it is simply necessary to cover up Vietnam. And, once again, those pilots were sent here. The Chkalov Memorial was unveiled in the State of Washington. Chkalov was a hero and deserves a memorial. But, to present the true picture, behind the memorial there should have been a wall and on it there should

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have been a bas-relief showing the executions, showing the skulls and bones.

We are also told (I apologise for so many quotes, but there are many more in your press and radio): "We cannot ignore the fact that North Vietnam and the Khmer Rouge have violated the agreement, but we're ready to look into the future." What does that mean? It means: let them exterminate people. But if these murderers who live by violence, these executioners, offer us *détente*, we will be happy to go along with them. As Willy Brandt once said: "I would even be willing to have a *détente* with Stalin." (At a time when Stalin was executing 40,000 a month, would he have been willing to have a *détente* with Stalin?)

Look into the future! This is how they looked into the future in 1933 and 1941, but it was a short-sighted look. This is how they looked into the future two years ago when a senseless, incomprehensible, non-guaranteed truce in Vietnam was arranged and it was a short-sighted view. There was such a hurry to conclude this truce that they forgot to liberate your own Americans from captivity. They were in such a hurry to sign this document that some 1,300 Americans were forgotten: "Well, they have vanished; we can get by without them." How is that done? How can this be? Some of them, indeed, may be missing in action, but the North Vietnamese leaders themselves have admitted that some of them are still in prison. And do they give you back your countrymen? No, they do not give them back, but demand new conditions. First they said, "Remove Thieu from power." Now they say, "Have the United States restore Vietnam, otherwise it's very difficult for us to find these people."

If the government of Northern Vietnam has difficulty in explaining to you what happened to your brothers, to those American POWs who have not yet returned, I, on the basis of my experience in the Archipelago, can explain this quite clearly. There is a law in the Archipelago that those who have been treated the most harshly and who have withstood the most bravely, the most honest, the most courageous, the most unbending, never again come out into the world. They are never again shown to the world because they will tell such tales as the human mind cannot accept. Some of your returned POWs told you that they were tortured. This means that those who remained were tortured even more, but did not yield an inch. These are your best people. There are your first heroes, who, in a solitary combat, have stood the test. And, today, unfortunately, they cannot take courage from our applause. They can't hear it from their solitary cells where they may either die or sit for 30 years, like Raoul Wallenberg, the Swedish diplomat who was seized in 1945 in the Soviet Union. He has been imprisoned for 30 years and they will not yield him up. There is a certain hysterical public figure who said: "I will go to

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North Vietnam. I will stand on my knees and beg them to release our prisoners of war." This isn't a political act—this is masochism.

TO understand properly what *détente* has meant all these 40 years —friendships, stabilization of the situation, trade, etc.—I would have to tell you something, which you have never seen or heard, of how it looked from the other side. Let me tell you how it looked: mere acquaintance with an American—and God forbid that you should sit with him in a café or restaurant—meant a 10-year term for suspicion of espionage. In the first volume of the *Archipelago*, I describe an event which was not told to me by some arrested person, but by all the members of the Supreme Court of the USSR, during those short days when I was in the limelight under Khrushchev. A Soviet citizen went to the United States and on his return said that there they had wonderful automobile roads. The KGB arrested him and demanded a term of 10 years. But the judge said: "I don't object, but there is not enough evidence. Couldn't you find something else against him?" So the judge was exiled to Sakhalin because he dared to argue, and they gave the other man 10 years. Can you imagine what a lie he told? And what sort of praise of American imperialism this was: in America there are good roads! 10 years. In 1945–46 many people passed through our prison cells and these were not ones who had cooperated with Hitler (although there were some of those, too). They were not guilty of anything, but, rather, were people who had just been in the West and had been liberated from German prison camps by the Americans. This was considered a criminal act: to be liberated by the Americans. That means: he has seen the good life; if he comes back, he will talk about it. The most terrible thing is not what he did, but what he would talk about. And all such people got 10-year terms.

During Nixon's last visit to Moscow, your American correspondents were reporting in the Western manner from the streets of Moscow. "I am going down a Russian street with a microphone and asking the ordinary Soviet citizen: tell me, please, what do you think about the meeting between Nixon and Brezhnev?" And, amazingly, every person to a man answered: "Wonderful. I'm delighted. I'm absolutely overjoyed!" What does this mean? If I'm walking down a street in Moscow and some American comes up to me with a microphone and asks me something, then I know that on the other side of him is a member of the state security, also with a microphone who is recording everything I say. Do you think I'm going to say something that is going to put me in prison immediately? Of course I say: "It's wonderful, I'm delighted, I'm overjoyed." But what is the value of such correspondents, if they simply transfer Western techniques over there without thinking things through?

You helped us for many years with Lend Lease, but now we have done everything to forget it, to erase it from our minds, not to

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remember it if at all possible. And now, before I came here, I delayed my visit to Washington a little so that I could first take a look at some ordinary parts of America, go to various states and simply talk with people. I was told—and I learned of this for the first time—that in every state during the war years there were Soviet-American friendship societies which collected assistance for Soviet people—warm clothes, canned food, gifts—and sent them to the Soviet Union. But we not only never saw these, we not only never received them (they were distributed somewhere among the privileged circles), no one ever even told us that this was being done. I have just heard about it for the first time here, this month, in the United States.

Everything poisonous which could be said about the United States was being said in Stalin's days. And all this is a heavy sediment which can be stirred up at any time. Any day the newspapers can come out with the headlines: "Bloodthirsty American imperialism wants to seize control of the world," and this poison will rise up from the sediment and many people in our country will believe it, and will be poisoned by it, and will consider you aggressors. This is how *détente* has been managed on our side. The Soviet system is so closed that it is almost impossible for you to understand from here. Your theoreticians and scholars write works trying to understand and explain how things occur there, giving naïve explanations which are simply funny to Soviet citizens. Some say that the Soviet leaders have now given up their inhumane ideology. Not at all: they haven't given it up one bit. Some say that in the Kremlin there are some people on the left, some on the right, and they are fighting with each other, and we've got to behave in such a way so as not to interfere with those on the left. This is all fantasy: left . . . right. There is some sort of a struggle for power, but they all agree on the essentials. There also exists the theory, that now, thanks to the growth of technology, there is a technocracy in the Soviet Union, a growing number of engineers and the engineers are now running the economy and they, rather than the Party, will soon determine the fate of the country. I will tell you, though, that the engineers determine the fate of the economy just as much as our generals determine the fate of the Army. That means zero. Everything is done the way the Party demands. That's our system. Judge it for yourself.

It is a system where for 40 years there have been no genuine elections, but simply a comedy, a farce; a system which has no legislative organs. It is a system without an independent press; a system without an independent judiciary; where the people have no influence either on external or internal policy; where any thought which is different from what the state thinks is crushed. And let me tell you that electronic bugging in our country is such a simple thing that it is an everyday matter. You had a case in the United States where a bugging caused an uproar which lasted for a year and a half. For us it's an

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everyday matter: almost every apartment, every institution has its bug and it doesn't surprise us in the least—we are used to it.

It is a system where unmasked butchers of millions, like Molotov and other lesser people, have never been tried in the courts, but retire on tremendous pensions in the greatest comfort. It is a system where the show still goes on today and to which every foreigner is introduced surrounded by a couple of planted agents working according to a set scenario. It is a system where the very constitution has never been carried out for one single day; where all the decisions mature in secrecy, high up in a small irresponsible group, and are then released on us and on you like a bolt of lightning.

And what are the signatures of such persons worth? How could one rely on their signatures to documents of *détente*? You yourselves might ask your specialists now and they'll tell you precisely that in recent years the Soviet Union has succeeded in creating wonderful chemical weapons and missiles which are even better than those used by the United States. So what are we to conclude from that? Is *détente* necessary or not? Not only is it needed, it is as necessary as air. It is the only way of saving the earth: to have *détente* instead of a world war, but a true *détente*, and if it has already been ruined by the bad word which we use for it—"*détente*"—then we should find another word for it.

I would say that there are very few—only three—main characteristics of such a true *détente*. In the first place, there would have to be disarmament—not only in relation to the use of war, but also to the use of violence. We must stop using not only the sort of arms which are used to destroy one's neighbours but the sort of arms which are used to oppress one's fellow countrymen. It is not *détente* if we here are having a good time, while over there people are groaning and dying in psychiatric hospitals. Doctors are now making their evening rounds, injecting people for the third time with drugs which destroy their brain cells. The second requirement of *détente*, I would say, is that it should not be one based on smiles or on verbal concessions, but on a firm foundation. You know the words from the Bible: "Build not on sand, but on rock." There must be a guarantee that this will not be broken overnight and, for this, the other side—the other party to the agreement—must have its acts subject to public opinion, to the press, and to a freely-elected parliament. And until such control exists, there is absolutely no guarantee. The third simple condition . . . what sort of *détente* is it when the sort of inhumane propaganda which is proudly called in the Soviet Union "ideological warfare" is used? Let us not have that. If we're going to be friends, let's be friends, if we're going to have *détente*, then let's have *détente* and an end to ideological warfare.

The Soviet Union and the Communist countries know how to conduct negotiations. For a long time, they won't make any concessions

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and then they give in a little bit. Then everyone says triumphantly, "Look, they've made a concession; it's time to sign." The European negotiations of the 35 countries have been for two years now painfully, painfully continuing. Nerves have been stretched to breaking point and the West finally gave in. A few women from the communist countries can now marry foreigners. And a few newspapermen are now going to be permitted to travel a little more than before. They give a thousandth of what natural law should provide: things which people should be able to do even before such negotiations are undertaken. And already there is joy: here in the West we hear many voices saying: "Look, they're making concessions; it's time to sign." During these two years of negotiations, in all East European countries the pressure has been increasing, the oppression intensified, even in Yugoslavia and Rumania, leaving aside the other countries. And it is precisely now that the Austrian Chancellor says, "We've got to sign this agreement as rapidly as possible." What sort of an agreement would this be? The proposed agreement is the *funeral of Eastern Europe*. It means that Western Europe would finally, once and for all, sign away Eastern Europe, stating that it is perfectly willing to see Eastern Europe be crushed and overwhelmed once and for all, but please don't bother us. The Austrian Chancellor thinks that if all these countries are pushed into a mass grave, Austria, at the very edge of this grave, will survive and not fall into it as well.

WE, from experience gained during our lives in the Soviet Union, have concluded that violence can only be withstood by firmness.

You must understand the nature of communism. The very ideology of communism—all Lenin's teachings—is that anyone is considered a fool who doesn't take what is lying in front of him. If you can take it, take it. If you can attack, attack. But if there is a wall, then go back. The communist leaders respect only firmness. They despise and laugh at persons who continually give in to them. Your people are now saying—and this is the last quotation I am going to give you from the statements of your leaders—"Power, without any attempt at conciliation, will lead to a world conflict." But I would say that power with continual subservience is no power at all. From our experience, I can tell you that only firmness can withstand the assaults of communist totalitarianism. We see many historic examples; let me give you some of them. Look at little Finland in 1939, which withstood attack on its own. You defended Berlin in 1948, only by your firmness of spirit, and there was no world conflict. In Korea in 1950, you stood up against the communists using only your firmness, and there was no world conflict. In 1962, you compelled the rockets to be removed from Cuba. Again, it was only firmness, and there was no world conflict. The late Adenauer conducted firm negotiations with Khrushchev and thus started a genuine *détente* with Khrushchev.

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Khrushchev started to make concessions and, if he hadn't been removed, he was planning that winter to go to Germany and to continue the genuine *détente*.

Let me remind you of the weakness of a man whose name is rarely associated with weakness: Lenin. Lenin, when he came to power, gave up in panic to Germany everything which Germany wanted. Just what it wanted. Germany took as much as it desired and said, "Give Armenia to Turkey." And Lenin said, "Fine." It is almost an unknown fact, but Lenin petitioned the Kaiser to act as intermediary to persuade the Ukraine and thus to make possible a boundary between the communist part of Russia and the Ukraine. It wasn't a question of seizing the Ukraine, but rather of making a boundary with the Ukraine.

We Soviet dissidents don't have any tanks, weapons, or organization. We don't have anything. Our hands are empty. We have only a heart and what we have lived through in the half-century of this system. And when we have found the firmness within ourselves to stand up for our rights, we have done so. It is only by firmness of spirit that we have withstood. And if I am standing here before you, it is not because of the kindness or the goodwill of communism, not thanks to *détente*, but thanks to my own firmness and to your firm support. They knew that I would not yield one inch, and when they couldn't do any more, they fell back. This is not easy. It was taught to me by the difficulties of my own life. And if you yourselves—any one of you—were in the same difficult situation, you would have learned the same thing. I don't want to mention many names tonight but take Vladimir Bukovsky, whose name is now almost forgotten. Now, I don't want to mention a lot of names, because however many I might mention, there are still more. And when we resolve the question with two or three names, it is as if we forget and betray the others. We should, rather, remember figures. There are tens of thousands of political prisoners in our country and—according to the calculations of English specialists—7,000 persons are now under compulsory psychiatric treatment. Let us take Vladimir Bukovsky as an example. They said to him, "All right, we'll free you. Go to the West and shut up." And this young man, today on the verge of death, said: "No, I won't go this way. I have written about the persons whom you have put in insane asylums. You release them and then I'll go to the West." That is what I mean by the firmness of spirit to stand up against granite and tanks!

FINALLY to sum up everything that I have said to you today I could say that we need not have had our conversation on the level of business calculations. Why did such and such a country act in such and such a way? What were they counting on? We should, rather, rise above this to the moral level and say: "In 1933 and in

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1941, your leaders and the whole Western world, in an unprincipled way, made a deal with totalitanianism." We will have to pay for this. Some day this deal will come back to haunt us. We have been paying for it for 30 years and we're still paying for it. And we are going to have to pay for it in a worse way. One cannot think only on the low level of political calculations. It's necessary to think also of what is noble, and what is honourable—not only what is profitable. Resourceful Western legal scholars have now introduced the term "legal realism." By this legal realism, they want to push aside any moral evaluation of affairs. They say, "Recognize realities; if such and such laws have been established in such and such countries of violence, then these laws must also be recognized and respected." At the present time, it is widely accepted among lawyers that law is higher than morality. Law is something which is worked out and developed, whereas morality is something inchoate and amorphous. That isn't the case. The opposite, rather, is true! Morality is higher than law! Law is our human attempt somehow to embody in rules a part of that moral sphere which is above us. We try to understand this morality, bring it down to earth and present it in the form of laws. Sometimes we are successful, sometimes less so. Sometimes you have, in fact, a caricature of morality, but morality is always higher than law. This view must never be abandoned. We must accept it with heart and soul.

It is almost a joke now in the Western world, in the twentieth century, to use words like "good" and "evil." They have become almost old-fashioned concepts, but they are very real and genuine concepts. These are concepts from a sphere which is higher than us. And instead of getting involved in base, petty, short-sighted political calculations and games, we have to recognize that the concentration of World Evil and the tremendous force of hatred is *there* and it's flowing from *there* throughout the world. And we have to stand up *against* it and not hasten to give to it, give to it, give to it, everything that it wants to swallow.

Today there are two major processes occurring in the world. One is the one which I have just described to you and which has been in progress for more than 30 years. It is a process of short-sighted concessions, a process of giving up, and giving up and giving up and hoping that perhaps at some point the wolf will have eaten enough. The second process is one which I consider the key to everything and which, I will say now, will bring all of us our future: under the cast-iron shell of communism—for 20 years in the Soviet Union and a shorter time in other communist countries—there is occurring a liberation of the human spirit. New generations are growing up which are steadfast in their struggle with evil; which are not willing to accept unprincipled compromises; which prefer to lose everything—salary, conditions of existence and life itself—but are not willing to sacrifice conscience, not willing to make deals with evil.

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This process has now gone so far that in the Soviet Union today, Marxism has fallen so low that it has become a joke: simply an object of contempt. No serious person in our country today—not even university and high school students—can talk about Marxism without smiling, without laughing. But this whole process of our liberation which will obviously entail social transformations is slower than the first one—the process of concessions. Over there, when we see these concessions, we are frightened. Why so quickly? Why so precipitously? Why yield several countries a year?

I began by saying that you are the allies of our liberation movement in the communist countries. And I call upon you: let us think together and try to see how we can adjust the relationship between these two processes. Whenever you help those who are persecuted in the Soviet Union, you not only display magnanimity and nobility, you are defending not only them, but yourselves as well. You are defending your own future. So let us try to see how far we can go to stop this senseless and immoral process of endless concessions to the aggressor: these clever legal arguments why we should give up one country after another. Why must we hand over to communist totalitarianism more and more technology, complex, delicate, developed technology, which it needs both for armaments and for crushing its own citizens? If we can at least slow down that process of concessions, if not stop it altogether—and make it possible for the process of liberation to continue in the Communist countries—ultimately these two processes will yield us our future.

On our crowded planet, there are no longer any internal affairs. The Communist leaders say, "Don't interfere in our internal affairs. Let us strangle our citizens in peace and quiet." But I tell you: interfere more and more. Interfere as much as you can. We beg you to come and interfere. Seeing my own task in the same way, I have perhaps interfered today in your internal affairs, or at least touched upon them, and I apologize for it. I have travelled a lot around the United States and this had added to my earlier understanding of it—what I have heard from listening to the radio, from talking to experienced persons. America evokes in me, among my friends and among people *over there* who think the way I do, among all ordinary Soviet citizens a sort of mixture of admiration and of compassion: admiration at the fact of your own tremendous strength which you perhaps don't even recognize yourselves. You are a country of the future, a young country, a country of still untapped possibilities, a country of tremendous geographical distances, a country of tremendous breadth of spirit, of generosity, of magnanimity. But these qualities—strength, generosity and magnanimity—usually make a man, and even a whole country, trusting and this has several times already done you a disservice.

I would like to call upon America to be more careful with its trust

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and prevent those wise persons who are attempting to establish even finer degrees of justice and even finer legal shades of equality—some because of their distorted outlook, others because of short-sightedness and still others out of self-interest—from falsely using the struggle of peace and for social justice to lead you down a false road. Because they are trying to weaken you; they are trying to disarm your strong and magnificent country in the face of this fearful threat—one which has never been seen before in the history of the world. Not only in the history of your country, but in the history of the world.

And I call upon you: ordinary working men of America—as represented here by your trade union movement—do not let yourselves become weak. Do not let yourselves be taken in the wrong direction. Let us try to slow down the process of concessions and help the process of liberation!

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Solzhenitsyn in Exile

John B. Dunlop

SINCE his deportation to the West, Solzhenitsyn has been at pains to stress that he considers his art his "main work."[1] He wishes he did not have to take time off from it for other activities. "If," he told Walter Cronkite of CBS, "there did not exist in our country a regime of constant oppression, if people were not suffering every day, if dissent were not being destroyed, and if this system were not trying to extend itself over the whole globe, I could permit myself in general not to write publicistic articles, not to give interviews or make public statements, but only to write my work. But there exists bitter necessity."[2] In the period following his expulsion, "bitter necessity" has prompted Solzhenitsyn to issue frequent press releases, grant a number of interviews and hold three lengthy press conferences. Invariably, this has been done either to draw the attention of world opinion to abuses of human rights in the USSR or to publicize his views on the path that Russia's future development should take.

Though now living in exile in Switzerland (although he is contemplating settling elsewhere), Solzhenitsyn remains virtually transfixed by the fate of his homeland. He and his family are convinced that they will return. "I have the feeling," Solzhenitsyn stated several days after being exiled, "that in several years I will return to Russia."[3] And in December 1974, he remarked, "I live with the constant sensation that I want to, must and will return to Russia. Here we continually experience the anguished feeling that we are not where we should be and that violence has been done to us."[4] He anxiously follows the fates of his friends who remain in the USSR. To help them, he has sought to draw attention to their plight, and he has also been channelling all royalties from *The Gulag Archipelago* into a special fund for Soviet political prisoners and their families.[5]

Besides attempting to direct Western public attention to the more unseemly aspects of the Soviet present, Solzhenitsyn has tried, in broad terms, to draft a "programme" for Russia's future. It is this programme which will be our major object of scrutiny in this article. An initial variant was Solzhenitsyn's *Letter to the Soviet Leaders*, which was published several weeks after his expulsion. Since the

[1] Interview with Walter Cronkite of CBS (17 June 1974). In A. Solzhenitsyn, *Mir i Nasilie* ("Peace and Violence") (Frankfurt/M.: Possev, 1974), p. 51.

[2] Ibid. pp. 51–52.

[3] Interview with AP Correspondent Frank Crepeau. In *Boston Record-American*, 19 Feb. 1974, p. 2.

[4] Press conference of 12 Dec. 1974. In *Russkaya Mysl*, 16 Jan. 1975, p. 7.

[5] Cronkite interview, p. 82.

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appearance in print of this document, which represents a slightly modified version of a letter he actually sent to the Kremlin in September 1973, Solzhenitsyn has clarified and elaborated his views in three contributions to the collection *Iz-pod Glyb* (English title: *From Under the Rubble*),[6] and in three marathon press conferences held in November and December 1974 and April 1975.[7] He has also developed his ideas in an article appearing in the journal *Kontinent* and in an open letter to the human rights activist Pavel Litvinov published in the Paris-based *Messenger of the Russian Christian Movement*.[8] He has further elucidated his thought in a televized discussion with a group of French journalists and critics and in an interview with Janis Sapiets of the BBC.[9]

At present, Solzhenitsyn is concentrating single-mindedly on the issue of how to transform Russia from a Marxist ideocracy to a "moral" society. Such a transformation, he believes, is quite literally a matter of life or death. After almost 60 years of Marxist rule, Russia has become utterly demoralized, almost to the point of spiritual extinction. Academician Sakharov, who has his differences of opinion with Solzhenitsyn, is in basic agreement with him on this point, as is dissident historian Andrei Amalrik.[10]

Solzhenitsyn feels that no ideology should be allowed to have an unbridled hold over society. Ideologies have a dangerous tendency to

[6] *Iz-pod Glyb: Sbornik Statei* (Paris: YMCA-Press, 1974). The English translation was published by Little, Brown and Company (Boston) in June 1975. The other contributors are M. S. Agurskii, E. V. Barabanov, A. B., Vadim Borisov, F. Korsakov (pseudonym) and I. R. Shafarevich.

[7] Lengthy extracts from the 16 Nov. press conference appeared in *Posev*, 12 (1974), pp. 2–10. The complete text was published in the booklet *Dve Press-Konferentsii k Sborniku "Iz-pod Glyb"* (*Two Press Conferences Relating to "From Under the Rubble"*). (Paris: YMCA-Press, 1975). Solzhenitsyn's 12 Dec. press conference appeared in full in *Russkaya Mysl*, 16 Jan. 1975, pp. 6–7. For an abridged translation, see *The National Review*, 6 June 1975, pp. 603–9. Selections from the 10 Apr. press conference were published in the 17 Apr. 1975 and 24 Apr. 1975 numbers of *Russkaya Mysl*. These same exerpts appeared in English translation in *The Times Literary Supplement*, 23 May 1975, pp. 560–61. See also the coverage of the press conference in *Le Monde*, 12 Apr. 1975, p. 4.

[8] A. Solzhenitsyn, "Sakharov i kritika 'Pisma vozhdyam'" ("Sakharov and the Criticism of 'Letter to the Soviet Leaders'"), *Kontinent*, 2 (1975), pp. 350–59 and "Otvet P. Litvinovu" ("Answer to P. Litvinov"), *Vestnik Russkogo Khristianskogo Dvizheniya*, 114 (1974), pp. 261–64.

[9] The television appearance occurred on 11 April 1975 on the programme "Apostrophes," moderated by Bernard Pivot. See the accounts in *Russkaya Mysl*, 24 Apr. 1975, p. 3 and *Le Monde*, 13–14 Apr. 1975, p. 11. The French transcript of this broadcast will shortly be published by Éditions du Seuil (Paris). The Sapiets interview appeared in *Encounter*, 44, No. 3 (Mar. 1975), pp. 67–72.

[10] Andrei Sakharov wrote in June 1972, "Our society is infected by apathy, hypocrisy, petit bourgeois egoism, and hidden cruelty . . . Drunkenness has assumed the dimensions of a national calamity. It is one of the symptoms of the moral degradation of a society that is sinking ever deeper into a state of chronic alcoholic poisoning." (*Sakharov Speaks* [New York: Vintage, 1974], pp. 153–54). Andrei Amalrik observed in his well-known *Will the Soviet Union Survive Until 1984?*, "Christian morality with its concepts of good and evil has been dislodged and effaced from the popular conscience and efforts have been made to replace it by 'class' morality, which can be

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depersonalize human beings by arranging them into "classes" and other groupings, some of which it may then be considered expedient to eliminate. Modern ideologies, quite simply, are "responsible for the murder of millions." [11] Marxism, moreover, represents "the most dangerous and best disguised of all the totalitarian ideologies." [12] Solzhenitsyn ridicules those such as Roy Medvedev who see Stalinism and the present regime as aberrations of Marxist socialism: "He who wants to prove that it is not socialism which exists in the Soviet Union, but Stalinist false-socialism, has to demonstrate that, proceeding from Lenin's theses and the concrete Russian situation of 1917, one could build socialism *without* mass dispossession of the peasantry, *without* enslaving the working class, *without* introducing mass slave ownership and *without* terror." [13] The kernel of mass extermination (Solzhenitsyn follows statistician Ivan Kurganov's estimate that Russia lost 66 million in the various phases of the Terror [14]) was in Marxist ideology from its inception. "It was no accident," he recently observed, "that Lenin constantly went into raptures over Marx and Engels until his death and that Marx and Engels were enraptured by the French Revolution. Between the French and October revolutions there exists the deep similarity that both were *ideological* and destroyed people not any old way but on the basis of *ideology*." [15]

When Academician Sakharov objected in his rejoinder to *Letter to the Soviet Leaders* that it was love of power and privilege rather than ideological commitment which motivated the contemporary Soviet leaders,[16] Solzhenitsyn invited the physicist to take a second look. "Ideology," he admitted, "is dead indeed [in the Soviet Union], but its malignant poison floods our souls and all our life. Ideology is dead, but it still makes all of us slaves. . . ." [17] Solzhenitsyn's point is that, even if they do not believe in Marxism, the Soviet leaders are *forced* to behave as if they do. And so, consequently, is all of Soviet society. "If *no one believes*," Solzhenitsyn wrote in *Kontinent*, "and yet everyone submits, this demonstrates not the weakness of an

formulated more or less as follows: good is what at the present moment is required by authority. Naturally, this kind of morality and also the implantation and the instigation of class and racial discord have completely demoralized society and deprived it of any really permanent moral criteria." (*Survey*, No. 73, Autumn 1969, p. 64).

[11] Sapiets interview, p. 68.

[12] Ibid.

[13] 12 Dec. press conference, p. 6. Here and subsequently, all italics within quotations are Solzhenitsyn's.

[14] Alexander I. Solzhenitsyn, *Letter to the Soviet Leaders* (New York: Harper and Row, 1974), p. 30. Roy Medvedev holds this figure to be an "exaggeration" and suggests 25–26 million as a more probable one. (See his response to Solzhenitsyn's *Letter* in Radio Liberty's Samizdat Archive, No. AS1874, p. 13). Even Medvedev's estimate, of course, suggests a mind-boggling holocaust.

[15] 12 Dec. press conference, p. 6.

[16] Andrei Sakharov, "In answer to Solzhenitsyn," *The New York Review*, 13 June 1974, p. 3.

[17] Sapiets interview, p. 67.

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ideology, but its frightful, evil power." [18] It is commitment to ideology that aggravates the Soviet Union's quarrel with Red China, thereby raising the spectre of the war of the century, and causes the regime to pursue adventurous policies all over the globe. "Marxist ideology," he concludes, "is the fetid root of today's Soviet life. Only by cleansing ourselves from it can we begin to return to humanity." [19]

As Solzhenitsyn sees it, Marxism is particularly dangerous because its vicious essence is cloaked in humanitarian terminology. Nazism was cruder and, therefore, easier to see through. Marxism's "frightful" power is demonstrated not only by its continuing grip on a society which no longer believes in it, but also by the attitude of many Western intellectuals towards it. "What was," Solzhenitsyn asks, "the West bewitched by for decades? By a handful of power-lovers? Whence came this sympathy of the [Western] intelligentsia? . . . *They sympathized with the ideology.*" [20] "We in the East," he points out, "never applauded the hangmen who appeared in the West. But the Western intelligentsia for decades applauded our hangmen." [21] Even in the 1970s, he feels, Marxist ideology maintains its fascination for Western liberals. This explains their intense interest in Roy Medvedev, a man who has virtually no following in the USSR, and their pronounced desire to see Solzhenitsyn as a socialist before his expulsion from Russia.[22]

But how, concretely, is Russia to rid herself of an oppressive and debilitating ideology? Two approaches are flatly ruled out by Solzhenitsyn: (1) a passive waiting about for something to happen; (2) revolution. If Russia does nothing, despotism will continue; it will not go away on its own. And this will lead to the spiritual death of the country, even if it should continue physically to subsist for a while longer. "History," Solzhenitsyn stresses to the watch-and-waiters, "is we ourselves." [23] A physical revolution is the opposite, unacceptable extreme. Such a cataclysm would result in untold casualties. Since Russia is at present more demoralized than at the time of the Bolshevik revolution, the savagery unleashed by revolution would probably exceed that of the Civil War. Even more ominously, war would be likely to break out between the different nationalities making up the Soviet Union (a point also made by Jewish activist Melik Agurskii [24]). Revolution must, therefore, be rejected as a course of action.

[18] *Kontinent*, 2, pp. 352–53.
[19] Ibid. p. 354.
[20] 16 Nov. press conference in *Posev*, 12 (1974), p. 8.
[21] Ibid. p. 10.
[22] 12 Dec. press conference, pp. 6–7.
[23] 16 Nov. press conference, p. 4.
[24] Melik Agurskii, "Mezhdunarodnoe znachenie 'Pisma k vozhdyam'" ("The International Significance of 'Letter to the Soviet Leaders'"), *Vestnik*, 112/113 (1974), pp. 220–21. It should be emphasized that Solzhenitsyn is opposed to revolution on principle and not just in the Russian context.

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What, then, is to be done? Solzhenitsyn has tried two tacks. One was his *Letter to the Soviet Leaders*, in which he attempted to convince the Kremlin to jettison Marxism and, while maintaining an authoritarian rule, to let the country "breathe." Solzhenitsyn was, of course, trying a long shot and was not naïve enough to think he actually had much of a chance of influencing the Soviet leadership.[25] On the day of his arrest, he tried a second tack—one for which he has greater hopes—an appeal to the Soviet citizenry to reject falsehood, entitled "Live Not by Lies."[26] Since his deportation, Solzhenitsyn has begun to call this "moral revolution."

The essence of moral revolution is: "never to act against your conscience, not to put your signature on documents you do not believe in, not to vote for those you think should not be elected, not to approve decisions, not to applaud, not to pass on lies, not to broadcast them, not to write them, not to put them down on paper, not to pretend. . . ."[27] Moral revolution, Solzhenitsyn insists, is not "passive resistance"; it is highly active. Its "passiveness" only consists in the fact that "you don't have to take a machine-gun in your hands, you don't have to shoot and kill."[28] The "ideological disobedience" he counsels has nothing in common with the "insane boldness of Indian-style civil disobedience" where one goes out and sits on roadways or railway tracks.[29] Solzhenitsyn compares moral and physical revolution thus:

> Physical revolution means: let's go slice up someone else, and *for sure* justice will be established. Moral revolution means: sacrifice yourself and *perhaps* justice will be established. Physical revolution means: kill someone else, and perhaps they will kill you. Moral revolution means: place yourself in such a position that you may be killed, but kill no one yourself.[30]

The writer's call for moral revolution is addressed to the entire Soviet people but, in particular, to the intelligentsia, which "is lying incessantly, especially the cultural intelligentsia."[31] If the moral revolution being promoted by Solzhenitsyn and his fellow contributors to *From Under the Rubble* catches fire, "it will transform our country in months, not years."[32] This will happen because the Soviet state

[25] In his recently-published literary memoirs, *Bodalsya Telënok s Dubom* (*The Calf Butted the Oak*), Solzhenitsyn does admit to an unremitting desire to engage the Soviet leaders in actual dialogue. (Paris: YMCA–Press, 1975, pp. 464–65).

[26] The full text appeared in Leopold Labedz, ed., *Solzhenitsyn: A Documentary Record* (Harmondsworth, Middlesex: Penguin, 1974), rev. ed., pp. 375–79. See the discussion of this document in *Bodalsya*, pp. 415, 421 and 465. Solzhenitsyn claims that the appeal and *Letter to the Soviet Leaders* represent "two sides of a whole." He repeats this assertion in *Kontinent*, 2, p. 350.

[27] Sapiets interview, p. 72.

[28] 16 Nov. press conference, p. 8.

[29] "Otvet P. Litvinovu," p. 261.

[30] Ibid. p. 3.

[31] Sapiets interview, p. 72.

[32] 16 Nov. press conference, p. 9.

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is so thoroughly based on ideology. "In so far as the State system is founded in ideology, it means that all we have to do is renounce the ideology, stop supporting it, and the state system will collapse by itself—it has nothing to hold on to but ideology, it will transform itself, become different."[33] Solzhenitsyn feels that, because of its "roguish materialistic Marxism," which is incapable of comprehending higher ethical impulses, the Soviet state is particularly helpless when confronted with a "steadfast human spirit." In such combat, its "rockets and flame-throwers" are of no avail.[34]

The transition of Russia from a Marxist state to a moral order is, Solzhenitsyn seems to hold, much more likely to result from "moral revolution" from below than from any revolution at the top. At present, he is waiting expectantly to see what the reaction to *From Under the Rubble* will be in Russia.

Solzhenitsyn speaks tentatively and somewhat cautiously about the shape of the society and government which should replace the present one. His ideas seem to be clearest in the field of foreign policy. Stressing his complete agreement with Academician Sakharov in this area (and intentionally employing the latter's terminology), Solzhenitsyn advocates "a repudiation of 'socialist messianism,' a rejection of open and covert support of disturbances throughout the entire world . . . the cessation of our guardianship over Eastern Europe, broad disarmament."[35] The Russia Solzhenitsyn envisages would draw into herself, not out of isolationism (which he rejects), but for a necessary period of healing. After her immense losses over the past 60 years and the deep, almost fatal wounds left by an enslavement to ideology, Russia, like any invalid, needs a period of convalescence. Her only external threat is China, a threat which would be greatly reduced if Marxism were abandoned. While Solzhenitsyn does not share the racialist, "yellow peril" fears of many contemporary Russian nationalists and has written that his heart "aches" for the ordinary Chinese people,[36] he does feel that Russia must keep a strong military presence on the Chinese border. As for the West, he emphasizes that Europe and America constitute no threat to Russia's security and advocates a broad reduction of armaments on the nation's Western border.

In a provocative essay entitled "Repentance and Self-Limitation," in *From Under the Rubble*,[37] Solzhenitsyn argues for a moral basis to international relations. Just as individuals, nations must seek to locate and then atone for those deeds which prick their national consciences. Rather than shrilly accusing other peoples of endless wrongdoings, nations should first tend their own gardens. Ticking off

[33] Sapiets interview, p. 72.
[34] "Otvet P. Litvinovu," p. 261.
[35] *Kontinent*, No. 2, p. 351.
[36] *Letter to the Soviet Leaders*, p. 16.
[37] "Raskayanie i samoogranichenie," pp. 115–50 in the collection.

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Russia's manifold historical sins against Poland and Poland's equally manifold sins against Russia, he asks, " How else are we going to rise above all this, if not through mutual repentance?" [38] West Germany's post-war " wave of remorse," expressed in deeds, is taken as a model of correct behaviour. On the other hand, Britain's refusal to take moral responsibility for the forced repatriation of one and a half million persons to the Soviet Union at the end of World War II, " knowing that they would be ruthlessly punished there," is cited as an example of wilful neglect.[39] Solzhenitsyn is at pains to stress that only a " suffering love " for one's homeland can lead to a location and correction of her wrongs. Those who refuse to admit that their nation has committed any wrongdoing and those who take a cold, detached delight in flailing their native land, as if they, too, did not participate in her guilt, are equally in error.

As far as relations between Great Russians and the other nationalities comprising the population of the Soviet Union are concerned, Solzhenitsyn is keenly aware of the growth of minority nationalist sentiment in recent years. His position on this issue is quite clear. Those who wish to emigrate to their " historic homelands "—Jews, Volga Germans, some Poles—should be free to do so.[40] No border nationality should be kept in the Russian federation against its will; all should be free to secede.[41] As for relations between Great Russians, Ukrainians and Belorussians, Solzhenitsyn seems to favour some kind of federalism. He is conscious of Ukrainian separatist leanings and has emphasized his lack of hostility towards Ukrainians. Replying to an invitation to lecture at a summer school organised annually in Munich by the Ukrainian Free University in conjunction with an American university, he wrote, " I am deeply moved by your invitation. Ukrainian life, culture and hopes for the future are not alien to me. My beloved [maternal] grandfather (the only one I ever knew) was Ukrainian and his wife was half-Ukrainian. In my childhood I constantly heard about the Ukrainian cause. Moreover, I shared with Ukrainians some of the most trying years of my life and befriended many of them. Therefore, if I had the slightest opportunity to accept your invitation, I would undoubtedly have done so." [42]

[38] *Iz-pod Glyb*, p. 141. Solzhenitsyn's views on Polish-Russian relations in history have been criticized by Jozef Lobodowski in *Wiadomosci* (London), 6 July 1975. Cf. also N. N. " Wypisy i Przypisy o Rosjanach," *Kultura*, No. 6, 1975.

[39] Sapiets interview, p. 71.

[40] 12 Dec. press conference, p. 6.

[41] In *Kontinent*, 2, he advocates " the repudiation of the holding of any national republic [in the Russian federation] by force." (p. 351).

[42] *Suchasnist* (Munich), 11 (1974), p. 124. Solzhenitsyn believes that Russians, Ukrainians and Belorussians (the last-named of whom he sometimes groups together with Russians) are united by the bond of extraordinary suffering which they have endured since the Bolshevik take-over. While far from denying that all Soviet peoples have suffered considerably, he is convinced that the Eastern Slavs have suffered the most. He regards this simply as historical fact and is quite willing to document his contention. See *Kontinent*, 2, pp. 357–58 and *Iz-pod Glyb*, pp. 134–35. On the Orthodox Easter

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ON domestic affairs, Solzhenitsyn agrees with Sakharov in advocating "the liberation of political prisoners, ideological tolerance, the strengthening of the family and education, the overcoming of 'the loss of mutual relations between people. . . .'"[43] He insists that Sakharov and other critics misunderstood his views, expressed in *Letter to the Soviet Leaders*, concerning the need for an authoritarian system in Russia. In his press conferences and interviews, Solzhenitsyn has emphasized that he is no foe of democracy in general. What he opposes is the notion that Russia can pass easily and smoothly from being a communist state to being a democracy. The unprepared introduction of Western-style democracy into Russian political life would not, he firmly believes, lead to democratization. Rather, it would plunge the nation into bloody chaos, as happened in the period following March 1917. And in 1917, he reminds us, Russia had had 12 years of limited parliamentary experimentation; now she is even less ready for democracy. In general, Solzhenitsyn seems to hold that an immediate transition to democracy would produce results roughly equivalent to those caused by a violent revolution. Any change must be gradual and wisely planned. A number of contemporary Soviet intellectuals are in agreement with Solzhenitsyn on this point.[44]

Because he is currently concentrating on the need for "moral revolution" in Russia, the precondition for any positive change, Solzhenitsyn has tended to play down certain ideas expressed in *August 1914*, *Letter to the Soviet Leaders* and elsewhere[45] concerning the shape of a post-Marxist Russia. Probably this has been done because his views in this sphere remain somewhat tentative and because he wishes to avoid injecting divisiveness into the ranks of potential participants in the "revolution." One wonders whether he is tactically correct in pursuing such a course. Soviet citizens might be more willing to desist from supporting the "lie" if given a vision of the kind of society which might succeed the Marxist ideocracy.

The following are some of the points of Solzhenitsyn's "positive" programme which emerge from *August 1914* and the *Letter*. First, Solzhenitsyn is suspicious of the very nature of Western political parties. "Don't imagine that a republic automatically means bread and circuses for all," a character in *August 1914* warns, "What would

for 1975, Solzhenitsyn broadcast a short message of paschal greetings over Radio Canada International to the numerous Canadians of Ukrainian descent. "My mother," he said, "was almost entirely of Ukrainian origin. My grandfather, the only male member of the family left after my father's death, was a Ukrainian. His language still rings in my ears." (*The Montreal Star*, 5 May 1975).

[43] *Kontinent*, 2, p. 351.

[44] E.g. Vladimir Osipov, Melik Agurskii, Gennadii Shimanov.

[45] E.g. the chapter "Slovo razrushit beton" ("The Word Will Destroy Concrete") from a variant of *The First Circle*. The chapter appeared in *Vestnik*, 114 (1974), pp. 193–203. As in *August 1914*, Solzhenitsyn here presents his ideas "polyphonically," which, of course, makes it difficult to decide for certain where the author stands on a given point. Solzhenitsyn may well appreciate this built-in ambiguity, as it permits him to advance ideas in tentative fashion.

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happen? A hundred ambitious lawyers would assemble—and who talks more hot air than lawyers do?—and shout each other down." [46] Political parties do not really represent the interests of their constituents. "Humanity awaits the prophet who will teach it how to live without parties in general." [47] Like many Soviet intellectuals,[48] Solzhenitsyn would prefer to have Russia's popular assembly based on the vocational rather than territorial principle. In *August 1914*, he seems, for example, to favour the formation of a "Union of Engineers" which would participate in the nation's legislative body, and in the *Letter*, he suggests that "at least the real power of the soviets should be restored." [49] Thus, ironically, though manifestly anti-Marxist, Solzhenitsyn could be termed "pro-soviet." He also argues for an "ethical authoritarianism," which he sharply distinguishes from lawlessness and totalitarianism, and for the broadest possible decentralization of government.[50] Like the late émigré philosopher Nikolai Berdyaev (d. 1948), whose influence is enormous in contemporary Russia, Solzhenitsyn appears to advocate a syndicalist structure. Berdyaev's scheme has been admirably summed up thus: "His conception takes the form of a corporate state made up of representatives of professional, economic and cultural associations—composed of both employers and workers—and defending the broad interests of their respective groups. This is essentially the form of cooperative society in which the class struggle is eliminated, since both the employers and the workers realize that their interests are basically identical. . . . The function of the government, thus, is to act as an umpire between the various associations, so that none would concentrate in its keeping tyrannous economic power. . . ." [51]

Like many contemporary intellectuals, Solzhenitsyn is attempting to seek out a middle path between Western capitalism and Eastern communism, one which avoids the pitfalls of both. In his *Letter*, he strongly advocates the disbanding of the collective farms and the de-nationalization of small trades and services. He prefers "small factories" to "enormous plants and combines" [52] and promotes "an economy of *non*-gigantism with small-scale, though highly-developed, technology." [53]

[46] Alexander Solzhenitsyn, *August 1914* (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1972), p. 582.

[47] "Slovo razrushit beton," p. 196.

[48] E.g. the revolutionary "Social-Christians," arrested by the KGB in 1967. Their "programme" has recently been published in the collection *VSKhSON* (Paris: YMCA-Press, 1975), pp. 31–79. An English translation of this document will appear in my study of the organization, *The New Russian Revolutionaries*, which will be published by Nordland Publishing Company in late 1975.

[49] A. Solzhenitsyn, *Pismo Vozhdyam Sovetskogo Soyuza* (Paris: YMCA-Press, 1974), p. 46. The published English translation of this passage (*Letter*, p. 54) is inaccurate.

[50] *Russkaya Mysl*, 24 Apr. 1975, p. 3 and "Slovo razrushit beton," p. 197.

[51] Matthew Spinka, *Nicolas Berdyaev: Captive of Freedom* (Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1950), pp. 168–69.

[52] *Letter to the Soviet Leaders*, p. 20.

[53] Ibid. pp. 37–38.

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Solzhenitsyn also favours radical ecological reform. "We have dirtied and defiled the wide Russian spaces and disfigured the heart of Russia, our beloved Moscow. . . . We have squandered our resources foolishly without so much as a backward glance, sapped our soil, mutilated our vast expanses with idiotic 'inland seas' and contaminated belts of wasteland around our industrial centres. . . . So let us come to our senses in time, let us change our course!" [54] The way out of Russia's urban blight and ecological havoc is to shift the country's economic development to the North-East: "In our vast north-eastern spaces, which over four centuries of sluggishness have prevented us from mutilating by our mistakes, we can build *anew*: not the senseless, voracious civilization of 'progress'—no, we can set up a *stable* economy without pain or delay and settle people there for the first time according to the needs and principles of that economy. These spaces allow us to hope that we shall not destroy Russia in the general crisis of Western civilization." [55] Through advanced modern technology, the North-East should be thawed out, and man-centred new towns ("humane, friendly, cozy places where the air [is] always clean") constructed which, Solzhenitsyn stresses, should be cultural centres in their own right.[56]

As a Christian, Solzhenitsyn thinks religion should, and will, play an important role in post-Marxist Russia. While insisting that the Russian Orthodox Church should be totally independent of the state, both juridically and financially, and that no one should be persecuted for holding dissenting religious convictions, Solzhenitsyn feels that only Christianity can fill the vacuum which will remain after the departure of the Marxist storm.[57] He readily admits that Russia's Church has committed serious errors, particularly in the period following its subjection by Peter the Great. By aligning itself too closely with the Tsarist state, the Church lost its "spiritual independence" and, therefore, its "authority" in the eyes of the educated stratum and the mass of urban workers.[58] "Most terrible of all," its authority even began to be eroded among the peasantry in the years preceding the Bolshevik take-over.[59] In the period following the revolution, however, Russian Christians suffered a persecution more severe than any since the pre-Constantine era. And this persecution bore

[54] *Letter to the Soviet Leaders*, pp. 25–26.
[55] Ibid. p. 27.
[56] Ibid. pp. 37–38.
[57] Ibid. p. 57 and "Tretemu Soboru Zarubezhnoi Russkoi Tserkvi" ("To the Third Council of the Russian Church Abroad"), *Vestnik Russkogo Khristianskogo Dvizheniya*, 112/113 (1974), pp. 106–7. The latter document elaborates Solzhenitsyn's ideas on the Russian Church and its role in Russian history. It is noteworthy that he traces the Church's problems to the late 17th and early 18th century "reforms" of Patriarch Nikon and Peter the Great. Many specialists would go back a century earlier: to the triumph of the so-called "Josephites" and the suppression of Russian hesychasm.
[58] "Tretemu Soboru . . . ," p. 106.
[59] Ibid.

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unexpected fruit. "Religion in our country," Solzhenitsyn told Janis Sapiets, "has spread much more widely, and its roots are much deeper here than in the West, where nobody has tried to obstruct religion, where it has been entirely free. I am counting on this spiritual strength of our people, I am counting on those forces which are born out of suffering. Individuals have suffered, but the entire nation has suffered too, and out of these sufferings a deep spiritual feeling has been born, which can help us to find a way out of our outwardly difficult situation." [60]

Solzhenitsyn has also been attempting to shore up Russian national self-consciousness. He angrily rejects charges that this renders him a "chauvinist." He stresses his desire for a national renaissance for all the different peoples of the Soviet Union. Great Russians, however, deserve the same rights as any other people: "Hardly had I concluded that . . . the Russian people also has a right to national self-awareness and to national rebirth after a harsh spiritual illness, than this was frenziedly declared to be great-power nationalism. . . . Russians are not deemed capable of loving their own people without hating others. We Russians are forbidden to mention not only national rebirth but even 'national self-consciousness.' Even that is declared a dangerous hydra." [61] In embracing a form of Russian nationalism (an extremely liberal, tolerant form), Solzhenitsyn is representative of a remarkable upsurge of neo-Slavophilism which has been particularly evident in the Soviet Union since the early sixties. To take just one of numerous possible examples, an "All-Russian Society for the Preservation of Historical and Cultural Monuments" was founded in 1965 to halt the wanton destruction of Russian historical monuments, particularly old churches. A year after its official inauguration, this purely voluntary organization numbered three million and, by 1972, seven million.[62] There unquestionably exists in contemporary Soviet Russia a broad base for patriotic and religious sentiments.[63]

The liberal "democratic movement," so strong in the sixties, has spent much of its strength, and a goodly half of its most active members have emigrated.[64] Neo-Marxism, though not being virtually reducible

[60] Sapiets interview, p. 72.

[61] *Kontinent*, 2, pp. 355–56. Solzhenitsyn's concept of the nation has a theological underpinning. He seems almost totally to accept the views in this sphere of his friend and co-contributor to *Iz-pod Glyb*, Vadim Borisov. See the pages from *Kontinent* just cited and *Dve Press-Konferentsii*, pp. 53/54. The most complete version of Borisov's article 'Lichnost i natsionalnoe samosoznanie" ("The Personality and National Self-Awareness") appeared in *Vestnik*, 112/113 (1974), pp. 229–60.

[62] See Dimitry Pospielovsky, "The Resurgence of Russian Nationalism in *Samizdat*," *Survey*, 19, No. 1 (1973), pp. 52/53 and Thomas E. Bird, "New Interest in Old Russian Things," *Slavic Review*, 32, No. 1 (1973), pp. 22–23, n. 29.

[63] On this, see my article "The Eleventh Hour. An Account of Neo-Slavophilism. Is It the Emerging Ideology of a Post-Marxist Russia?" in *Frontier*, 18, No. 2 (Summer, 1975), pp. 71–82.

[64] 16 Nov. press conference, pp. 4–5. In *Bodalsya*, Solzhenitsyn speaks quite critically of the "democratic movement," though he stresses his admiration for Andrei Sakharov. Already by 1968, he writes, it had become clear that the movement had no positive,

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to "the Medvedev brothers," as Solzhenitsyn claims, citing a joke by Alexander Galitch, has relatively few followers.[65] For the majority of Soviet intellectuals, Marxism has been tainted by the experience of the past 60 years. The real struggle of ideas in contemporary Russia may, therefore, be taking place between liberal nationalists, such as Solzhenitsyn, and the less liberal. In *From Under the Rubble*, Solzhenitsyn gives what he calls a "bare but not distorted" summary of the views of the right-wing nationalists, whom he terms "national Bolsheviks":

> In its qualities the Russian people is the noblest in the world. Neither its ancient nor its modern history has been stained by anything. It is inadmissible to accuse either Tsarism or Bolshevism of anything. There were no national mistakes or sins before the seventeenth century or after. We have not experienced a loss of any moral loftiness and have no need to perfect ourselves. There are no problems with the border republics. . . . Communism is unthinkable without patriotism. The prospects for Russia-USSR are radiant. Adherence to the Russians or non-Russians is strictly a matter of blood. . . . Orthodoxy is no more Russian than Marxism, atheism, a natural scientific world-view or, for example, Hinduism. . . . All of this together they call the *Russian Idea*.[66]

This is actually something of a caricature of the right-wingers' views and, in any case, fails to deal adequately with the thought of a large body of centrist neo-Slavophiles.[67] The outcome of the present debate between Russian nationalists could prove to be of great significance, and the influence of Solzhenitsyn's ideas in this discussion is, of course, immense.

HAVING dealt at some length with Solzhenitsyn's "programme" for Russia's future development, I should like, briefly, to treat his views on the West, for two reasons. First, he thinks that Western attitudes towards Russia inevitably affect, for better or for worse, the internal life of the Soviet Union. Second, since the late seventeenth

responsibly thought-out programme but only the cry "Give us liberty!" This reminds him of the spirit of the two decades preceding the Bolshevik takeover in 1917 (pp. 395–406).

[65] 16 Nov. press conference, p. 5. To counteract the influence of Solzhenitsyn and *Kontinent*, Roy Medvedev and other neo-Marxists have begun publishing the *samizdat* journal *Twentieth Century*. (*International Herald Tribune*, 13 Mar. 1975, p. 1).

[66] pp. 128–29. Solzhenitsyn seems to err in not distinguishing adequately between the views of right-wing nationalists, who can be anti-Bolshevik, and authentic National Bolsheviks, such as the now-defunct Fetisov group.

[67] He is somewhat fairer in his treatment of Viktor Chalmaev and the well-known *Molodaya Gvardiya* episode in *Bodalsya* (pp. 266–75). On pp. 268–69 he outlines the points of convergence and divergence between his views and those of the conservative nationalists. Of related interest is his high opinion of certain of the so-called "ruralist" prose writers (*derevenshchiki*) who publish in official Soviet literary journals. (*Bodalsya*, p. 14 and also his Aug. 1973 interview with A.P. and *Le Monde* correspondents, in Labedz, p. 334).

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century, when Russia was grafted on to Western civilization, she has been intimately involved in the West's destiny. Interestingly, Solzhenitsyn feels that the contemporary West's problems and those of the Soviet Union share a common root, a " defect " inherent in Western civilization from the time of the Renaissance. Since the Renaissance, he told a group of Italian journalists, the Western countries, like little children, have been riding a materialist merry-go-round. Its orbital path has been: " Renaissance, Reformation, Enlightenment, physical bloody revolutions, democratic societies, socialist attempts." [68] Rebellion against the coercion of medieval theocracies prompted the West to ascend the merry-go-round:

> They pulled us, drove us toward Spirit, by force, and we naturally rejected this, jerked free, plunged into Matter. Thus began a long epoch of humanistic individualism. Thus did civilization begin to be constructed on the principle: man is the measure of all things and man is above all things. This whole inevitable path enriched the experience of mankind immensely. But before our eyes it also has reached its point of exhaustion. . . . Having placed man as the highest measure—imperfect man, never free from self-interest, self-love, envy and vanity, man having given himself up without measure or restraint to Matter—we have arrived at a littering, a surfeit of garbage. We are drowning in terrestrial garbage. This refuse fills and obstructs all spheres of our existence.[69]

Solzhenitsyn proceeds to elaborate. " In the *material* sphere, this garbage . . . has poisoned the air, the water, a considerable part of the earth's surface. . . . But in the so-called *spiritual* sphere as well, this refuse obstructs us, presses upon us. . . . A thundering civilization has completely deprived us of a concentrated inner life, has dragged our souls out to either the Party or commercial market place. In the *social* sphere, our path of many centuries has brought us in some cases to the brink of anarchy and in others to stable despotism." [70] By heeding the lessons of Western civilization's journey since the Renaissance and by returning to the spirit, both East and West could emerge from their predicaments. Solzhenitsyn believes that the West's present problems, even inflation, are primarily " psychological and moral " and only secondly economic and political.[71] Like the East, the West is in need of " moral revolution."

At his 12 December press conference, Solzhenitsyn expanded upon what he sees as the crux of contemporary Western man's predicament:

[68] " Rech pri poluchenii premii ' Zolotoe klishe ' soyuza italianskikh zhurnalistov " (" Speech upon Receiving the Prize ' The Golden Cliche ' from the Union of Italian Journalists "), in *Mir i Nasilie*, p. 99. By tracing the West's difficulties only back to the Renaissance, Solzhenitsyn, of course, diverges from the views of the 19th century Slavophiles, who went back to the 9th century.

[69] Ibid.

[70] Ibid. pp. 99–100.

[71] 12 Dec. press conference, p. 7.

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> . . . in the West there exists general freedom to order one's life. With the fall of religious principles . . . this leads to an intensified activity of each man on his own behalf. Western man is placed in a worrying position. Literally all the time, every day, he could fall into a situation where he might miss an opportunity [for self-advancement] . . . or a professional group might let a chance pass. And in this tense struggle and competition people sometimes occupy themselves overly with material affairs and think too much about their own narrow interests and not about everyone . . . not about society.[72]

This, he believes, is the essence of the problem in the US, Britain and France. Post-Christian man finds it difficult to conceive a loyalty to anything higher than himself. At most, it is to his political party, trade union or professional group. Only in small, "stable" democracies, such as Switzerland (which Solzhenitsyn admires for its "noiseless" decentralized machinery of government), does one observe people moderating their desires for the benefit of society as a whole.[73]

Since his deportation, Solzhenitsyn has frequently been asked his opinion on *détente* and the correct attitude the Western powers should have towards the Soviet Union. In responding, he has stressed the vast difference in our knowledge of what transpires in the East and West, "The two sides of the earth are illumined differently. . . . Thus, too, does information illumine our terrestrial globe. Half the Earth, the West, is under a bright sun. Everything is seen through and through. The Western press, Western parliaments, any social activist tell all. . . . And why do so-called Sovietologists judge with such difficulty and are so often mistaken about the East? Because the East is plunged in darkness. . . ."[74] To "trust" a regime which does not bother to observe its own constitution and continually presses down upon its people is, Solzhenitsyn feels, the height of folly. The Soviet repression of its citizenry is not at all "an internal affair of the Soviet Union."[75] Uncontrolled internal violence is as dangerous for the world as war. As in the case of Nazi Germany, it easily and almost naturally shifts over to external aggression. By employing the weapon of publicity, the West can positively affect the internal situation in Russia. And any improvement there means less danger abroad. In helping oppressed Soviet citizens, the West is, therefore, *de facto* helping itself. On the other hand, by ignoring the suppression of human rights in the USSR, the West is, Munich-like, courting disaster: "If today they are crunching our bones, it is a certain pledge that tomorrow they will be crunching *yours*."[76]

While the West is frequently deceived about the actual state of

[72] Ibid.
[73] Cronkite interview, pp. 90–91.
[74] Ibid. pp. 60–61.
[75] Ibid. p. 77.
[76] Letter of 27 May 1974 to *Aftenposten*. In *Mir i Nasilie*, p. 48.

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affairs in the communist East, there is, Solzhenitsyn believes, another factor at work. Often the West simply does not want to know the truth. To illustrate this point, he cites an example earlier publicized by George Orwell. In 1932–33 the Bolsheviks organized an artificial famine in the Ukraine to break the will of the peasantry. When news of the famine reached the West, the Soviets organized a tour for foreign correspondents to assist them in refuting slanderous allegations abroad. However, one American journalist, Thomas Walker, managed to break away from the guided tour and to photograph the grisly results of the famine. At great personal risk, Walker then smuggled the photographs out of the country. For an entire year thereafter, he was unable to find an American paper willing to print his photos.

> The much-suffering Ukraine continued to die while Western publishers considered it indecent to inform readers of the unpleasant aspects of Communist Russia. And when the famine had done its work and all six million had perished, then, finally, a printing appeared. . . . Here one has to do with a frightful human trait expressed in the Russian proverb, "A sated man does not understand one who is hungry." A contented man does not comprehend one who is suffering. . . . I strongly ask that you understand me correctly: I am not accusing any particular Western government or any particular Western social group. This is that frightening human attribute against which both religious books and many works of artistic literature warn us.[77]

Were the shoe on the other foot, Solzhenitsyn ruefully concedes, Russia would "with great probability" have remained equally indifferent to the sufferings of the West. The universality of the malady of indifference (*ravnodushie*) does not, however, render it any less disturbing. It will probably be 40 years before the West decides that it wants to know about what is happening now in China: "Today there perhaps exists in China a similar [Gulag] Archipelago of thirty millions. But a Chinese book about the 'Archipelago' will come to you in forty years, when it will already be too late to help."[78]

While he does not feel inclined to prophesy about the West's future, Solzhenitsyn clearly has a sense of foreboding. As he sees it, since the second world war, the West has been gradually retreating before communism, without there being any necessity for this.

> In 1945 the Western powers were victors with incomparable strength. The armed might of the Western allies represented a power such as had never previously existed on earth. But, beginning with 1945, without any world war, the Western powers, under the influence of Western public opinion, have voluntarily ceded one position after another, one country after another. . . . Their spirit of resistance has weakened, all their positions in the world have weakened, and the trust in them on the part of

[77] 10 Apr. press conference in *Russkaya Mysl*, 17 Apr. 1975, p. 2.
[78] Ibid.

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> the neutral " third world " has weakened. On the other hand, the Communist system has spread throughout vast territories, to the whole Far East. . . . The victorious [Western] countries have voluntarily become defeated countries. The position of the Western victor-nations is now such as it would have been had they just lost a world war.[79]

Solzhenitsyn appears to see a totalitarian shadow over the contemporary Western world. This is because, in his view, totalitarianism " is not born of monarchy and not of an authoritarian regime, but from the failure of democracy. Such was the case in Russia, such was the case in Germany and Italy and so it is occurring now before our eyes in Portugal." [80] The West's sputtering democracies may, Solzhenitsyn intimates, eventually be called upon to share the fate of the communist East.

In response to the frequently asked question of emigration, Solzhenitsyn replies, " I of course consider that any man who wants to emigrate must have that right and that any hindrance to emigration is barbaric, savage and unworthy of a civilized country. However, in general, those emigrate who are fleeing, saving themselves from terrible conditions. Much more courageous people, steadfast and devoted to their country, remain in order to correct the situation and achieve a betterment of conditions there. For some reason *they* are not accorded the West's attention." [81] Only Soviet Jews who actually intend to go to Israel and Volga Germans have a justification for emigrating. The others should stay behind and do battle at home. The West's myopic concentration on emigration does not benefit the Soviet people as a whole: " It seems to me the main problem should be how those 250 million who remain are to live." [82]

Solzhenitsyn has also, on more than one occasion, been asked his opinion of the Western press. He has answered that he is most grateful for its support while he was in the Soviet Union: " . . . the Western press helped myself, Sakharov, all of us to hold out for years. . . ." [83] He strongly supports the notion of an independent press, free of state control, but feels that, in two respects, the Western press should alter its habits: it should exhibit more self-control at home, and it should be

[79] Ibid. Solzhenitsyn recently expanded upon this idea in his essay " Tretya mirovaya? " (" A Third World War? ") which appeared in *Russkaya Mysl*, 12 June 1975, p. 3, and, in translation, in the *International Herald Tribune*, 24 June 1975, p. 4. It was criticized by Raymond Aron in *Le Figaro* (12 June 1975). Solzhenitsyn came back to the subject in his speech delivered in Washington on 30 June 1975 at the dinner organized in his honour by the AFL-CIO (*International Herald Tribune*, 2 July 1975).

[80] *Russkaya Mysl*, 24 April 1975, p. 3.

[81] Cronkite interview, p. 73.

[82] 16 Nov. press conference, p. 6 Solzhenitsyn's views on emigration (also expressed by his friend Shafarevich in Moscow) nave been the subject of an acrimonious debate in which they were criticized by Yuli Daniel from inside, and by Vladimir Weidle and Mstislav Rostropovich from outside.

[83] Cronkite interview, p. 56.

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bolder in reporting on the East. To illustrate his first point, he recounts his initial encounter with the press upon arriving in the West:

> . . . suddenly I arrive in Western Europe. . . . Three hours previously I was expecting to be executed. Three hours previously. . . . And almost from that moment there began a storm. The Western press pounced upon me. I still could not sort out in my head what had happened. I was shaken. I wasn't in a mood to say anything. But they demanded that I make a statement, as if I had arrived with prepared statements. I settled on the single sentence that I "had said enough in the Soviet Union and would keep silent." But day after day the press did not leave me in peace. . . . I went out one night onto the back balcony where there were no correspondents. Suddenly two floodlights were on me . . . and they were photographing me at night! I was walking along the street with my companions, we were conversing, and they thrust in a microphone, several microphones to find out what I was saying to my companions. To pass on to their agencies. Well, I got vexed and said, "You're worse than the KGB!" They seized on it. My first statement. Solzhenitsyn comes to the West and declares, "The Western press is worse than the KGB." As if I had called a press conference and made such a declaration.[84]

Solzhenitsyn's second point is that Western correspondents who, in the West, will permit nothing to stop them, usually become extraordinarily timid and unadventurous once they arrive in the East. "The lowest Bulgarian policeman says, 'Stop! Don't photograph that church.' [And the correspondent answers:] 'All right, I won't do it.'" [85] Solzhenitsyn asks, "Why this difference?" He is, however, quite willing to admit that there are courageous Western correspondents who are an exception to the rule.

I would like to underline that, whatever Solzhenitsyn's influence in the West, his impact is far stronger and more significant in his homeland and in Eastern Europe, where his ideas are closely followed through foreign radio broadcasts and *samizdat* circulation of literature. It is to Russians first and to the non-Russian population of the USSR and Eastern Europeans second—the "400 million," in his words [86]—that he primarily directs his message.

ALEXANDER Solzhenitsyn and his views on *détente* became the focal point of a major controversy in the United States during the early summer of 1975, a period which also witnessed the Apollo-Soyuz link-up in space and President Ford's departure for Helsinki to attend the 35-nation European summit conference on security. The controversy centred on two main factors. First, there was President

[84] Ibid. pp. 56–57.
[85] Ibid. p. 59.
[86] 16 Nov. press conference, p. 10.

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Ford's decision to turn down an invitation to attend a large dinner on 30 June in Solzhenitsyn's honour, sponsored by the AFL-CIO, and his negative response to a request from Senators Jesse Helms and Strom Thurmond that he have a meeting with the writer.[87] When questions were asked about what quickly came to be known as Ford's " snub " to Solzhenitsyn, a White House spokesman explained that the president had acted on advice from the National Security Council that a meeting with the Nobel prizewinner would be inconsistent with the policy of *détente*.[88] This provoked a storm of criticism. 500 letters and telegrams were received by the White House, not one of them supporting the president's position.[89] The president was also subjected to severe and uncomplimentary attacks in the press and in Congress. To take a representative day, on 11 July, *The Washington Post* carried a column by George F. Will opening with the words, " The U.S. government may have to expel Alexander Solzhenitsyn from the republic, not only as a hands-across-the-barbed-wire gesture of solidarity with its *détente* partner, the Soviet government, but also to save the president and his attendants from nervous breakdowns," and concluding, " *Détente* has conferred upon Brezhnev veto power over the appointments calendar of the President of the United States." The same day, Senator Ernest Hollings termed Ford's sidestepping of Solzhenitsyn an " embarrassment " to the United States and introduced a resolution that the writer be invited to address a joint session of Congress.[90]

Under such unsparing and virtually uniform criticism, the White House decided to backtrack. It seems to have begun to make indirect approaches to Solzhenitsyn as early as 12 July, and on the 15th no fewer than four attempts were made through intermediaries to arrange a meeting. By this time, however, Solzhenitsyn was not interested in an encounter which promised to have a purely cosmetic character.[91] He is also said to have turned down an offer from Dr Kissinger for a private, unpublicized meeting.[92] On 16 July, at a press conference in Milwaukee, Kissinger, " under some pressure " from reporters, was induced to admit that in June he had personally counselled the president not to see Solzhenitsyn because " the symbolic effect " of such a meeting would have been disadvantageous for US foreign policy.[93] Kissinger's admission unleashed more criticism at his and the presi-

[87] *The New York Times*, 3 July 1975, and Rowland Evans and Robert Novak, " Snubbing Solzhenitsyn," *The Washington Post*, 17 July 1975.

[88] *The New York Times*, 3 July 1975.

[89] *The New York Times*, 17 July 1975, p. 10, and *The Washington Post*, 18 July 1975, p. A2.

[90] *The New York Times*, " Notes on People," 12 July 1975.

[91] *The New York Times*, 18 July 1975, and Evans and Novak, " Snub and Counter-Snub," *The New York Post*, 19 July 1975, p. 27. For Solzhenitsyn's explanation of his lack of desire to see President Ford, see *The New York Times*, 22 July 1975, p. 9.

[92] Evans and Novak, " Snub . . . "

[93] *The New York Times*, 17 July 1975, p. 10, and *The Times* (London), 17 July 1975, p. 5.

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dent's expense.[94] Summing up the entire episode, one American commentator wrote in early August, "The decision not to invite Alexander Solzhenitsyn to the White House has been deplored by now from all points of the ideological compass. For sheer political ineptitude it was in a special class. . . . Men will remember and read Alexander Solzhenitsyn when Gerald Ford is a footnote to history. . . ." [95]

The second factor in the controversy was Solzhenitsyn's critique of *détente* which he repeated and developed at AFL-CIO dinners in his honour in Washington and New York, at a reception held for him by 24 US senators and on other occasions.[96] Support for Solzhenitsyn's position on *détente* was not as uniform among American commentators as was the feeling that President Ford should have invited him to the White House. Joseph Kraft may have summed up the fears of many when he wrote about Solzhenitsyn's long speech of 30 June:

> Alexander Solzhenitsyn is a great literary artist with a supreme feel for human suffering. But, as his speech the other day makes plain, he hails from a culture backward by American standards, and he knows little about relations between states. Americans who hearken to his message are at least half-looking for the simple answers of the cold war. . . . To him [Solzhenitsyn] communism is not only a revolutionary ideology which enormously complicates peaceful relations between sovereign states. To him it is evil incarnate. . . . From that vantage point all contact between the Western world and the Communist world is bad. . . . But the application of an intense personal morality to international relations does not yield good policies. . . . Because Solzhenitsyn's views have so little to do with practical American reality, the worship of his presence seems to me slightly ominous. . . .[97]

Kissinger vented similar fears at his press conference in Milwaukee on 16 July. Stressing that there was "no alternative" to *détente*, Kissinger said that, if he understood Solzhenitsyn's "message" correctly, it was not only that *détente* was a threat, "but that the United States should pursue an aggressive policy to overthrow the Soviet Union." He continued, "Now I believe that Solzhenitsyn is a man whose suffering entitles him to be heard and who has stood with great anguish for his views. But I do believe that if his views became the national policy of the United States, we would be in a period—we would be confronting a considerable threat of military conflict. This will not be acceptable to the American people or the world, but this is no

[94] E.g. the editorial in *The New York Times*, 24 July 1975 and David S. Broder, "Kissinger's Advice on Solzhenitsyn," *The Washington Post*, 23 July, 1975.

[95] Anthony Lewis, "Life Without Dreams," *The International Herald Tribune*, 5 August 1975, p. 4.

[96] The Russian text of the speech of 30 June appeared in *Russkaya Mysl*, 17 July 1975, pp. 3–5. For the English translation, see this issue of *Survey*, p. 114. For a lengthy summary of the 9 July address, see *The New York Times*, 10 July 1975, p. 31. See also *Russkaya Mysl*, 24 July 1975, p. 2. For the Russian of Solzhenitsyn's short speech to the senators, see *Novoe Russkoe Slovo*, 19 July 1975, p. 1.

[97] Joseph Kraft, "Solzhenitsyn's Message," *The Washington Post*, 3 July 1975.

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reflection on the literary greatness of Solzhenitsyn or on the importance of some of his message." [98]

Other commentators have ably undertaken to defend Solzhenitsyn's ideas on *détente*.[99] However, since the writer frequently sought to clarify his views during his appearances in the United States, it will be best to let him speak for himself. In his speech on 9 July to the New York AFL-CIO, he emphatically rejected one of the charges made by Joseph Kraft: "One commentator described me as an advocate of the cold war. This is a total misunderstanding of the world situation. The cold war is still going on, but from the other side. I can assure you, the cold war has never stopped for one second in the Soviet Union." [100] In other words, he was summoning the US to take up a defensive position, not to pass over to the offensive. On the same occasion, he denied that he was calling upon Americans to liberate the Russian people (the charge which Kissinger was to make a week later): "This is not true. I have always told my countrymen that they must save themselves and not look to outsiders." [101]

On the other hand, Solzhenitsyn had no quarrel with those who claimed that he saw communism as "evil." Attacking the widespread notion that the concepts of good and evil are "old-fashioned," he laid the blame for many of communism's recent successes at the feet of an undiscerning "relativism." [102] For Solzhenitsyn, the proof that communism is evil is in its works, particularly in its mass extermination of human life. In his speech of 30 June, he pointed out that in the 80 years preceding the Bolshevik revolution—years of unrest and revolutionary ferment—Tsarist Russia executed an average of 17 persons a year. By 1918–19, the Bolsheviks were already exterminating more than 1,000 persons a *month*, and during 1937–38, the monthly toll soared to 40,000.[103]

A corollary of Solzhenitsyn's view of the nature of communism is his belief that only strength and firmness are able to keep it in check:

> You must understand the nature of communism. The very ideology of communism—all Lenin's teachings—are that anyone is considered a fool who does not take what is lying in front of him. If you can take it, take it. If you can attack, attack. But if there is a wall, then go back. . . . You defended Berlin in 1948 only by your firmness of spirit, and there was no world conflict. In Korea in 1950, you stood up against the communist using only your firmness, and there was no world conflict. In 1962, you compelled the rockets to be removed from Cuba. Again it was only

[98] "Kissinger Sees Perils in Solzhenitsyn's Views," *The New York Times*, 17 July 1975, p. 10.

[99] E.g. Bernard Levin, "Solzhenitsyn: Poison Darts from among the Pygmies," *The Times*, 17 July 1975, p. 14, and Roscoe Drummond, "What Solzhenitsyn Really Said," *The Christian Science Monitor*, 23 July 1975.

[100] *The New York Times*, 10 July 1975, p. 31.

[101] Ibid.

[102] *Russkaya Mysl*, 24 July 1975, p. 2.

[103] *Russkaya Mysl*, 17 July 1975, p. 3.

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> firmness, and there was no world conflict. . . . And if I am standing here before you, it is not because of the kindness or the goodwill of communism, not thanks to *détente,* but thanks to my own firmness and your firm support.[104]

Unceasing and needless concessions to the communists threaten the entire world with a totalitarian yoke. The rapidity of the West's retreat before communism is particularly disturbing to Solzhenitsyn, considering the healing process which is occurring at present in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. This healing needs time, which the West's headlong retreat does not allow for.[105]

In Solzhenitsyn's view, the most reprehensible aspect of *"détente,"* as it is currently practiced by the West, is the suicidal propping up of the Soviet Union's economy. "Our whole slave system," he stresses, "depends on your economic assistance." American trade permits the Soviets to concentrate on armaments and preparations for war; without it, the USSR would have to devote considerably more of its resources to feeding, clothing and housing its own people. "Stop sending goods," he urges. "Let them stand on their own feet, and see what happens."[106] Solzhenitsyn reminded his listeners that Lenin "always said that the Western capitalists would do anything to strengthen the economy of the USSR."[107]

While he has more than a few reservations about *détente* as it is currently practiced, Solzhenitsyn insists that he is, nevertheless, a proponent of "true *détente.*" Since the word "*détente*" has become so debased, however, he feels that perhaps a new term should be coined for what he advocates. True *détente* is distinguished from false *détente* in three ways: (1) it demands a relaxation of internal repression as well as external disarmament; (2) it is built on "stone," not sand, i.e. each side is subject to independent domestic controls, such as a free press and free parliament; (3) neither side engages in "ideological warfare" against the other.[108]

In his speeches, Solzhenitsyn frequently warned his American hosts against employing *détente* as a kind of isolationist soporific: "We already hear voices in your country and in the West: 'Give up Korea, and we will live quietly. Give up Portugal, of course; give up Japan, give up Israel, give up Taiwan, the Philippines, Malaysia, Thailand, give up 10 more African countries. Just let us live in peace and quiet. Just let us drive our big cars on our splendid highways; just let us play tennis and golf in peace and quiet; just let us mix our cocktails in peace and quiet, as we are accustomed to doing; just let us see the beautiful toothy smile with glass in hand on every advertisement page of our magazines.'"[109]

[104] Ibid., p. 5.
[105] Ibid.
[106] *The New York Times,* 10 July 1975, p. 31.
[107] *Russkaya Mysl,* 17 July 1975, p. 3.
[108] Ibid., p. 5.
[109] Ibid., p. 4.

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Solzhenitsyn has also sought to puncture the arguments employed by those who preach non-involvement in the rest of the world:

> "It is impossible to protect those who do not have the will to defend themselves." I agree with that, but this was said about South Vietnam. In half of today's Europe and three-quarters of today's world, the will to defend oneself is even less than it was in South Vietnam. We are told: "We cannot defend those who are unable to defend themselves with their own human resources." But no country can defend itself with its own resources against the overwhelming powers of totalitarianism, when all of this power is thrown against a country. Japan, for instance, does not have a standing army. We are told: "We should not protect those who do not have full democracy." . . . This is the *Leitmotiv* which I hear in your newspapers and in the speeches of some of your political leaders. Who in the world, ever, on the front line of defence against totalitarianism, has been able to sustain full democracy? *You* . . . were not able to sustain it. At the first threat of Hitlerism, you stretched out your hands to Stalin.[110]

Throughout his American tour, Solzhenitsyn repeatedly wondered out loud whether he could conceivably alert "a prosperous American society" to the "dread reality" of totalitarian expansion and the speciousness of false *détente*.[111] Would not Americans prefer to take temporary and illusory refuge in their own material well-being, seeking to wall themselves off from the rest of the world behind their own proud skyscrapers? In any case, as he told the 24 US senators who gathered to hear him on 15 July, "I have done what I was obliged to do and what I could."[112]

[110] Ibid.
[111] *Novoe Russkoe Slovo*, 19 July 1975, p. 1.
[112] Ibid.

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Survivors from Utopia

Michael Heller

THE anthology *Iz Pod Glyb* (*From Under the Rubble*) is without question the most important document to originate from the Soviet opposition. Its appearance has not, however, aroused as much interest as its authors had hoped. The ideas, thoughts and opinions set forth in the 11 articles which form the book made, to put it mildly, an unfavourable impression on the Western intelligentsia because of their " conservatism," " religiosity," " nationalism " and " patriotism." Amongst Soviet " dissidents " and émigrés, the anthology has sparked off debates on points of minor importance. Perhaps, though, there has been a misunderstanding.

From Under the Rubble is indisputably an extremely important document, mainly because it is the first alternative programme to the official ideology to emerge: a complete, comprehensive programme. It expresses, furthermore, the views which have formed around the person of Alexander Solzhenitsyn. The author of *The Gulag Archipelago* has rallied around himself six other writers so that he can proclaim: I am not alone, I am the spokesman for an entire spiritual movement. It must be stressed, however, that if the other authors of the anthology have been influenced by Solzhenitsyn's views, he, in turn, has undoubtedly been influenced by theirs: they have, to a certain extent, helped him to form many of his own ideas. However, the main significance of *From Under the Rubble* lies in the fact that this alternative opposition programme is a product of Soviet society, a product of the effect of that society on those of its members who reject it.

The most interesting feature of *From Under the Rubble* is not the ideas, thoughts and opinions expressed in it *per se*, but the transformation they have undergone in Soviet society.

Ostap Bender, the comic hero of the novels of Ilf and Petrov, was somewhat surprised to discover that there was a column of air weighing 300 kilogrammes pressing down upon all citizens alike, including members of trade unions. Alexander Solzhenitsyn knows this better than anyone else. At the very beginning of his first article, with which the anthology opens, he warns: " the stereotypes of required thought, or rather of dictated opinion, dinned into us daily from the electrified gullets of radio, reproduced in thousands of newspapers as alike as peas, condensed into weekly surveys for political study groups, have made cripples of us all and left very few minds undamaged. . . ." " Very few," writes Solzhenitsyn. Perhaps he should have written " none at all." . . .

Before the revolution, Maximilian Voloshin wrote of the Russian *intelligent:*

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We remember him . . . A precisely printed negative
Of the autocratic profile: a lump
Where the fist should be, instead of the bayonet—a hole,
In place of assertion, denial,
Reversal of all ideas and feelings. . .

The same could be said of Soviet dissidents, and with a good deal more justification, because one simply cannot compare the degree of ideological pressure in the days of the tsarist autocracy with the degree to which the " stereotypes of dictated opinion " are foisted upon people under the Soviet autocracy.

The text of the articles in *From Under the Rubble* leaves one in no doubt as to the source of their inspiration: the *Vekhi* anthology, published in 1909, and a collection of articles called *From the Deep* (*Iz Glubiny*), written in 1918. Solzhenitsyn himself referred directly to *Vekhi* at his press conference, as if to emphasise that he and his co-authors were continuing the debate on the fortunes of Russia begun 70 years earlier.

It would be very interesting to trace the transformation which the ideas formulated by P. Struve, S. Bulgakov, N. Berdyayev, L. Shestov and the other *Vekhi* authors have undergone after 60 years of Soviet power. However, another source for some of the articles published in *From Under the Rubble* caught my attention: the book *The Journey of My Brother Alexei to the Land of the Peasant Utopia* by Ivan Kremnev, which came out in Moscow in 1920. I do not know whether the authors of *From Under the Rubble* are familiar with Kremnev's book. Solzhenitsyn mentions its author, Alexander Chayanov (Kremnev was a pseudonym), in the first volume of *The Gulag Archipelago*, and gives a not entirely accurate biographical sketch. But familiarity or otherwise with Kremnev's book does not alter the essential fact that both it and *From Under the Rubble* express similar views on the future.

Aldous Huxley wrote that all prophecies are interesting chiefly by virtue of the fact that they shed light on the age in which they were made. He maintained that our ideas about the future have the same significance that Freud attributed to our desires, that is, as an expression of our contemporary hopes and fears. The study of ideas about the future is particularly interesting because, as the Russian literary historian P. Sakulin observed as early as 1912, " the appearance of Utopias is symptomatic of the approach of a crisis."

The history of Soviet Utopian literature bears out this observation: Utopias have appeared in 1920 and in 1956. The latest one has now been published in *From Under the Rubble*. Solzhenitsyn's *Letter to the Soviet Leaders* was a Utopia, if we define a Utopia as a blueprint for an ideal state (or a state approximating as nearly as possible to the ideal). The author of the *Letter*, however, sees Utopia simply as a fantasy, an unrealizable dream, and would, of course, reject any

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attempt to describe his own blueprint as Utopian. *From Under the Rubble* is imbued with contradictions. Solzhenitsyn has objected very strongly to members of the opposition writing under pseudonyms: the anthology includes two such articles. Solzhenitsyn disapproves of emigration: one contributor to the anthology has applied for permission to emigrate. Solzhenitsyn speaks scornfully of "Utopias": in *From Under the Rubble,* the second part of M. Agursky's article is the latest Soviet Utopia. Look at its title: "A Socio-economic System for the Future." Agursky's article, and also Igor Shafarevich's contribution, "Socialism," a critique of Utopianism, which the writer identifies with socialism, contains views very similar indeed to those of Chayanov.

The Journey of My Brother Alexei to the Land of the Peasant Utopia was the first attempt to conjecture about the future, to express certain hopes and fears. "A Socio-economic System for the Future" is the most recent attempt, and is made half a century later. The similarity between them, with characteristic modifications and transformations, cannot fail to strike one.

Chayanov was an eminent specialist in problems of agricultural economics and a prominent figure in the Russian cooperative movement. After the revolution, he advocated the setting up of peasant cooperative societies, which he regarded as the only way to boost Soviet agriculture. When collectivization, the "liquidation of the kulaks," was begun in the Soviet Union in 1929, Chayanov was arrested and charged with having founded a Peasant Labour Party. The charges brought against him appear in the first edition of the Small Soviet Encyclopaedia: "Chayanov organized acts of sabotage and propounded theories which were outwardly adapted to the tasks of Socialist construction, but in essence were aimed at its disruption." These "theories which were outwardly adapted to the tasks of socialist construction," and which were the cause of Chayanov's downfall, are expounded in his only work of fiction, *The Journey of My Brother Alexei to the Land of the Peasant Utopia.* In a foreword to the book, P. Orlovsky (the pseudonym of the distinguished communist literary critic and later Soviet diplomat V. Vorovsky) explains why Kremnev's Utopia is being published despite the erroneousness of the author's views:

> We are publishing it so that every working man, and, in particular, every peasant who takes a thoughtful attitude towards the great upheaval we are living through, should know how people who think differently from us see the future, so that he can develop a critical and intelligent attitude towards the arguments of the enemy.

This noble desire to allow the workers and peasants to acquaint themselves with the ideas of "people who think differently from us," and to give them the opportunity to "develop a critical and intelligent attitude towards the arguments of the enemy" was short-lived. The

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thoughts of Evgeny Zamyatin on the future, which he set forth in his novel *We*, written at about the same time as Chayanov's book, were not permitted to reach the reading public: *We* was banned by the censorship.

Despite all the differences between the thoughts of a scholarly economist about the future of Russia expounded in semi-fictional form and a major work of literature whose true worth has still not been fully appreciated, there is an inward kinship between Chayanov's book and Zamyatin's novel. Both are based on a common assumption: the inevitability in Russia of war between town and country. The main difference lies in what the two writers see as the outcome of the war.

The history of the Sole State described by Zamyatin begins with a 200-year war against the countryside and the victory of the town: "A muffled wailing: they are driving people into the town in drab, interminable herds, so as to save them by force and teach them happiness." The history of the state which Chayanov describes begins with the victory of the countryside. Chayanov and Zamyatin are, as it were, analysing two possible versions of the future development of Russia, of the whole world: one resulting from the victory of the town, the other from the victory of the countryside. Chayanov, to use Zamyatin's expression, has written a social fantasy with a plus sign—a Utopia—and Zamyatin a social fantasy with a minus sign—an anti-Utopia.

Zamyatin predicts that the victory of the town will lead to the creation of a soulless, inhuman, totalitarian Sole State. The victory of the country, according to Chayanov, leads to exactly the opposite.

The action in Chayanov's book takes place in 1984, the year which Orwell chose for his anti-Utopia, and the year until which, according to Amalrik's prediction, the Soviet Union will not survive. By now, comparatively little time remains until we shall be able to verify whether 1984 really will be a turning-point in world history. At any rate, Chayanov was the first to sense its mystic properties. In his novel, 67 years have passed since the October revolution. During that time, writes Chayanov, astonishing things have happened in Russia. Exploiting the quarrels between right and left Bolshevik factions, peasant leaders secured equal electoral rights for workers and peasants (under the 1918 constitution, the worker had five votes to the peasant's one), and then seized power in the soviets by parliamentary means. In 1932, power is firmly in the hands of the peasant party. A decree is passed authorizing the destruction of the towns. In 1937, the towns make a last attempt to regain a political role; they organize an uprising, are defeated, and "dissolve in the peasant sea."

Replying to the question put by Alexei Kremnev, the communist of 1919 who is transported by some mysterious means into the future, his interlocutor, a peasant leader of 1984, says: "You ask about the new principles which peasant power has introduced into our social and economic life. As a matter of fact, we had no need of any new prin-

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ciples at all; our task consisted in affirming the age-old principles which have served as the basis of the peasant economy from time immemorial."

The astonishing coincidence of views between Chayanov and the authors of *From Under the Rubble* is particularly striking in certain respects. First and foremost, they share a simultaneous rejection of socialism and capitalism, and a desire to find a special road for Russia to take. Chayanov writes: "Socialism was conceived as the antithesis of capitalism; born in the torture-chambers of the German capitalist factory, matured by the psychology of an urban proletariat exhausted by compulsory labour, and by generations that had utterly lost the habit of individual creative work and thought, it could see the ideal order only in terms of negation of the existing order." Agursky writes: "Both systems [capitalism and socialism. M.H.] are profoundly corrupt and are dragging mankind headlong towards catastrophe. . . ." Chayanov writes: "When the worker constructed his ideology, being a mercenary, he made mercenariness the creed of the future order and created an economic system in which all were executives and only a handful of individuals had the right to be creative." He is echoed by Agursky: "We should relinquish entirely the utterly obsolete notion (which, anyway, was never correct) that the workers are some kind of leaders of society whose ideology has turned out to be merely a convenient screen for the setting up of totalitarian regimes by small groups of intellectuals."

The peasant regime has destroyed the towns. Solzhenitsyn calls them "cancerous tumours." In his *Letter to the Soviet Leaders* he nostalgically recalls towns as they were before the advent of the motor-car, "towns made for people, horses, dogs—and the trams too . . . a garden to almost every house. . . ." In Chayanov we read: "The stone masses which once obscured the horizon vanished. . . . Then everything round about was swathed in gardens. . . . The whole expanse was filled with clumps of spreading trees, almost to the Kremlin itself. . . ." This is Moscow the garden-city, the garden-village, in the year 1984.

For Chayanov, the basis of the future economy is a return to the principles of ancient *Rus:* "the individual peasant farm . . . where man is pitted against nature, and labour comes into creative contact with all the forces of the cosmos and creates new forms of existence. Every worker is a creator, every manifestation of his individuality an example of the art of labour." In his *Letter to the Soviet Leaders*, Solzhenitsyn points to what he regards as the main reason why "our ideological agriculture" has by now become "the laughing-stock of the whole world": it is because the peasants-turned-collective farmers have no "interest or faith in their work."

Chayanov regards neither capitalism nor socialism as the sole means of saving Russia; for him, the road to salvation is through cooperative

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societies. In the final analysis, this is also the sum total of Solzhenitsyn's thought: "An economy of non-giantism, with small-scale, though highly-developed, technology," and it is echoed by Agursky: "The economy of a future society must base itself upon the fragmentation of industry, but it must also be based upon technological progress."

Solzhenitsyn muses: "Many provincial towns . . . were important cultural centres *in their own right*." By 1984, the village has regained its former prominence; "higher forms of culture, with mankind living in scattered rural settlements, have developed."

Turning to the state system, we find yet another remarkable coincidence of views. "Our regime," says the 1984 activist, "is a *soviet* regime, a regime of peasant soviets. On the one hand, this is a legacy from the socialist period of our history, but on the other, it has a good many valuable aspects." In *Letter to the Soviet Leaders* we read: "Would it still be within the bounds of realism, or a lapse into day-dreams, if we were to propose that at least some of the real power of the *soviets* be restored? I do not know what can be said on the subject of our constitution; from 1936, it has not been observed for a single day, and, for that reason, does not appear to be viable. But perhaps even the constitution is not beyond all hope? "

Finally, the Russia of 1984 and the Soviet Union of 1974 resemble one another in that they both have a socialist enemy. In the first case, the enemy is a socialist Germany; in the second, a socialist China: in both instances, socialist states which harbour hostile intentions towards Russia. Chayanov's book even ends with Germany attacking Russia, but the war ends in a lightning victory for the Russians.

The amazing similarity between the hopes and fears of 1920 and those of 1974 appears, at first sight, to be cancelled out by the gap of the five decades which have passed between these two dates. Those decades have not gone by without leaving their mark. It is their effect which must provide the explanation for the differences between these two Utopias half a century apart.

The first difference is that the authors of *From Under the Rubble* make religion the basis of their *Weltanschauung*, whereas it plays no role at all in Chayanov's book. Solzhenitsyn sees "a strong moral foundation" in "Christian Orthodoxy, the ancient, seven-centuries-old Orthodoxy . . ."; Agursky regards "religious revival" as the main force in the struggle against totalitarianism; and Shafarevich considers atheism, "the hatred of socialist states for religion," as one of the most important flaws in the socialist doctrine. In Chayanov's Russia of 1984, the ancient icons and churches are reverently preserved, and bell-ringing recitals are held on holidays, but it is all done for aesthetic, rather than religious, reasons. The people of 1984, "not being adherents of the monistic school of thought, interpretation and action . . . possessed a consciousness capable of accommodating a pluralistic conception of the world." For the people of 1974, this is considerably

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more difficult. In one of the articles in *From Under the Rubble*, we even come across the assertion that " Orthodoxy is the one sole truth."

A second difference lies in their attitude to the state and to coercion. Chayanov, writing in the period of war communism, when the state which, theoretically, was supposed to be on the point of withering away was using force and coercion against its citizens, paints quite a different picture of the future to that contained in *From Under the Rubble*. The " epoch of state collectivism, when the ideologists of the working class had been putting their ideals into practice on the land, using the methods of enlightened absolutism," has been left far behind. The peasants, in coming to power, " tried to conquer the world by the inner strength of their cause and their organization, by the technological superiority of their organizational concepts, not by smashing in the faces of anyone who thought differently."

The old forms of the state are so indistinguishable in 1984 that the " popular masses, drawn into state creativity," set up the most unexpected varieties of government: " In the Yakutsk region we have parliamentarism, while in Uglich those who love the monarchy have instituted an ' apanage prince '—to be sure, restricted by the power of the local soviet—and the Mongol-Altai territory is being personally ruled over by a ' governor-general ' from the central power."

Chayanov summarises his attitude towards state power in the future through the mouth of one of his characters: " We regard the state as one of the obsolete modes of social organization, and nine-tenths of our work is carried on by public methods. . . ."

Six decades of Soviet power have taught the authors of *From Under the Rubble* to take a different view of the state. They do not believe that a relaxation of state power or democracy are possible. In *Letter to the Soviet Leaders*, Solzhenitsyn writes: " Over the last half-century, Russia's preparedness for democracy, for a multi-party parliamentary system, can only have diminished. I am inclined to think that its sudden re-introduction now would merely be a melancholy repetition of 1917." Proceeding from this, Agursky, asserting that " the society of the future must be a democratic one," and proposing " a high level of economic and political decentralization," feels a special need to dwell at length on the problem of control, which, he stresses, will not be totalitarian by nature.

The basis of the future society, as Agursky imagines it, will be " spiritual and moral values." These values will produce a " high level of self-discipline " which will be, as it were, a counterbalance to democracy. But the author of this Utopia, nevertheless, proposes the establishment of " public control of the mass information media," and of " the censorship of mass information." He emphasises, insists even: " Censorship of mass information is absolutely essential," adding, to be sure, that it " must be implemented not by bureaucratic organizations, but by elected individuals."

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I have already mentioned the contradictions inherent in *From Under the Rubble*. Here we have yet another one. In his lengthy article "Socialism," Igor Shafarevich accuses the authors of all Utopias, beginning with Plato, whom he calls the author of "the first socialist system," of devoting a great deal of space to "a carefully thought out description of the methods by which a society subordinates the personalities of its members to itself." But a few dozen pages further on, Agursky not only describes in detail a system of censorship, but even reminds us that "many other democratic freedoms [as well as freedom of speech. M. H.] are becoming their exact opposites." He lists the freedoms which he believes must somehow be restricted: the freedom to procure arms, but also the freedom to strike, which Agursky regards as "one of the main sources of inflation." What is most surprising of all is that Agursky sees a danger in "freedom of movement within the country, and freedom of entry into and exit from it." This freedom, he claims, "can easily be exploited by criminals or for espionage by a hostile totalitarian state, and so on."

A third and final difference between Chayanov's Utopia and *From Under the Rubble* lies in their attitudes to the question of nationalism. Both books affirm the necessity for Russia to isolate herself from the world. But the passion with which the authors of *From Under the Rubble* speak of a revival of Russian national feeling is in sharp contrast to the quiet confidence of Chayanov, who did not suspect that Bolshevik ideology would become a threat to Russian national awareness.

The importance of the programme for the future outlined in *From Under the Rubble* is that it expresses the hopes and fears of Soviet society. The "land of Inonia" was a dream dreamed not only during the first years of the revolution. In 1943, when there was already a feeling that the war was drawing to an end, Alexei Tolstoy wrote in his diary: "What will become of Russia? We shall spend the next ten years restoring our cities and farms. After peace comes, there will be a NEP which will be totally different from the previous NEP. The essence of this NEP will be the preservation of the principles of the collective farm system, with the state taking charge of all means of production and large-scale commerce. But the opportunity for private initiative will be opened up, and it will not conflict with the fundamentals of our legislation or our state system, but will complement and enrich them. There will be a protracted struggle between the old forms of the bureaucratic *apparat* and the new type of civil servant promoted by life itself. The new civil servants will win. A people which has returned from war will be afraid of nothing. They will be demanding and enterprising. Trades and all kinds of artels will flourish as they struggle to sell their products. . . . All eyes will turn and fasten on Russia, attracted by the very fact of her growth and prosperity."

It is difficult not to notice in this programme a similarity with some

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of the thoughts expressed by Solzhenitsyn and Agursky on the subject of the reform of the Soviet national economy: the retention of collective farms, but only "as a basis," that is, the toleration of private farming and the encouragement of initiative; the development of trades and artels, that is, the fragmentation of industry; and the toleration of competition, which Alexei Tolstoy calls the struggle to sell one's product. But the similarity between Alexei Tolstoy's dreams and the Russia of 1984 described by Chayanov is indisputable.

Both Chayanov and Alexei Tolstoy say little about the spiritual foundations of the future Russia. That staunchest of communists, Evgeny Petrov (Ilya Ilf's co-author), writes about them in his unfinished novel *Journey to the Land of Communism*. He maintains that in the communist Russia of the future, which he places in 1963, "the old Christian morality, which had been poisoned by monetary relations and economic inequality, was purified and became a reality."

From Under the Rubble brings together all the traditional Russian dreams and aspirations, endowing in addition the Orthodox religion with a dominant role in the spiritual life of the people, and insisting on the strict control of citizens' morality. It sharply and categorically rejects Marxism, thereby creating a programme whose attractiveness for the Soviet Union can scarcely be doubted.

THE publication of *From Under the Rubble* did not provoke any serious pertinent arguments, that is, arguments about the future. One question which did arise concerned the present: emigration from the Soviet Union and whether emigration is permissible. One might think it strange in the 1970s to dispute a man's right to live wherever he pleases, but Solzhenitsyn, Shafarevich and other contributors to the anthology equate leaving the Soviet Union—and they have in mind above all the emigration of dissident writers, artists, musicians, and cultural figures—with desertion.

One of the first Russian émigrés, Vladimir Pecherin, who left Russia about 140 years ago, wrote: "I fled from Russia as people flee from a plague-stricken city. There is no reason to stop and think, the plague spares no-one, especially people with a delicate constitution. And I had a premonition: I foresaw that if I remained in Russia, with my weak and gentle nature, I would most certainly become the vilest of loyal servants—or end up for no reason at all in Siberia. I fled without turning my head, in order to preserve my human dignity." We might add in parenthesis that the truth of this dilemma has been very recently borne out by the trial of the unfortunate Maramzin. But Solzhenitsyn and his friends assert that sacrifice, death even, is better than flight. They assert, to take Pecherin's image, that it is imperative that one should stay and fight the plague, and not flee from the stricken city, leaving one's fellow-citizens to die there. Certainly, such

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noble and heroic behaviour would merit nothing but admiration, had it not been upheld as a law, a compulsory, universally binding rule.

The idea of emigration as flight from Russia was engendered by Russia's isolation and, in turn, engenders that very isolation. The idea itself is a very old one. But it is only in the Soviet Union that it has become a most important element of official ideology. The belief that emigration is betrayal of the fatherland, that it is impossible to live or work outside one's native land, is hammered into the heads of Soviet citizens from their very earliest years. This is understandable: the conviction that one cannot escape from prison, strengthened by the certitude that there is no life outside the prison walls, keeps people in confinement better than any lock and key—though these methods are, of course, also used.

The best evidence of the disastrous effects of emigration was supposed to have been furnished by literature. For many years, the flowering of literature on native, Soviet soil was contrasted with the total loss of creative powers allegedly suffered by Russian émigré writers. Even when decisions have been made, in the words of Nadezhda Mandelstam, to "adopt" certain émigré writers, this has always been done, and still is being done, on the pretext that the writers have returned—in spirit—to their native land, that is, that they have confessed their errors and repented. If no such repentence exists, it is invented.

I do not know whether to expose the myth of the barrenness of Russian writers away from their native land was one of the intentions of a group of researchers led by Professor Jean Bonamour, who have begun publishing a series called *Russian Writers in France*. Bibliographies of the works of N. Berdyayev, A. Remizov and I. Shmelev have already been prepared. The first volume to be published contains a bibliography of Mikhail Ossorgin, the second a bibliography of Lev Shestov. Evidently, it is pure coincidence that the first two volumes in this series have been devoted to a writer and a philosopher who were both exiled from Russia at the same time as part of the large group of writers, philosophers, lawyers and historians expelled in 1922. But this coincidence has taken on a symbolic meaning. It was in 1922 that the young Soviet republic, after having brought the civil war to a triumphant conclusion, resolved to clear the ground for a forthcoming ideological attack on the minds of Soviet citizens. The prophet armed (though he was not long to remain so), Trotsky, in his article "Dictatorship, where is thy Whip?", called for the Soviet Union to be purged of dissidents. Lenin did not doubt the need for such a purge, and after a short discussion on the various methods of "purging," a "liberal" one was selected—exile.

It all sounds as though it happened in the very recent past: "He often said that the time would come . . . when we would finally re-unite the literature which had grown up on either side of the frontiers of

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autocratic Russia, when we would at last be able to study it in its entirety, as a single whole, and would take serious note of the fact that many authors had been obliged, willy-nilly, to publish abroad." It all sounds like the very recent past. The man who dreamed thus of re-uniting Russian literature was Vladimir Ilyich Lenin, and he was sharing his dream with V. Bonch-Bruyevich. "And that time did come!" Bonch-Bruyevich commented in his reminiscences of the Leader's dream. It came after October 1917. But immediately a section of Russian writers refused to recognize the new regime and emigrated. In 1922, those who did not wish to emigrate but wanted to think and write freely were exiled. The "dreamer in the Kremlin," as H. G. Wells elegiacally called Lenin, soon abandoned his dreaming. Once again, Russian literature was divided.

The plan—and it is interesting that it occurred to two former émigrés, Lenin and Trotsky—was to "purge" the young republic, the workers' fatherland, of dissidents and save it from temptation; to tear the dissidents up by their roots and throw them out into the contemptible West, where they would surely atrophy and perish.

From this point of view, the bibliographies of Ossorgin and Lev Shestov are remarkably interesting, each reading like the fascinating history of a difficult but fruitful life. The bibliography of Mikhail Ossorgin, the writer and journalist, and eternal rebel, was prepared under the direction of Tatiana Ossorgina, who is also the editor of other volumes in the series. We learn from it that Ossorgin was banished from his native land at the age of 44. However, in the 20 years Ossorgin spent abroad he wrote far more than he had written during the whole of his time in Russia—part of which, incidentally, he also spent in exile as an enemy of the tsarist autocracy. Reading the bibliography of Ossorgin, a considerable part of which is taken up with articles which he published in the periodical press, one can see that this talented novelist was profoundly distressed by the need to resort to writing for newspapers and magazines to earn his daily bread. But today, merely glancing through the titles of his articles which often reveal a particular theme or topic of analysis, we cannot but marvel at the rich source material they constitute for the researcher into Soviet literature and Soviet history. An attentive, shrewd and objective observer, Mikhail Ossorgin has left a legacy, the great value of which has become apparent only now, after the publication of the bibliography of his works.

Lev Shestov, one of the greatest Russian philosophers, was 56 when he was exiled. He spent 16 years in emigration and during that time wrote a number of his most important works.

The bibliographies of Ossorgin and Shestov bear witness to the fact that at least one of the aims pursued in expelling dissidents has not been achieved: although uprooted, they continued to live and to create. But another aim *was* achieved: their works have remained

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unknown in their native land and thus the myth that emigration is fatal lives on.

One early work by Lev Shestov is called *An Apotheosis of Groundlessness. An Attempt at Adogmatic Thinking.* Perhaps it is this, the ability to think adogmatically, that is so lacking in Soviet citizens and former Soviet citizens. Biologists claim that the absence of just one vitamin, even if all the others are present, disturbs the normal functioning of the organism. Is not adogmatic thought the most important of those vitamins which ensure the organism's viability?

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Document: Czechoslovakia:

Letter to Dr Gustav Husak, General Secretary of the Czechoslovak Communist Party

Václav Havel

Dear Dr Husak,

In our offices and factories work goes on, discipline prevails. The efforts of our citizens are yielding visible results in a slowly rising standard of living: people build houses, buy cars, have children, amuse themselves, live their lives.

All this, of course, amounts to very little as a criterion for the success or failure of your policy. After every social upheaval, people invariably come back in the end to their daily labours, for the simple reason that they want to stay alive; they do so for their own sake, after all, not for the sake of this or that team of political leaders.

Not that going to work, doing the shopping and living their own lives is by any means all that people do. They do much more than that: they commit themselves to numerous output norms which they then fulfil and over-fulfil; they vote as one man and unanimously elect the candidates proposed to them; they are active in various political organizations; they attend meetings and demonstrations; they declare their support for everything they are supposed to. Nowhere can any sign of dissent be seen from anything that the government does.

These facts, of course, are not to be made light of. One must ask seriously, at this point, whether all this does not confirm your success in achieving the tasks your team set itself—those of winning the public's support and consolidating the situation in the country?

The answer must depend on what we mean by consolidation.

In so far as it is to be measured solely by statistical returns of various kinds, by official statements and police accounts of the public's political involvement, and so forth, then we can certainly hardly feel any doubt that consolidation has been achieved.

But what if we take consolidation to mean something more, a genuine state of mind in society? Supposing we start to inquire after more durable, perhaps subtler and more imponderable, but none the less significant factors, i.e. what lies hidden behind all the figures by way of genuine personal, human experience? Supposing we ask, for example, what has been done for the moral and spiritual revival of society, for the enhancement of the truly human dimensions of life, for the elevation of man to a higher degree of dignity, for his truly free and authentic assertion in this world? What do we find when we thus turn our attention from the mere set of outward manifestations to their inner causes and consequences, their connections and meanings, in a word, to that less obvious plane of reality where those manifestations

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might actually acquire a general human meaning? Can we, even then, consider our society " consolidated? "

I make so bold as to answer, No; to assert that, for all the outwardly appealing facts, inwardly our society, far from being a consolidated one, is, on the contrary, plunging ever deeper into a crisis more dangerous, in some respects, than any we can recall in our recent history.

I shall try to justify this assertion.

THE basic question one must ask is this: *why* are people in fact behaving in the way they do? Why do they do all these things that, taken together, form the impressive image of a totally united society giving total support to its government? For any unprejudiced observer, the answer is, I think, self-evident: they are driven to it by *fear*.

For fear of losing his job, the schoolmaster teaches things he does not believe; fearing for his future, the pupil repeats them after him; for fear of not being allowed to continue his studies, the young man joins the Youth League and participates in whatever of its activities are necessary; fear that, under the monstrous system of political credits, his son or daughter will not acquire the necessary total of points for enrolment at a school leads the father to take on all manner of responsibilities and " voluntarily " to do everything required. Fear of the consequences of refusal leads people to take part in elections, to vote for the proposed candidates and to pretend that they regard such ceremonies as genuine elections; out of fear for their livelihood, position or prospects, they go to meetings, vote for every resolution they have to, or at least keep silent: it is fear that carries them through sundry humiliating acts of self-criticism and penitence and the dishonest filling out of a mass of degrading questionnaires; fear that someone might inform against them prevents them from giving public, and often even private, expression to their true opinions. It is the fear of suffering financial reverses and the effort to better themselves and ingratiate themselves with the authorities that in most cases makes working men put their names to " work commitments "; indeed, the same motives often lie behind the establishment of Socialist Labour Brigades, in the clear realization that their chief function is to be mentioned in the appropriate reports to higher levels. Fear causes people to attend all those official celebrations, demonstrations and marches. Fear of being prevented from continuing their work leads many scientists and artists to give allegiance to ideas they do not in fact accept, to write things they do not agree with or know to be false, to join official organizations or to take part in work of whose value they have the lowest opinion, or to distort and mutilate their own works. In the effort to save themselves, many even report others for doing to them what they themselves have been doing to the people they report.

The fear I am speaking of is not, of course, to be taken in the

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ordinary psychological sense as a definite, precise emotion. Most of those we see around us are not quaking like aspen leaves: they wear the faces of confident, self-satisfied citizens. We are concerned with fear in a deeper sense, an ethical sense if you will, namely, the more or less conscious participation in the collective awareness of a permanent and ubiquitous danger; anxiety about what is being, or might be, endangered, becoming gradually used to this threat as a substantive part of the actual world; the increasing degree to which, in an ever more skilful and matter-of-fact way, we go in for various kinds of external adaptation as the only effective method of self-defence.

Naturally, fear is not the only building block in the present social structure.

Nonetheless, it is the main, the fundamental material, without which not even that surface uniformity, discipline and unanimity on which official documents base their assertions about the "consolidated" state of affairs in our country could be attained.

The question arises, of course, what are people actually afraid of? Trials? Torture? Loss of property? Deportations? Executions? Certainly not. The most brutal forms of pressure exerted by the authorities upon the public are, fortunately, past history—at least in our circumstances. Today, oppression takes more subtle and choice forms. And even if political trials do not take place today—everyone knows how the authorities manage to manipulate them—they only represent an extreme threat, while the main thrust has moved into the sphere of existential pressure. Which, of course, leaves the core of the matter largely unchanged.

Notoriously, it is not the absolute value of a threat which counts, so much as its relative value. It is not so much what a man objectively loses, as the subjective importance it has for him on the plane on which he lives, with its own scale of values. Thus, if a man today is afraid, say, of losing the chance of working in his own field, this may be a fear equally strong, and productive of the same reactions, as if—in another historical context—he had been threatened with the confiscation of his property. Indeed, the technique of existential pressure is, in a sense, more universal. For there is no one in our country who is not, in a broad sense, existentially vulnerable. Everyone has something to lose and so everyone has reason to be afraid. The range of things a man can lose is a very wide one, extending from the manifold privileges of the ruling caste and all the special opportunities afforded to the powerful—such as the enjoyment of undisturbed work, advancement and earning power, the ability to work at all in one's field, the chance of higher education—down to the mere possibility of living in that limited degree of legal certainty available to other citizens, instead of finding oneself amongst the special class to whom not even those laws which apply to the rest of the public apply, in other words, among the victims of Czechoslovak political apartheid. Yes, every-

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one has something to lose. The humblest workman's mate can be shifted to an even more lowly and worse paid job. Even he can pay a savage penalty for speaking his mind at a meeting or in the pub.

This system of existential pressure, embracing totally the whole of society and every individual, either as a specific everyday threat or as a general contingency, could not, of course, work effectively if it were not backed up—exactly like the former, more brutal forms of pressure—by its natural hinterland in the power structure, namely, by that force which renders it comprehensive, complex and robust: the ubiquitous, omnipotent state police.

For this is the hideous spider whose invisible web runs right through the whole of society; this is the point-at-infinity where all the lines of fear ultimately intersect; this is the final and irrefutable proof that no citizen can hope to challenge the power of the state. And even if most of the people, most of the time, cannot see this web with their own eyes, nor touch its fibres, even the simplest citizen is well aware of its existence, assumes its silent presence at every moment in every place, and behaves accordingly—behaves, that is, so as to ensure the approval of those hidden eyes and ears. And well does he know the importance of that approval. For the spider can intervene in a man's life without any need to have him in his jaws. There is no need at all for a man actually to be interrogated, charged, brought to trial or sentenced. For his superiors are also ensnared in the same web; and at every level where his fate is decided, there are people collaborating or forced to collaborate with the state police. Thus, the very fact that the state police are in a position to intervene at any time in a man's life, without his having any chance of resisting, suffices to rob his life of some of its naturalness and authenticity and to turn it into a kind of endless dissimulation.

If it is fear which lies behind people's defensive attempts to preserve what they have, it becomes increasingly apparent that the chief impulses for their aggressive efforts to win what they do not yet possess are *selfishness* and *careerism*.

Seldom in recent times, it seems, has a social system offered scope so openly and so brazenly to people willing to support anything at any time, as long as it brings them some advantage; to unprincipled and spineless men, prepared to do anything in their craving for power and personal gain; to born lackeys, ready for any humiliation and willing at all times to sacrifice their neighbours' and their own honour for a chance to ingratiate themselves with those in power.

In view of this, it is not surprising that so many public and influential positions are occupied, more than ever before, by notorious careerists, opportunists, charlatans and men of dubious record; in short, by typical collaborators, men, that is, with a special gift for persuading themselves at every turn that their dirty work is a way of rescuing something, or, at least, of preventing still worse men from stepping into

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their shoes. Nor is it surprising, in these circumstances, that corruption among public employees of all kinds, their willingness quite openly and in any situation to accept bribes and allow themselves shamelessly to be swayed by whatever considerations their various private interests and greed dictate, has reached a level higher than can be recalled during the last decade.

The number of people who sincerely believe everything that the official propaganda says and who selflessly support the government's authority is smaller than it has ever been. But the number of hypocrites rises steadily: up to a point, every citizen is, in fact, forced to be one.

This dispiriting situation has, of course, its logical causes. Seldom in recent times has a regime cared so little for the real attitudes of outwardly loyal citizens or for the sincerity of their statements. It is enough to observe that no one, in the course of all those self-criticisms and acts of penance, really cares whether people mean what they say, or are only considering their own advantages. In fact, one can safely say that the second assumption is made more or less automatically, without anything immoral being seen in this. Indeed, the prospect of personal advantage is used as the main argument in obtaining such statements. No one tries to convince the penitent that he was in error or acted wrongly, but simply, as a rule, that he must repent in order to save himself. At the same time, the benefits he stands to gain are colourfully magnified, while the bitter taste, which will remain after the act of penance, is played down and treated as an illusion.

And if some eccentric who repented in all sincerity and showed it, for example, by refusing the appropriate reward on principle, should turn up, the regime itself would, in all probability, find him an object of suspicion.

It is fair to say that, in a way, we are all being publicly bribed. If you accept this or that office in your place of work—not, of course, as a means of serving your colleagues, but of serving the management—you will be rewarded with such and such privileges. If you join the Youth League, you will be given the right and access to such and such forms of entertainment. If, as a creative artist, you take part in such and such official functions, you will be rewarded with such and such genuine creative opportunities. Think what you like in private, as long as you agree in public, refrain from making difficulties, suppress your interest in truth and silence your conscience—and the doors will be wide open to you.

If the *principle of outward adaptation* is made the keystone to success in society, what sort of human qualities will be encouraged and what sort of people, one may ask, will come to the fore?

SOMEWHERE between the attitude of timid self-defence vis-à-vis the world and that of aggressive eagerness to conquer the world for one's own benefit lies a range of feelings which it would be wrong

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to overlook, because they, too, play a significant role in forming the moral climate of today's " united society ": feelings of *indifference* and everything that goes with them.

It is as if the shocks of recent history, and the kind of system subsequently established in this country, had led people to lose any faith in the future, in the possibility of setting public affairs right, in the sense of any struggle for truth and justice. They shrug off anything that goes beyond their everyday routine concern for their own livelihood; they seek all manner of escape routes; they succumb to apathy, indifference towards impersonal values and their fellow men, to spiritual passivity and depression.

And anyone who still tries to resist by, for instance, refusing to adopt the principle of dissimulation as the key to survival, doubting the value of any self-fulfilment purchased at the cost of self-alienation—such a man appears to his ever more indifferent neighbours as an eccentric, a fool, a Don Quixote, and in the end is regarded inevitably with some aversion, like everyone who behaves differently from the rest and in a way which, moreover, threatens to hold up a critical mirror before their eyes. Or, again, those indifferent neighbours may expel such a man from their midst or shun him as required, for appearances' sake while sympathizing with him in secret or in private, hoping to still their conscience by clandestine approval of a person who acts as they themselves should, but cannot.

Paradoxically, though, this indifference has become a very active social force. For can one deny that it is plain indifference, rather than fear, that brings many to the voting booth, to meetings, to membership of official organizations? Is not the political support for the regime, which seems to be so successfully supplied, to a large degree a mere matter of routine, of habit, of automatism, of laziness, actually backed by nothing but total resignation? Participation in all the political rituals which no one believes in is pointless. Still, at least it does ensure a quiet life—and would it be any less pointless *not* to participate? One would gain nothing, and lose the quiet life into the bargain.

Most people are loth to spend their days in ceaseless conflict with authority, especially when it can only end in the defeat of the isolated individual. So why not do what is required of you? It costs you nothing, and in time you cease to bother about it. It is not worth a moment's thought.

Despair leads to apathy, apathy to conformity, conformity to routine performance—which is then quoted as evidence of " mass political involvement." All this goes to make up the contemporary concept of " normal " behaviour—a concept which is, in essence, deeply pessimistic.

The more completely men abandon any hope of general reform, any interest in impersonal goals and values or any chance of exercising influence in an " outward " direction, the more their energy is diverted

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in the direction of least resistance, i.e. " inwards." People are thinking today far more of themselves, their homes and their families. It is there that they find rest, there that they can forget all the world's folly and freely exercise their creative talents. They fill their homes with all kinds of equipment and pretty things, they try to raise their housing standards, they make life agreeable for themselves, building cottages, looking after their cars, taking more interest in their food and clothing and domestic comfort. In short, they turn their main attention to the material aspects of their private lives.

Clearly, this social orientation has favourable economic results. It encourages improvements in the neglected fields of consumer goods production and public services. It helps to raise the general living standard. Economically regarded, it represents a significant source of dynamic energy, able to succeed, at least partially, in developing society's material wealth, which the inflexible, bureaucratized and unproductive state sector of the economy could hardly ever hope to accomplish. (It is enough to compare state and private house-building as to quantity and quality).

The authorities welcome and support this spill-over of energy into the private sphere.

But why? Because of its favourable effects as a stimulus to economic growth? Certainly, that is one reason. But the whole spirit of current political propaganda and practice, quietly but systematically applauding this " inward " orientation as the very essence of human fulfilment on earth, shows only too clearly why the authorities really welcome this transfer of energy. They see it for what it really is in its psychological origins: an escape from the sphere of public activity.

Rightly divining that such surplus energy, if directed " outward," must sooner or later turn against them—i.e. against the particular forms of power they obstinately cling to—they do not hestitate to represent as human life what is really a desperate substitute for living. In the interest of the smooth management of society, then, society's attention is deliberately diverted from itself, that is, from social concerns. By nailing a man's whole attention to the floor of his mere consumer interests, it is hoped to render him incapable of appreciating the ever-increasing degree of his spiritual, political and moral degradation. Reducing him to a simple vessel for the ideals of a primitive consumer society is supposed to turn him into pliable material for complex manipulation. It is intended to nip in the bud the danger that he might conceive a longing for one of the innumerable, unforeseeable roles which his manhood fits him to play by imprisoning him within the wretched range of parts that he can perform as a consumer, subject to the limitations of a centrally directed market.

All the evidence suggests that the authorities are applying a method quite adequate for dealing with a creature whose only aim is self-preservation. Seeking the path of least resistance, they completely

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ignore the price that must be paid—the harsh assault on human integrity, the brutal castration of the humanity of men.

Yet these same authorities justify themselves with obsessive insistence by their revolutionary ideology, in which the ideal of man's total liberation has a central place! But what, in fact, has happened to the concept of human personality and its many-sided, harmonious and authentic growth? Of man liberated from the clutches of an alienating social machinery, from a mythical hierarchy of values, formalized freedoms, from the dictatorship of property, the fetish and the might of money? What has happened to the idea that a man should live in full enjoyment of social and legal justice, have a creative share in economic and political power, be raised on high in his human dignity and become truly himself? Instead of free economic decision-sharing, free participation in political life and free intellectual advancement, all he is actually offered is a chance freely to choose which washing-machine or refrigerator he wants to buy.

In the foreground, then, stands the imposing façade of great humanistic ideals—and behind it crouches the modest family house of a socialist bourgeois: on the one side, bombastic slogans about the unprecedented increase in every sort of freedom and the unique structural variety of life; on the other side, unprecedented drabness and the squalor of life reduced to a hunt for consumer goods.

SOMEWHERE at the top of the hierarchy of pressures by which man is manipulated into becoming an obedient member of a consumer herd, there stands, as I have hinted, a concealed, omnipotent force: the state police. It is no coincidence, I suppose, that this body should so aptly illustrate the gulf that separates the ideological façade from everyday reality. Anyone who has had the bad luck to experience personally the "work-style" of that institution must be highly amused at the official explanation of its purpose. Does anyone really believe that that shabby swarm of thousands of petty informers, professional narks, complex-ridden, sly, envious, malevolent *petits bourgeois*, and bureaucrats, that malodorous gob of treachery, evasion, fraud, gossip and intrigue "shows the imprint of the working man, guarding the people's government and its revolutionary achievements against its enemies' designs?" For who would be more hostile to a true workers' government—if everything were not upside down—than your *petit bourgeois*, always ready to oblige and sticking at nothing, soothing his arthritic self-esteem by informing on his fellow-citizens, a creature clearly discernible behind the regular procedures of the secret police as the true spiritual author of their "work-style?"

I think it would be hard to explain this whole grotesque contrast between theory and practice, except as a natural consequence of the real mission of the state police today, which is not to protect the free development of man from any assailants, but to protect the assailants

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from the threat which any real attempt at man's free development poses.

The contrast between the revolutionary teachings about the new man and the new morality and the shoddy concept of life as consumer bliss raises the question of why the authorities actually cling so frantically to their ideology. Clearly, only because their ideology, as a conventionalized system of ritual communications, assures them the appearance of legitimacy, continuity and consistency, and acts as a screen of prestige for their pragmatic practice.

The actual aims of this practice do, of course, leave their traces on the official ideology at every point. From the bowels of that infinite mountain of ideological rhetoric by which the authorities ceaselessly try to sway people's minds, and which—as its communication value is nil—the public, for the most part, scarcely notices, there emerges one specific and meaningful message, one realistic piece of advice: " Avoid politics if you can; leave it to us! Just do what we tell you, don't try to have deep thoughts, and don't poke your nose into things that don't concern you! Shut up, do your work, look after yourself—and you'll be all right! "

This advice is heeded. That one needs to make a living is, after all, the one point on which a man can rather easily agree with his government. Why not make good use of it then? Especially as you have no other choice anyway.

WHERE is the whole situation which I have tried to outline here ultimately leading?

What, in other words, is the effect on people of a system based on fear and apathy, a system that drives each man into a fox-hole of purely material existence and offers him deceit as the main form of communication with society? To what level is a society reduced by a policy where the only aim is superficial order and general obedience, regardless of by what means and at what price they have been gained?

It needs little imagination to see that such a situation can only lead towards the gradual erosion of all moral standards, the breakdown of all criteria of decency, and the widespread destruction of confidence in the meaning of any such values as truth, adherence to principles, sincerity, altruism, dignity and honour. Life must needs sink to a biological, vegetable level amidst a demoralization " in depth," stemming from the loss of hope and the loss of the belief that life has a meaning. It can but confront us once more with that tragic aspect of man's status in modern technological civilization marked by a declining awareness of the absolute, and which I propose to call a *crisis of human identity*. For how can the collapse of man's identity be slowed down by a system that so harshly requires a man to be something other than he is?

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Order has been established. At the price of a paralysis of the spirit, a deadening of the heart, and devastation of life.

Surface " consolidation " has been achieved. At the price of a *spiritual and moral crisis in society.*

Unfortunately, the worst feature of this crisis is that it keeps deepening. We only need to raise our sights a little above our limited daily perspective in order to realize with horror how hastily we are all abandoning positions which only yesterday we refused to desert. What social conscience only yesterday regarded as improper is today casually excused; tomorrow it will evidently be thought natural, and the day after be held up as a model of behaviour. What yesterday we declared impossible, or at least averred we would never get accustomed to, today we accept, without astonishment, as a fact of life. And, conversely, things that a little while ago we took for granted we now treat as exceptional: and soon—who knows—we might think of them as unattainable chimeras.

The changes in our assessment of the " natural " and the " normal," the shifts in moral attitudes in our society over the past few years have been greater than they might appear at first glance. As our insensitivity has increased, so naturally our ability to discern our own insensitivity has declined.

The malady has spread, as it were, from the fruit and the foliage to the trunk and roots. The most serious grounds for alarm, then, are the prospects which the present state of affairs opens up for the future.

The main route by which society is inwardly enlarged, enriched and cultivated is that of coming to know itself in ever greater depth, range and subtlety.

The main instrument of *society's self-knowledge* is its *culture*: culture as a specific field of human activity, influencing the general state of mind—albeit often very indirectly—and at the same time continually subject to its influence.

Where total control over society completely suppresses its differentiated inner development, the first thing to be suppressed is regularly its culture: not just " automatically," as a phenomenon intrinsically opposed to the " spirit " of manipulation, but as a matter of deliberate " programming " inspired by justified anxiety lest society be alerted to the extent of its own subjugation through that culture which gives it its self-awareness. It is culture that enables a society to enlarge its liberty and to discover truth—so what appeal can it have for the authorities who are basically concerned with suppressing such values? There is only one kind of truth they recognize: the kind they need at the given moment. And only one kind of liberty; to proclaim that " truth."

A world where " truth " flourishes not in a dialectic climate of genuine knowledge, but in a climate of power motives, is a world of mental sterility, petrified dogmas, rigid and unchangeable creeds leading inevitably to creedless despotism.

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This is a world of prohibitions and limitations and of orders, a world where cultural policy means primarily the operations of the cultural police force.

Much has been said and written about the peculiar degree of devastation which our contemporary culture has reached: about the hundreds of prohibited books and authors and the dozens of liquidated periodicals; about the carving up of publishers' projects and theatre repertoires and the cutting off of all contact with the intellectual community; about the plundering of exhibition halls; about the grotesque range of persecution discrimination practised in this field; about the breaking up of all the former artistic associations and countless scholarly institutes and their replacement by kinds of dummies run by little gangs of aggressive fanatics, notorious careerists, incorrigible cowards and incompetent upstarts anxious to seize their opportunity in the general void. Rather than describe all these things again, I will offer some reflections on those deeper aspects of this state of affairs which are germane to the subject-matter of my letter.

In the first place, however bad the present situation, it still does not mean that culture has ceased to exist altogether. Plays are put on, television programmes go out every day, and even books get published. But this overt and legal cultural activity, taken as a whole, exhibits one basic feature: an overall externalization due to its being estranged in large measure from its proper substance through its *total emasculation as an instrument of human, and so of social, self-awareness.* And whenever, even today, something of incontestably excellent value appears—a superb dramatic performance, let us say, to remain in the sphere of art—then it appears, rather, as a phenomenon to be tolerated because of its subtlety and refinement, and hence, from an official point of view, its relative innocuousness as a contribution to social self-awareness. Yet, even here, no sooner does that contribution begin to be at all keenly perceived than the authorities start instinctively to defend themselves: there are familiar instances where a good actor was banned, by and large, simply for being too good.

But that is not what concerns me at this point. What interests me is how this externalization works in fields where it is possible to describe the human experience of the environment far more explicitly and where the function of promoting social self-awareness is, thus, far more manifestly fulfilled.

I will quote an example. Suppose a literary work, a drama perhaps, undeniably skilful, suggestive, ingenious, meaningful, is published (it does happen from time to time). Whatever the other qualities of the work may be, of one thing we may always be perfectly certain. Whether through censorship or self-censorship, because of the writer's character or his self-deception, as a consequence of resignation or of calculation, it will never stray one inch beyond the taboos of a banal, conventional and, hence, basically fraudulent social consciousness that

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offers and accepts as genuine experience the mere appearance of experience—a concatenation of smooth, hackneyed, superficial trivia of experience; that is, pallid reflections of such aspects of experience as the social consciousness has long since adopted and domesticated. Despite, or, rather, because of this fact, there will always be people who find such a work entertaining, exciting and interesting, although it sheds no light on anything by any flash of real knowledge revealing what was known, expressing what had never been said, or providing new, spontaneous and effective evidence of things hitherto only guessed at. In short, by imitating the real world, such a work, in fact, falsifies the real world. As regards the actual forms this externalization takes, it is no accident that the vat most frequently tapped should be the one which, thanks to its proven harmlessness, enjoys the warmest approval of the authorities in our country, whether bourgeois or proletarian. I refer to the *aesthetics of banality*, safely housed within the four walls of good-natured *petit bourgeois* morality; the sentimental philosophy of kitchen-sink country-bumpkin earthiness, and the provincial *Weltanschauung* based on the belief in its general good naturedness. I refer to the aesthetic doctrine whose keystone is the cult of right-thinking mediocrity, bedded in hoary national self-satisfaction, guided by the principle that everything must be slick, trivial and predigested, and culminating in that false optimism which puts the drabbest interpretation on the dictum that " truth will prevail."

Of works designed to give literary expression to the government's political ideology, there is today—as you must be aware—an extreme scarcity, and those few are clearly, by professional standards, bad ones. This is not merely because there is no one to write them, but also, I am sure, paradoxical as it may appear, because they would not be particularly welcome. For, from the standpoint of actual contemporary attitudes (those of the consumer society, that is), even if such works were available, proved professionally competent and attracted somebody's interest, they would divert too much attention " outwards," rub salt into two many old wounds, provoke—through their general and radical political character—too much general and radical political reaction, thus stirring up too many pools that are supposed to be left as stagnant as possible. What far better suits the real interests of the authorities today is what I have called the aesthetics of banality, which misses the truth much more inconspicuously, acceptably and plausibly, and (since it is naturally far more digestible for the conventional mind) is far better calculated to perform the role accorded to culture in the consumer philosophy: not to excite people with the truth, but to reasure them with lies.

It is this kind of artistic output which has naturally always predominated. But in our country, there had always been some chinks at least through which works which could truthfully be said to convey a more genuine kind of human self-awareness reached the public. The

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road for such works of art was never particularly smooth. They met resistance not only from the authorities, but from easy-going and sluggish conventional attitudes as well. Yet until recently they had always managed in some mysterious way, by devious paths and seldom without delay, to get through to the individual and to society, and so to fulfil the role of culture as the agent of social self-awareness.

This is all that really matters. This is precisely what I take to be really important. And it is also precisely this that the present government—and it can be shown that the achievement is unprecedented since the age of our National Revival—has managed to render almost completely impossible, so complete is the present system of bureaucratic control of culture, so perfect the surveillance of every chink through which some major work might see the light of day, so great the fear of government and the fear of art entertained by that little band of men who have deposited in their own pockets the keys of every door.

You will, of course, appreciate that I am speaking at this moment not of the ample indexes, listing the names of all creative artists subject to a total or partial ban, but of a much worse list—of that "blank index" which includes, *a priori*, everything which might contain the spark of a slightly original thought, perceptive insight, deeper sincerity, unusual idea or suggestive form; I am speaking of that open warrant for the arrest of anything inwardly free and, therefore, in the deepest sense "cultural." I am speaking of the warrant against culture issued by your government.

Once more arises the question which I have been posing from the start. What does it all really mean? Where is it leading? What is it going to do to society?

Once more, I take a particular case. Most of the former cultural periodicals, as we know, have ceased to appear in our country. If any have survived, they have been so *gleichgeschaltet* that they are hardly worth considering.

What has been the effect of that?

At first glance, practically none. The wheels of society continue to go round, even without all those literary, artistic, theatrical, philosophical, historical and other magazines whose number, even while they existed, never measured up to the latent needs of society, but which were around and played their part. How many people today still miss those publications? Only the few tens of thousands of people who subscribed to them—a very small fraction of society.

Yet this loss is infinitely deeper and more significant than might appear from the numbers involved. Its real implications are again, of course, hidden, and can hardly be assessed precisely.

The forcible liquidation of such a journal—a theoretical review concerned with the theatre, say—is not just an impoverishment of its particular readers. It is not even merely a severe blow to theatrical

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culture. It is simultaneously, and above all, the liquidation of a particular organ of society's self-awareness and, hence, an interference, hard to describe in exact terms, in the complex system of circulation, exchange and conversion of nutrients that maintain life in that many-layered organism which is society today; a blow against the natural dynamic of the processes going on within that organism; a disturbance of the balanced interplay of all its various functions, an interplay reflecting the level of complexity reached by society's anatomy. And just as a chronic deficiency of a given vitamin (amounting in quantitative terms only to a negligible fraction of the human diet) can make a man ill, so, in the long run, the loss of a single periodical can cause the social organism much more damage than would appear at first sight. And what if the loss involves not just one periodical, but virtually all?

It is easy to show that the real importance of knowledge, thought and creation is not limited, in the stratified world of a civilized society, to the significance these things have for the particular circle of people who are primarily, directly and, as it were, physically involved with them, whether actively or passively. This is always a small group, especially in the sciences. Yet the knowledge in question, conveyed through however many intermediaries, may in the end affect very profoundly the whole of society, just as politics, including the nuclear threat, physically concerns each one of us, even though most of us have had no experience of the speculations in theoretical physics which led to the manufacture of the atom bomb. That the same holds for non-scientific knowledge is shown by many historic instances of an unprecedented cultural political and moral upsurge throughout society, where the original nucleus of crystallization or catalyst was an act of social self-awareness carried out, and indeed directly and " physically " perceived, only by a quite small and exclusive circle. Even subsequently, that act may have remained outside the apperception of society at large, yet it was still an indispensable condition of its upsurge. For we never know when some inconspicuous spark of knowledge, struck within range of the few brain cells, as it were, specially adapted for the organism's self-awareness, may suddenly light up the road for the whole of society, without society ever realizing, perhaps, how it came to see the road. But that is far from being the whole story. For even those other innumerable flashes of knowledge which never illuminate the path ahead for society as a whole have their deep social importance, if only through the mere fact that *they happened*; that they might have cast light; that in their very occurrence they fulfilled a certain range of society's potentialities—either its creative powers, or simply its liberties; they, too, help to make and maintain a climate of civilization without which none of the more effective flashes could ever occur.

In short, the space within which spiritual self-awareness operates is *indivisible*; the cutting of a single thread must injure the coherence

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of the whole network, and this itself shows the remarkable interdependence of all those fine processes in the social organism that I spoke of, the transcendent importance of each one of them and hence the transcendent destructiveness wrought by its disturbance.

I would not wish to reduce everything to this single and still relatively minor aspect of the probelm. Still, does it not in itself confirm the deeply injurious influence on the general spiritual and moral state of society which the " warrant against culture " already has and will have in future, even though its immediate impact is only on a fairly limited number of heads?

If not a single new Czech novel, of which one could safely say that it enlarges our experience of the world, has appeared in recent years in the bookshops, this will certainly have no public effect. Readers are not going to demonstrate in the streets, and, in the last resort, one finds something to read. But who will dare assess the real significance of this fact for Czech society? Who knows how the gap will affect the spiritual and moral climate of the years to come? How far will it weaken our ability to " know ourselves? " How deeply will such an absence of cultural self-knowledge brand those whose self-knowing begins only today or tomorrow? What mounds of mystification, slowly forming in the general cultural consciousness, will need to be chipped away? How far back will one need to go? Who can tell what people will still find the strength to light new fires of truth, when, how and from what resources, once there has been such thorough wastage not only of the fuel, but of *the very feeling that it can be done*?

A few novels of the kind absent from the bookshops do nevertheless exist: they circulate in manuscript. So, in this respect, the situation is not yet hopeless: it follows from everything I have said that if such a novel went around for years, unknown to all but 20 people, the fact of its existence would still be important. It means something that there is such a book, that it could be written at all, that it is alive in at least one tiny area of the cultural consciousness. But what about the fields in which it is impossible to work, except through the so-called legal channels? How can one estimate the actual extent of the damage already done, and still to be done, by the strangling of every interesting development in the stage and cinema whose role as social stimuli is so specific? How much greater still may be the long-term effect of the vacuum in the humanities and in the theory and practice of the social sciences? Who dares measure the consequences of the violent interruption of the long processes of self-knowledge in ontology, ethics and historiography, dependent as they are on access to the normal circulation of information, ideas, discoveries and values, the public crystallization of attitudes?

The overall question, then, is this: what profound intellectual and moral impotence will the nation suffer tomorrow, following the castration of its culture today?

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I fear that the baneful effects on society will outlast by many years the particular political interests that gave rise to them. So much the more guilty, in the eyes of history, are those who have sacrificed the country's spiritual future for the sake of their power interests today.

JUST as the constant increase of entropy is the basic law of the universe, so it is the basic law of life to be ever more highly structured and to struggle against entropy.

Life rebels against all uniformity and levelling; its aim is not sameness, but variety, the restlessness of transcendence, the adventure of novelty and rebellion against the *status quo*. An essential condition for its enhancement is the secret constantly made manifest.

On the other hand, the essence of authority (whose aim is reduced to protecting its own permanence by forcibly imposing the uniformity of perpetual consent) consists basically in a distrust of all variety, uniqueness and transcendence; in an aversion to everything unknown, impalpable and currently obscure; in a proclivity for the uniform, the identical and the inert; in deep affection for the *status quo*. In it, the mechanical spirit prevails over the vital. The order it strives for is no frank quest for ever higher forms of social self-organization, equivalent to its evolving complexity of structure, but, on the contrary, a decline towards that " state of maximum probability " representing the climax of entrophy. Following *the direction of entropy*, it goes *against the direction of life*.

In a man's life, as we know, there is a moment when the complexity of structure begins suddenly to decline and his path turns in the direction of entropy. This is the moment when he, too, succumbs to the general law of the universe: the moment of death.

Somewhere at the bottom of every political authority which has chosen the path to entropy (and would like to treat the individual as a computer into which any programme can be fed with the assurance that he will carry it out), there lies hidden the *death-principle*. There is an odour of death even in the notion of " order " which such an authority puts into practice and which sees every manifestation of genuine life, every exceptional deed, individual expression, thought, every unusual idea or wish, as a red light signalling Confusion, Chaos and Anarchy.

The entire political practice of the present regime, as I have tried to outline it here step by step, confirms that those concepts which were always crucial for its programme—order, calm, consolidation, " guiding the nation out of its crisis," " halting disruption," " assuaging hot tempers " and so on—have finally acquired the same lethal meaning that they have for every regime committed to " entropy."

True, enough, order prevails: a bureaucratic order of grey monotony that stifles all individuality; of mechanical precision that suppresses

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everything of unique quality; of musty inertia that excludes the transcendant. What prevails is *order without life.*

True enough, the country is calm. Calm as a morgue or a grave, would you not say?

IN a society which is really alive, there is, naturally, always something happening. The interplay of current activities and events, of overt and concealed movement, produces a constant succession of unique situations which provoke further and fresh movement. The mysterious, vital polarity of the continuous and the changing, the regular and the random, the foreseen and the unexpected, has its effect *in the time dimension* and is borne out in the *flow of events.* The more highly structured the life of a society, the more highly structured its time dimension, and the more prominent the element of uniqueness and unrepeatability within that time flow. This, in turn, of course, makes it easier to reflect its sequential character, to represent it, that is, as an irreversible stream of non-interchangeable situations, and so, in retrospect, to understand better whatever is governed by regular laws in society. The richer the life society lives, then, the better it perceives the dimension of social time, *the dimension of history.*

In other words, wherever there is room for social activity, room is created for a social memory as well. Any society that is alive is a society with a *history.*

If the element of continuity and causality is so vitally linked in history with the element of unrepeatability and unpredictability, we may well ask how true history—that inextinguishable source of "chaos," fountainhead of unrest, and slap in the face for law and order—can ever exist in a world ruled by an "entropic" regime.

The answer is plain: it cannot. And, indeed, it does not—on the surface, anyway. Under such a regime, the elimination of life in the proper sense brings social time to a halt, so that history disappears from its purview.

In our own country, too, one has the impression that for some time there has been no history. Slowly but surely, we are losing the sense of time. We begin to forget what happened when, what came earlier and what later, and the feeling that it really doesn't matter overwhelms us. As uniqueness disappears from the flow of events, so does continuity; everything merges into the single grey image of one and the same cycle and we say, "There is nothing happening." Here, too, a deadly order has been imposed: all activity is completely organized and so completely deadened. The deadening of the sense of the time-sequence in society inevitably kills it in private life as well. No longer backed by social history or the history of the individual position within it, private life declines to a prehistoric level where time derives its only rhythm from such events as birth, marriage and death.

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The loss of the sense of social time seems, in every way, to cast society back into the primeval state where, for thousands of years, humanity could get no further in measuring it than by the cosmic and climatic pattern of endlessly repeated annual seasons and the religious rites associated with them.

The gap left by the disquieting dimension of history has, naturally to be filled. So the disorder of real history is replaced by the orderliness of *pseudo-history*, whose author is not the life of society, but an official planner. Instead of events, we are offered non-events; we live from anniversary to anniversary, from celebration to celebration, from parade to parade, from a unanimous congress to unanimous elections and back again; from a Press Day to an Artillery Day and vice versa. It is no coincidence that, thanks to this substitution for history, we are able to review everything that is happening in society, past and future, by simply glancing at the calendar. And the notoriously familiar character of the recurrent rituals makes such information quite as adequate as if we had been present at the events themselves.

What we have, then, is perfect order—but at the cost of reverting to prehistory. Even so, we must enter a caveat: whereas for our ancestors the repeated rituals always had a deep existential meaning, for us they are merely a routine performed for its own sake. The government keeps them going to maintain the impression that history is moving. The public goes through the motions to keep out of trouble.

AN "entropic" regime has one means of increasing the general entropy within its own sphere of influence, namely, by tightening its own central control, rendering itself more monolithic and enclosing society in an ever more comprehensive and impermeable straitjacket for unilinear manipulation. But with every step it takes in this direction, it inevitably *increases its own entropy too.*

In an effort to immobilise the world, it immobilises itself, undermining its own ability to cope with anything new or to resist the natural currents of life. The "entropic" regime is, thus, essentially doomed to become finally the victim of its own lethal principle, and the most vulnerable victim at that, thanks to the absence of any impulse within its own structure that could, as it were, make it face up to itself. Life, by contrast, with its irrepressible urge to oppose entropy, is able all the more successfully and inventively to resist being violated, the faster the violating authority succumbs to its own sclerosis.

In trying to paralyse life, then, the authorities paralyse themselves and, in the long run, incapacitate themselves for paralysing life.

In other words, life may be subjected to a prolonged and thorough process of violation, enfeeblement and anaesthesia. Yet, in the end, it cannot be permanently halted. Albeit quietly, covertly and slowly, it nevertheless goes on. Though it be estranged from itself a thousand times, it always manages in some way to recuperate; however violently

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ravished, it always survives, in the end, the power which ravished it. It cannot be otherwise, in view of the profoundly ambivalent nature of every "entropic" authority, which can only suppress life if there is life to suppress and so, in the last resort, depends for its own existence on life, whereas life in no way depends on it. The only force that can truly destroy life on our planet is the force which knows no compromise: the universal validity of the second law of thermodynamics.

If life cannot be destroyed for good, neither, then, can history be brought entirely to a halt. A secret streamlet trickles on beneath the heavy lid of inertia and pseudo-events, slowly and inconspicuously undercutting it. It may be a long process, but one day it must happen: the lid will no longer hold and will start to crack.

This is the moment when once more something visibly begins to *happen*, something truly new and unique, something unscheduled in the official calendar of "happenings," something that makes us no longer indifferent to what occurs and when—something truly historic, in the sense that *history* again demands to be heard.

BUT how, in our particular circumstances, could it come about that history "demands to be heard?" What does such a prospect really imply?

I am neither historian nor prophet, yet there are some observations touching on the structure of these "moments" which one cannot avoid making.

Where there is, in some degree, open competition for power as the only real guarantee of public control over its exercise and, in the last resort, the only guarantee of free speech, the political authorities must willy-nilly participate in some kind of permanent and overt dialogue with the life of society. They are forced continually to wrestle with all kinds of questions which life puts to them. Where no such competition exists and freedom of speech is, therefore, of necessity sooner or later suppressed—as is the case with every "entropic" regime—the authorities, instead of adapting themselves to life, try to adapt life to themselves. Instead of coping openly and continually with real conflicts, demands and issues, they simply draw a veil over them. Yet somewhere under the lid, these conflicts and demands continue, grow and multiply, only to burst forth when the moment arrives when the lid can no longer hold them down. That is the moment when the dead weight of inertia crumbles and history steps out again into the arena.

And what happens after that?

The authorities are certainly still strong enough to prevent those vital conflicts from issuing in the shape of open discussion or open rivalry for power. But they have no longer the strength to resist this pressure altogether. So life vents itself where it can—in the secret

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corridors of power, where it can insist on *secret discussion* and finally on *secret competition.* For this, of course, the authorities are unprepared: any substantive dialogue with life is outside their range of competence. So they panic. Life sows confusion in their council-chambers in the shape of personal quarrels, intrigues, snares and confrontations; and even infects, as it were, their own representatives: the death mask of impersonality that their officials wore to identify themselves with the monolith of power is suddenly dropped, revealing live people competing for power in the most "human" way and struggling in self-defence, one against the other. This is the notorious moment for palace revolutions and putsches, for sudden and outwardly mystifying changes of portfolio and changes of key points in set speeches, the moment when real or construed conspiracies and secret centres are revealed, the moment when real or imaginary crimes are made known and ancient guilt unearthed, the moment for mutual dismissals from office, mutual denigration and perhaps even arrests and trials. Whereas before every man in authority had spoken the same language, used the same clichés, applauded successful fulfilment of the same targets, now suddenly the monolith of power breaks down into distinguishable persons, still speaking the same language, but using it to make personal attacks on one another. And we learn with astonishment that some of them—those, that is, who lost in the secret struggle for power—had never taken their targets seriously and never successfully fulfilled them—far from it—whereas others—the winners—had really meant what they said and are alone capable of achieving their aims.

The more rational the construction of the official calendar of non-events over the years, the more irrational the effect of a sudden irruption of genuine history. All its long-suppressed elements of unrepeatability, uniqueness and incalculability, all its long-denied mysteries, come rushing through the breach. Where for years we had been denied the slightest, most ordinary surprise, life is now one huge surprise—and it is well worth it. The whole disorderliness of history, concealed under artificial order for years, suddenly spurts out.

How well we know all this! How often we have witnessed it in our part of the world! The machine that worked for years to apparent perfection, faultlessly, without a hitch, falls apart overnight. The system that seemed likely to reign unchanged, world without end, since nothing could call its power in question amid all those unanimous votes and elections, is shattered without warning. And, to our amazement, we find that everything was quite otherwise than we had thought.

The moment when such a tornado whirls through the musty edifice of petrified power-structures is, of course, far from being just a source of amusement for all of us who are outside the ramparts of authority. For we, too, are always involved, albeit indirectly. Is it not the quiet perennial pressure of life, the ceaselessly resisted, but finally irresistible

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demands and interests of all society, its conflicts and its tensions, which ever and again shake the foundations of power? No wonder that society continually reawakens at such moments, attaches itself to them, receives them with great alertness, gets excited by them and seeks to exploit them! In almost every case, such tremors provoke hopes or fears of one kind or another, create—or seem to create—scope for the realization of life's various impulses and ambitions and accelerate all kinds of movements within society.

Yet, in almost every case, it is equally true that this situation, owing to the basically unnatural structure of the kind of confrontation with life which such shake-ups of power bring about, carries with it many and incalculable risks.

I shall try to illuminate further one such risk.

IF every day a man takes orders in silence from an incompetent superior, if every day he solemnly performs ritual acts which he privately finds ridiculous, if he unhesitatingly gives answers to questionnaires which are contrary to his real opinions and is prepared to deny his own self in public, if he sees no difficulty in feigning sympathy or even affection where, in fact, he feels only indifference or aversion, it still does not mean that he has entirely lost the use of one of the basic human senses, namely, the *sense of humiliation.*

On the contrary: even if they never speak of it, people have a very acute appreciation of the price they have paid for outward peace and quiet: the permanent *humiliation of their human dignity.* The less direct resistance they put up to it—comforting themselves by driving it from their mind and deceiving themselves with the thought that it is of no account, or else simply gritting their teeth—the deeper the experience etches itself into their emotional memory. The man who can resist humiliation can quickly forget it; but the man who can long tolerate it must long remember it. In actual fact, then, nothing remains forgotten. All the fear one has endured, the dissimulation one has been forced into, all the painful and degrading buffoonery, and, worst of all, perhaps, the feeling of displayed cowardice—all this settles and accumulates somewhere on the bottom of our social consciousness, quietly fermenting.

Clearly, this is no healthy situation. Left untreated, the abscesses suppurate; the pus cannot escape from the body and the malady spreads throughout the organism. The natural human emotion is denied the process of objectivization and instead, caged up over long periods in the emotional memory, is gradually deformed into a sick cramp, into a toxic substance not unlike the carbon monoxide produced by incomplete combustion.

No wonder, then, that when the crust cracks and the lava of life rolls out, there appear not only well-considered attempts to rectify old wrongs, not only searchings for truth and for reforms matching life's

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needs, but also symptoms of bilious hatred, vengeful wrath, and a kind of feverish desire for immediate compensation for all the endured degradation. (The impulsive and often wayward forms of this desire may also spring largely from a vague impression that the whole outbreak has come too late, at a time when it has lost its meaning, having no longer any immediate motive and so carrying no immediate risk, when it is actually just an *ersatz* for something that should have happened in quite a different context.)

No wonder, again, that the men in power, accustomed for years to absolute agreement, unanimous and unreserved support and a total unity of total pretence, are so shocked by the upsurge of suppressed feelings at such a moment that they feel exposed to such an unheard-of threat and, in this mood (assuming themselves to be the sole guarantors of the world's survival), detect such an unprecedented threat to the rest of the world, too, that they do not hesitate to call upon millions of foreign soldiers to save both themselves and the world.

We experienced one such explosion not long ago. Those who had spent years humiliating and insulting people and were then so shocked when those people tried to raise their own voices, now label the whole episode an " outbreak of passions." And what, pray, were the passions that broke out? Those who know what protracted and thorough-going humiliations had preceded the explosion, and who understand the psycho-social mechanics of the subsequent reaction to them should be more surprised at the relatively calm, objective and, indeed, loyal form which the " explosion " took. Yet, as everyone knows, we had to pay a cruel price for that " moment of truth."

The authorities in power today are profoundly different from those who ruled prior to that recent explosion. Not only because the latter were, so to speak, the " original " and their successors a mere formalized imitation, incapable of reflecting the extent to which the " original " had meanwhile lost its mystique, but primarily for another reason.

For whereas the earlier version rested on a genuine and not inconsiderable social basis derived from the trustful support accorded, though in declining measure, by one part of the population, and on the equally genuine and considerable attractiveness (which also gradually evaporated) of the social benefits it originally promised, today's regime rests solely on the ruling minority's instinct of self-preservation and on the fear of the ruled majority.

In these circumstances, it is hard to foresee all the feasible scenarios for an eventual future " moment of truth ": to foresee how such a complex and undisguised degradation of the whole of society might one day demand restitution. And it is quite impossible to estimate the scope and depth of the tragic consequences which such a moment might inflict, perhaps must inflict, on our two nations.

In this context, it is amazing that a government which advertises

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itself as the most scientific on record is unable to grasp the elementary rules of its own operations or to learn from its own past.

I have made it clear that I have no fear of life in Czechoslovakia coming to a halt, or of history being suspended for ever with the accession to power of the present leaders. Every situation in history and every epoch have been succeeded by a fresh situation and a new epoch, and for better or worse, the new ones have always been quite remote from the expectations of the organizers and rulers of the preceding period.

What I am afraid of is something else. The whole of this letter is concerned, in fact, with what I really fear—the pointlessly harsh and long-lasting consequences which the present violent abuses will have for our nations. I fear the price we are all bound to pay for the drastic suppression of history, the cruel and needless banishment of life into the underground of society and the depths of the human soul, the new compulsory " deferment " of every opportunity for society to live in anything like a natural way. And perhaps it is apparent from what I wrote a little way back that I am not only worried about our current payments in terms of everyday bitterness at the spoliation of society and human degradation, nor about the heavy tax we shall have to pay in the shape of a long-lasting spiritual and moral decline of society. I am also concerned with the scarcely calculable surcharge which may be imposed on us when the moment next arrives for life and history to demand their due.

The degree of responsibility a political leader bears for the condition of his country must always vary and, obviously, can never be absolute. He never rules alone, and so some portion of responsibility rests on those who surround him. No country exists in a vacuum, so its policies are in some way always influenced by those of other countries. Clearly the previous rulers always have much to answer for, since it was their policies which predetermined the present situation. The public, too, has much to answer for, both individually, through the daily personal decisions of each responsible human being which went to create the total state of affairs, or collectively, as a socio-historic whole, limited by circumstances and in its turn limiting those circumstances.

Despite these qualifications, which naturally apply in our current situation as in any other, your responsibility as a political leader is still a great one. You help to determine the climate in which we all have to live and can therefore directly influence the final size of the bill our society will be paying for today's process of " consolidation."

The Czechs and Slovaks, like any other nation, harbour within themselves simultaneously the most disparate potentialities. We have had, still have and will continue to have our heroes, and, equally, our informers and traitors. We are capable of unleashing our imagination

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and creativity, of raising spiritually and morally to unexpected heights, of fighting for the truth and sacrificing ourselves for others.

But it lies in us equally to succumb to total apathy, to take no interest in anything but our bellies and to spend our time tripping one another up. And though human souls are far from being mere pint-pots that anything can be poured into (note the arrogant implications of that dreadful phrase so frequent in official speeches, when it is complained that "we"—that is, "the government"—find that such and such ideas are "being instilled into people's heads"), it depends, nevertheless, very much on the leaders which of these contrary tendencies that slumber in society will be mobilized, which set of potentialities will be given the chance of fulfilment and which will be suppressed.

So far, it is the worst in us which is being systematically activated and enlarged—egotism, hypocrisy, indifference, cowardice, fear, resignation and the desire to escape every personal responsibility, regardless of the general consequences.

Yet even today's national leadership has the opportunity to influence society by its policies in such a way as to encourage not the worse side of us, but the better.

So far, you and your government have chosen the easy way out for yourselves, and the most dangerous road for society: the path of inner decay for the sake of outward appearances; of deadening life for the sake of increasing uniformity; or deepening the spiritual and moral crisis of our society, and ceaselessly degrading human dignity for the puny sake of protecting your own power.

Yet, even within the given limitations, you have the chance to do much towards at least a relative improvement of the situation. This might be a more strenuous and less gratifying way, whose benefits would not be immediately obvious and which would meet with resistance here and there. But in the light of our society's true interests and prospects, this way would be vastly the more meaningful one.

As a citizen of this country, I hereby request, openly and publicly, that you and the leading representatives of the present regime consider seriously the matters to which I have tried to draw your attention, that you assess in their light the degree of your historic responsibility and act accordingly.

Václav Havel
Writer

8 April 1975

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VIKTOR NEKRASOV was inadvertently omitted from our Contributors' page in the Winter-Spring 1975 issue of *Survey*, for which he wrote an introduction to Bukovsky's and Gluzman's *Manual on Psychiatry for Dissidents* and an Open Letter to Academician Snezhnevsky, of the Serbsky Institute. Nekrasov is the author of *In the Trenches of Stalingrad*, for which he received the Stalin Prize for Literature in 1946. In 1972, he was expelled from the Union of Soviet Writers for defending Solzhenitsyn and other dissidents. He left the Soviet Union in 1974 and now lives in France.

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

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